Box 59, Item 1894: Draft of On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out
Title
Box 59, Item 1894: Draft of On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out
Subject
Typescript (photocopy) draft. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'War and peace. 1: on the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out', Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, 5. Dept. of Philosophy, Australian National University.
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The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 59, Item 1894
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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l 89 - .r
1 NTRO!)UCT f 0N.
Vlrt· uc1l ly .11 1 t h e ph i1os ophi.c ;l1 lit cri'!ture on nur.le a r war ls wr i t te n from
;-1
SllfK·rpower (predomin an tly Amer i can) or e lse European (mainl.y German,
British or Fre nch) viewpoint.
This art:icle, a f ter connecting in initial
section s with Northern Catholic literatur e , adopts a very different Antipodean
s La nce . Such re gional per spective s , whil e t he should not affect
the morality
o [ t he mat t e r, ,ff , highly po1i ticaJly relevrmt.
eitlH_•t
t he phJ.lo so ph i ca l li tera tun~, c>spec ially t:ha t emanating from th e
als o
a i l s th e test of morality. lt is c oncerned only or primAr i ly with
what i s good o r "rati onal" or prudential f o r A.raer.i.cans,
or for the American
sl.ltc, t o do ~ whereas mora l ity is ind e pende n t o f place, race , natio na lity and
t ile li ke . This article tries t.o take the morality of the matter, and the
r es ult ing r ed is tribution of mora l and political obligations, seriously. It
c onc l ud es, amon g other things, that th e Ame r i can and Russian states have no
moral bu s ine ss putting nonaligned peoples at suc h grave risk as pre sent nuclear
ar r angemen ts involve.
Mtwh o f
U~A,
CUNTENTS AND OUTLINE: Itali ci sed heading s §3 - §8 indicate the ma i n
structure of the argument
Pag e No
§O.
Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wa rs, and new moral
l.
i ss llPS . L,1 rg e-sc nle (LSN) vs limited nuel ea r wars , the focus on the
f ormer , but the l mplic tions for the latter.
§1 . J_l5)w nuclea r wa rs differ from o t her wars; wars and Htates, and the
2::.9s ulti ng l imi ted appr~riateness of older models and theories of war.
War chc1rac t e ri sed. The e ss e ntial role of th e state. New and diff~r nt
featur es o f nucle ar wars.
2
0
§2 . The mora l si tuation: the recent: tendE:'n_c::L of moral consid e rations
-~-~~s_ome e_n t.i.re ly submerge d_ in_ the context o f war.
The nncl e nt d ist i nction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning
base on expe di enc y. Argume nts tha t war must be expediency-base d refuted.
Mor a l i ty dues nol have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency.
Uti lit ari a ni sm nnd expediency distinguish ed . Limits to consensus:
s upermen and s u pe rhawks. National Interest and expediency assimilated.
Li mits of st ate e n titlement.
§3 . The initial a rgum':nt to the immorality of LSN wars.
One ke y argume nt, from the wrongness of ki.lling noncombatants in mass, is
pr esen t ed, ass es sed, and criticisms met. Ar guments for the premisses of
the ke y argumen t elabo r ated.
§L1. Argum e nt s f r om historica] r equirement s on ,just wars: the important
a rgume nt from convergence, and env:l.ronment a_l ar~Ements_ .
Argume nts from just war requJrements: di sc rimination; proportionality ,
p r ospe ct of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral
positions. Arguments from enviro1nental principles.
§ 5. The shift t:o nuclear deterrence: nrgume nts to its immora~-~~·
De t e rre nc e seen a s the only prac tical way to satisfy major desiderata:
p re ve ntion of wa r: and maintenance of pruden t ial values. Pure deterrence
not t. he po H e y. De terr c nce ais prac t.! c (• d has i.ncreased the probability of
nuclea r war. Th e first argume nt to imruorHlity of deterrence, from the
pla u s ibi l i t y of probab-Ui.ty of Immorality. F11rther arguments through
<l ~u n t i c conn e ct.l.ng principl(~S : the probahl ll Ly l.inkage. Refuti.ng the
c ou n t e rargume nt from the succe ss of deterr ence . The way the onus of
1.
5
11
1 !•
17
Page No
!,ills on deterrence policy , 1.Jhi ·h cannot mt>et. evidcnlla J. requireThe second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious
prc'p.tralio n for nuclear war. The general form of connecting pri nc ipl es;
separating out t hose hat arc correct . Th e third connecting principle:
the wrongness of se rious threats of nuclear devastati.on . Criticism of
this principle lead s to further connecting principles, th rough i n te ntion
and through commitment. Meet i ng counterargumen ts from utilitarianism .
AppJying the connec ting prlncip1es to argue to the jmmoral:tty of
deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti -ut ilitarian
versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with de terrence .
piu,.,f
Till·lll H.
56. ~£0Ctical ,___pru<lcnU.al and more moral arguments from national
daugers Lo nuclear build-up of the ~upe r statc.s, and the genes i s . - of
nu c 1 t',ff di lemmas .
The tirgume nts from nucle,:-ir black.ma:!.l and foreign domination, and from
risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial arg ume11t from basic ri g ht s and
f11ncl;iml.'nl.al values. The argument from i solated people to superstate
iwnoral ity. The supers tat e theme, and rea&ons for its appeal . The much
less p0rsuasive de endcnt state theme. Ch:1llcnging the assumptions of
tllr> undt'rlying rc latiatory mode].
§7. The rcsulring nuclear di~emmas ·- fo r nligned states and their
_supporl e rs.
Ch,nc1ct. er ot the nuclear fix. Subsid iary di lemmas: natio na l securit y vs
37
43
fre edo m nnd democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features
of deontlc dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-bes t escape from the
nud.car fix . The nuclear fix a fix of s t ates' own making . Interconnection s
between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangeme nts.
§8. Wavs out of nuc lear dilemmas: initial political fall-out f rom th e
ethical res 1lts.
Tl1e inevit.c1bil i ty of limitation s on nat1onal sovereignt y. In terstate
and ex trastate approache s . The Way Up and th e Way Down of extrastate
approaches . Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case aga i.ns t it.
FaiJurc of internati onal agreement s) espe ci ally on human rights and
geno ci de. Excl11s ion of nuclear dete rrence und er the Genocid e Convention.
Need fur the reexam i na t i on of current political arrangements i mpo sed b y
the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated politi cal a r ra ngen.ents revealed by nuclear problems . Further arguments from the nucle a r
1 ix for polll lc:il reassessme nt. The we . k J i.nk: the sovereig n nationstatc. Forfeit11re of political obligation by many st~tes . Alternative
po 1 I. Lical arr;__ingcmen t s vs nuc lcar time hor 1.zons.
49
The rnultt-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main polit ica l
mea ns lle outside state governmenta l apparatus. Laying the s pectre of
ideo1ogicnl domination. Social restr uct u ring a nd devolution of powe r.
Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty
go. Dissolving the arguments f r om natiorrnl dangers. S .. a e r e si.stance to
loss of po wer . Further lines of o r ganised act ion agains t nuclear states.
Appendix 1: On
Scl1;!1l
t he fate of mankind and the ea r th, according to
and Anders.
Nuclear prophets a nd prophet .i c ru bb ish . The ext in ct ion assumption .
Common emerging themes of Sc-hell and Anders. The extravagant anthropocentric assumption , and some of wha t is wrong wi.th i t. Second death
dlsmlssed . The universal i ty of peril. The alleged universality of
responsibili t y : the Pogo theme . The correct, but undeveloped, whole
earth theme . Ultimately Schell offers little hope and s upe rf icialiqy.
Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of de t er renc e.
H
64
.1,t . . ..
Page No
~~~_cl_:!~~; On mat t ers of co lJective and individual rt'sp oirn:ibilit.y
a nd on regional strat egies.
Individual and state responsibi.J.ity. Opt-·ouL positions , and o.rguments
t.o Lhem. Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group co peration .
Arguments to direct obligations of individ1rnls to the nuclear
dissociation. Limitations of rival political ob l igati ons.
Dif f eren L pol ic y r e organi sati on for d:i ff 're n l regions. Shallm,•er and
deeper g a]s. Th e important opportunity for deepe r r eo rg.nnisution
afforde d by nuclear dilemmas. Ob.ligations of those in the Antipodes:
what i. s required, and justifi d . Soci a l and ec onomic reorganisation
in the An tipodes, and reducing costs i.nvolv1~d. Bloc kages to social
and po litical adjus tment.
iii
73
ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEA! WAR AN!)
NtlCLEAR
DETERRENCE
AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
Large -seal ~ nuclear wars raise cthlcal questions not generated,
~ Ll
o r n~ arly
HO
th11 n e of even t he larges
d if f0 r· c n c:' !n kln<l of war.
invo l ve,
and
threatened
sa id
to
so
differ
co nv entiona l wars ( t he World Wars ) as to yield a
CertFdnly ma s sive
PX
hAnges
Gt1ch
as
nuc.le:ir
wars
exchanges such a s nuc lear deterrence presupposes , ar e
neither envisaced nor fully accommodate d by tr·d ltional theories of
Muc h
at
forcefully, by previo us human mili tar y cncounters. 1 This is at
bottom because of their projected effect . , which are often
f r om
eit her
just
wars.
new philosophic al reflection and inveRtigatio n is required, even if r a ther
wel l -t est d and old-fashion ed moral princip l es will
se rv e
as
initial
ethical
ba se.
Al though nuclear wars are, thus
non ex i s tent
(extrapolat e
va r ie tiea,
objects,
1
nuclear
wa rs
from n very limited
Ia
fnr, only a decidedly
menac1.ng
class
of
proper have several distinctive properties
nu .lear
experlence 2 )
and
come
in
several
particular, confined or limited nuclear war s, of which tactical
or st rat eg ic ar c subvarietie s, contrast witl1 lirge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars)
- - - ------- ---- -1,
The US Catholic Bi shops i n t heir Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point
forc e fully:
'Nuclear weapons •.. and nuclear warfare ••• are new moral
issu s . •. The re exists a capacity to do something no other age could
ima g ine:
we can threaten the created ord 1· • • • We could des roy [God ' s]
work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows
has a great deal .i n common with the Bishop ' s position, it differs
significant ly in removing the religious backdrop and associated fe a tures
and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument
more clearly and sharply. To illust ra t e the differences tha t emerge with
removal of the religious backdrop ~nd its the associated unity-of-ev il
theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL, p.323:- First l y,
peace is possible without religious enligh t enment if it is possible wit h
it: religious enlightenme nt is not an essential c ondition as there
implied . Secondly, violence does no take all the forms the Bishops tr y to
give it , e .g.
sexual discriminat ion is hardly a form of violence,
pornography an aper tc without it , etc. It ia a serious m stok e to try to
heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading
(forms or violence) along wi.th war aa if t hey stood and fell together, e.g.
abortion and nuclear war.
Note tha t referencing , ·where not through an au thor's name, :ls by way of
acronym explained in the references at the end.
2.
an
The isolal ed, and unnece sary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very
end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear
wars proper will he very different and v ry nmeh mo re horrifying.
Nuclear
wars proper, though elements of uncomfortab ly adjacent possible wor l ds,
ought therefore to be onfined t o merely possible worlds. Enough of their
features we can appreciate without their being brought to act~ality.
111hicl. r1c'ed not howe ver. be unlimited 3 •
explosio n
A large-sca le nuclear
involv es
war
of l arge quantitie s of nucl ear devices ove r a sizeable region;
a [unction of two main parameter s:
distr i bution.
Such
strnt.egic ) nuclear
quant l t leo
of
a
war
war
quantity
diffe rs
which
explosivc n,
ts
markedly
limited,
nnd
(megatonn age
wh ere
from
by
the
a
of
t:,Hget.s
it i s
ex plosive)
limited
assumptio n,
the
to
and
(tactical
much
or
smaller
chnr.uctcr i Rtic ,111.y
arc
cl rcumscr ibed, f or instance confined in pr i ncip l e to military inst al l ations in
a
given
reg ion.
Though
t he
focus
in
what follows is upon I.SN wars and th eir
prev e nti.on, limLted nuclear wars are by no
nucl.car
arsenal
means
a
separate
st r ike 1
s ince
a
is a prereq utsite, an d th e probabil ities of escalatio n of suc l1
waxs to LS N wars arc high (given usual reasonabl e aosumptio ns
second
iss ue ,
et c. ).
4
Because
of
these
of
follow -up
or
connecti ons, much of the ca se made
acainst LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as wi l l become evid ent .
How nuclear wars
reHultlng
d-Lffer
from
oth er
war s:
wars and states and th e
-- ---------- - -- - --
llmltcd appropria teness of old er modelY and theories of war.
of war that has dominated mucl1 thinking, including strategi c
two
party
(or
thinking,
A model
is
th e
severa l person) game or, as a complicat ion of that, th e clan or
trib e bat tle ~.
A picture of
war
thu s
refle c tion
r e quirement s
for
legitimat e and just wa rs, which technolog ical
on
advances have
trad iti ona l
now
theo ry
ender ed
of
war,
emerg ed,
inapprop riate
ha rdly
and
especiall y
sometimes
surprisin gly,
as
a
result
inapplica ble.
of
The
made no allowance for such
J.
Another dimension of varia tion concerns the sequence of the war, es pe cially
the type of strike :lnvolved.
Though the sequence is j_mportant for the
mo r al ass es smen t , for example of th e ma in actors , it in no way alters the
immorali ty of LS N wars, as will emerge.
4.
'T he overwhelm in pro babi li.ty [.is1 that a nucl e ar exchange would have no
limits ' (PL, p.31 !+). He nce am, Jor org ument. against limited nuclear wars:
t hat any such war risks , inde ed renders highly probable, an unlimited war,
and the ris k is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by
s Lrai g htforwanl a ppli a_tio n of decislon theory, multi.plyi ng the mass lv e
undesira bi lit y (mora l and ot h ~rw ise ) of n LSN war by 'ts probabill ty gi ven
a limited nuclear war.-Giv en th e character of weapons developme nt and
present communica tion ar.rangem ents, the id e a of a highly circumscr ibed
purel y nuclea r exchange between the s upe rpower s , perhaps in the European
"theatre'' , is really a myth.
5.
There was a substanti al element of sport (and connec ted features of
prowess) in t radi tional wars tha t bas been eroded in modern t echnologi cal
wars. Nuc lear wars may be not just un s po r ting , in that no notice is given,
etc. , t hey a re also remote and impersona l, and different ly unjust, in a
mu h deeper wa y,
j
phenomena ns mass bomb.lng o f lar.ge citJes, such a s
Tokyo.
rn1clear bomb.fng , wi.th
And
j t.'
many
occurred
wi.th
Dre s d e n
and
further crucial effects be yond mass
bombJng, adds furthe r new d imens ions .
Ycl lt is impor t a nt for tic argument
1Jnchors,
Lo
historica l
were
accounted
unjust
war l s essential ly a ma tter of states and their control:
the Oxford Eng l is h Dictionar y acc ount, w~..!::_ is 'hos t .ile contentio n
ar1ncd
'war'
of
content io n
or
comba t;
cxct1i1nge is the actual e xp<irience .
but
other
are not literal, but transferr ed, metaphor ic, etc. 8
proLagon ists, antag onists or players;
means
and
or
wrong.
to elabo rate
by
means
of
forces, car ried on betwe en nations, states , or rulers, or between part i es
in t he same nation or state' for control of the state7 ;
noun
linkages
G
to be awa re of what counted as war (the :emantice of the matter),
and
of wh Pn , 2nd why, w;-1rs an<l military ac tions
Firstly ,
r e tain
always
a
f nction
of
sens es
of
the
States are the
forces c omprising armed soldiers are
the
a nd comba t or forceful and typically viol_ent
Thus wars ar _ external or internal
states or their rule.
(c.ivi.l),
Thus too wars have grown in
quantity and fr eque ncy as states hav e expanded , wars have changed as states have
transform ~d,
and
nuclear
war
has
emerged
with
nuclear states.
lhf,on°tic al way then to eliminate wars is t o remove states :
6.
An obvious
:i.n short, wars
ar e
There arc interes ting si delights concernin g eve n the etymology of the term
1
war' , wh ich wa s deri ved from a term meaning 'confusio n ' . In particula r,
'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times ha d
in living use any word pro pe r ly meani ng 'war'': Oxford English Dictiona rt
( OED) o n wa r,
7.
But of co urse there can be something quite a nalogous to war waged between
clans , gangs, multinati onal firms, even against Nature , and still more
me taphorica lly against poverty, etc. To this extent , a strict definitio n
of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structure s
the argumen t will direct us to, has to ex t end beyond just the brea k-down of
nation--s tates.
8.
Tn to thls category (si.n ce Natu re i s no naU.on) falls the ubiquitou s and
unwa rranted war against Nature of modern times , wh ic h features just as
large in Marxism as in capitalism . As could have be en guessed , someone
.t was James - suggest ed channelli ng all war into "war'' in the me taphorica l
sens e agai.nst that unarmed and nonaggres sive "opponen t'', Natur e.
James
proposed a s a substitut e for war proper, conscripU .on of the youth for a
wa r again st Nature (see Wasserstr om, p.12).
What it boiled down to,
howev er , was that youth -was to be c hannelled into all the dirty work, in
that way to acqui r e manly virtu.s mil i tary ac.tivit.ie s "rightly" i.nstil,
especia lly discipline ;---but also service, devotion, physical fitness,
con struc tive exertion, responsi bility, and order. Another less diabolica l
sub st it ute for wars p r oper (in America n ecoropian literatur e) is through
wnr gam es and other game s of competit i ve cast.
Again specious arguments
enter for t hose bringing- out the "best" in human males, etc .
.:1n uut
,~01•1p
of ro llt:ica l :.ind asso ci ated t cclmoJ .ogJ--n l st ru cture,
and are
nltcr i ng
by
the
s tructu r e.
Wars
j _Lu a t
from
c an thu s be seen as a struct ural problem of
(other wi se
defect ive)
politi ca l organ isatio n of states ;
they are a
ional fix , n struct ural malfor mation .
helps
wa r
arise
War
Thls seman t.ically based pictur e
of
exp.la in why th e rad ical a rgumen t agains t nuclea r wars and
deterr ence
d t: vo lves into an
war-m akers ,
argume nt
agains t
aga.in st
states .
In
the
fact
( s<'1 f-legit i.mise d)
on
the
war-d eclare rs
and
tradit ional theory , wars wer e
r estric ted to extern al wars, which were coni:;tr u ed as
t heir
r emoved
t1 e
right
of
r ulers (p ri nces) to conduc t for certai n politi cal purpos es;
states
or
the argume nt
was that priva t e person s with grieva nces had access to the
c our ts 9, while states
did
not ( wa r s w_re, so to speak, the intern a ti.onal analog ue of
th e law courts ).
But this is itself a very sta tist conce pti on of th• legitim
at e
place
of
wars;
ll1c• scmiJn tica i s not so rest.r .i ctive and permtt s intern a
l wars with i.n i; t ate s, for
examp le t.o end wars, injust ice, etc.
Let. us
a
h OW\ ) V1_. r
to brlng out what is differ ent now - confin e att e nt1on
-
basic and moat famili ar cas e, extern al wa rs hetwe n two s
tates or sets (axes)
of st a t. es , two-pl a yer ex t cr n;il wars.
·ompr litive
game s,
could
be
won.
attent uated form for some "victo rs")
Lhc World vfars.
strate gy.
surrou nding
trad i tional ly
firstl y
for
mass ive
armed
wa rs,
Like
exchan ges
such
as
th •re may well be no winnin g
in
ar e as
the
of
No r thern
very
hemisp here
countr yside.
Thus,
and
the
second ly,
for
laying
the
was te
_£Dint
of
of
substa ntially
substa ntiall y
oblite rated 10 ,
(cxe rcl sed
and
most
as
nothin g
all
worse off than at the outset of the "play" .
are
huge
war
seen, to settle seriou s inters tate disput es , is remove d:
a nothe r point of diff e rcn ~e , the phenom enon of wars that
prepar ed
that:
That assum ption still held good ~hough in
Wj th LSN wars it no longer holds;
is settle d with main protag onists
player s
It war; assume d
An LS N war could involv e destru c t ion of all main Wester n
metro polita n
agglom e ra tio ns
9.
to
main
Hence
elabor ately
f0r , etc,), but which can never be pointf ully fought ;
Thus Aquina s a nd Grotiu s for examp le (see Ba rnes , p
. 776, top).
The
argume nt
presup poses rather a lo t , includ ing a neat public /priva
te
dis t inctio n . Put Aquin as's way,
it looks as if it could be readil y
t r .-:m sf erred into an argume nt for intern atio·n al govern
ment, or at least
effect ive law-co urt s , Yet all Christe ndom was suppos ed a
t that time to be
one state!
5
hence t he ineviL Bl>Je emphasis on .l:..l!.E.~- deterrenc e.
.:uid
ot her
Lhf'
e lements o f gamesmen ship ha d a role in earlier wars, but it was
not pu re de t e rr e nc e .
to
mil i tary
Certainly , deterrenc e, bluff,
Lastly, tradition al wars could be confined in
tar gets
r egn rd s ju s t wa r s ;
and
military
e xchanges.
principle 11
This feature iG fundnnent al as
for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross
uni nvolved par t ie s sac rifice any pretensio n to morality.
ways
to
The special effects of
nu -lea r exp lo s i •cs , e s pecially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear
canno t
w3rs
be
legitimat e ly
confined.
l1orrify lng det a i l i n popu l a r so 1rce s
uz0ne
<lestr uc ti on,
s hockwav es,
suc h
effe cts
gign nt l c fum i gat i on s
§2.
a nd
th e
e nti re l y
rapid
••.
speed
special effects (presente d in
Schell)
include
radioacti vity,
pu lses, fireball or firestorm
e tc., etc.
As a result
of
these
of exchange, LSN wars will resembl e
mor e than they re semble old e r - style war:s.
The mora l s ituation:
be c ome
as
el ec troma gnet1 c
<lcv .,su1t .i o11, rog ue bac t e r in ;.rnd viru se s,
com pounded
Th e se
the
r ecent
tend e ncy
submerged in the context of war.
of
moral
considera tions
to
It is particula rly important
i n t he ca se of war to mainta in a firm grasp on the ancient
distinctio n
mo r a lity
or local or nat :l. onal
and ~ ..e5:..diency.
What is done in war, especiall y
between
advant a ge, may be very diff e r ent from what ought morally to be done, whether the
l ') .
There is however the degen e rate idea of war as i.nvolving annihilat ion or
extinctio n, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilat ion of the enemy whil e
no t be i ng e ntirely annl.hilat ed oneself: the side that somehow "survlves "
suff ic iently to r ebuild is said to "win".
But this is, at best, an
extremely t e nuous sense of winning , wl1ich in any case neglects the medical
ev idence conce rning nuclear destructi on.
Recen t t alk a bout winning or even s urviving a nuclear war must
reflect a failure to appre ciate a medical reality: Any nuclear
war would inevitabl y cause death, disease and suffering of
pa nde~onic proportio ns and without the possibili ty of effective
me d ical int e rvention
(PL, p.313).
Mo reov e r an y such phoenix war is r adically unjust, because of violat ion cf
the tr adit i onal requireme nt of pro portional ity, and for other reasons
de veloped in the tex~.
Unf o rtunat e ly as doc umented ir Sch ee r, significa nt off i cials who are
resp o nsibl e for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of t he world t hink that the devast a tion o nuc l ear war an be survived by Americans and
t hat a gl oba l nucl e2 r war can actua lly be "won"! They re ly , among other
things, on a n incredibl y low , and unaccepta ble, redefinit ion of "winning" .
11.
In prac t i ce they often were not, they drained limited economies , they layed
wa s te countr yside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or
c hemic al wa rf Rre or mod er n min i ng), im poverishi ng inhabit·n ts, etc.
l all('.l" f u determ in e d usi ng the cod es :ind conv en l:lotH'
Much
t.h at
oug h t
war ,
of
or
othenlis e 12,
not t o be do 1c i n wa r is do ne, for one (alleged) advantage or
anothr·r, desplte modern m:i l tt ar y cod es a n d co nv ent i ons ani the like .
we
liv e
not
go
in
a rat her bar barous age :
unremarke d,
if
the
th e horrors of the twentieth century will
history
Furt.l1c1inore rn Ll tta ry t h i nki n g a nd
ge t s
writt e n
as
wi pi ng
moves :
based
on
"stra t e gy"
disad van t ages ,
of
mor a lly
excluded
actions,
·a J.culaU o ns.
charncterist i ca---1J:x
its
is.
that
rur al populations, be come real 1o ss ib i liti e s, included in
o t
con,w<ptr·n ti nli.sr
d0.Lcrmi nes
(accurately)
str ate gtc pl an n ing tend (.1s Nagel ex plains) t o
induce a ce r ta i n mo ral numbing, so th a t a r ang e
such
Hllitarily
its
e xp<'di e n cy .
by
gains
own
i.t _o u~ !:_, morally,
cons i d e r i n g
and
Eac h
side
only
lo s 8e s a s
a
in a military encounter
own
its
advantages
and
r e sult. of alterna tJve possible
to consider those of the other side( s) as
well.
In
t h is way stra t eg ic planning di s places morality .
I nd eed l t ha s been contended that wa r should be planned and conducted
wa y,
a
no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without
l i mit s , moral or other (except insofar a s technology limits the means of
eLc.) .
Such
t he
class lcal
through
"bald
an
inc r emental
a
distinct
nrgumen t
tc.tt1s .
g
a r gument
from
an
t ha t
th e
It
would
And
(bu t
The
externally
wil l be broken by each pl a yer in turn for advantag e .
ext r aordi na r i l y na rrow motivat1ona l bas e i s assumed.
the
of
li mit)
escalation
man" f a llac yi 3), t hat there can be no limit.
assum p tion is t hat a ny merely s e lected limit (as
enforced
force,
Js the so-called "classic " view of Clausewicz, oft: repeated.
Cl ause wicz Lr ics to argue,
reall y
this
Thus t oo
follow
from
i d ea of a limited wa r is some so r t of contradiction i n
nut i t i. s not, though breaking off i n the he at of war, or the
s upposedl y l imited nucle a r exchange, may be s ingularly impr obable .
c onfusion
Nuclear
12.
For a s Nage l c ontend s (early on), there are moral restr ic tions on the
c onduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither
a r bit r a ry no merely conventional, nor a mat t e r of usefulness.
These
t li cn1<•s
run er Lindy co11n t •r Lo the. cll.llrn :l.c t heory of war of Clnuscwic z - n
th e ory outlin ed In Walz e r.
13.
As one l e s s hair does not, at any stage, dis t inguish a bald man from a
hirsute ma n, there a r , starting from the hirsute end, no ba ld men. Th e
prog~e ssiv e escalation ar.gument concerning war is an inc remental ar gument
Jike
the t e chnic a l Sorites syJlo gisms , formalising the type of fallaciou s
a r g ume n t which shows that one more straw never makes a heap.
Th e
fn l l;i.cio us e scalation argument 'i. s pa rt of the so-called "logi.c of war ", f or
more on whJch see the conclusion of Appendtx 1..
i'
war s thus appear dec i dedl y Cla usewiczj_ a n .
for
the
l
anc,
r or
players
Still the !irgument
is
inc onclu s ive;
can choose, at leafJ t J n sma ll er calmer wars, not t o e scnlate,
examplt!, agree to abide b y arranged practlccs , t y pes of we a pons, etc. l· 4
A s t 11tc engaged in war se ld om sees i t self a s e ntirely bound by
of
mo ·al i t y:
lt i s t ake n to be me r e prude nce on t he pa r t o f those attacked to
take account of the no-imr oral- holds-ban:-e d appr oa ch t h e y
c<;p,~, f,11 ly
t lw
1
constraint s
from the ot her s'ido.
11w~Liou not onl y
as
to
ma y
well
enc ount e r,
So 0a , h g1·oup po t e n t i a 1l y e ngn g cd in war f;1cps
it
wlw t
o u g ht
to
do
in
mor a lly
permi ss ibl e
si. lu<1tlons , but al s o both wha t i t ou g h~_ r ea l ly do, a nd wh a t it can morally do in
the morally flawed situati on s it finds i t s e lf.
But the last question do e s
not,
in tli,1L cnsc•, r e d uce t o o ne of ex pe di e nc y .
There i s no que st ion, then, of moral i t y giving or having
0:x.pe<.lienc y,
even
under
extreme
to
give
way
to
circumst a nc e s such as the prospect of LSN war
involves .
Fo r it i s not as if s haky con Ri de r a tions of
give
to the f i rm ground of exped iency when t he c hips are down, since often
way
morality
eno1gh such mora l ero s ion does not occ ur in c risis s ituations.
t hcorc~ical
fac t
is
that
both
deliver
f r om
us
But the
the
vnlue
the o q'.: .
to
Expedlency
fact,
but
urg('s ,
tba t
does
foreign
takes
local va l.ue s - o f sel f , family, clan, class, or nation - ar e
conside rat i on s .
proper charact risa t i on , a
remote
By cont r ast, mo rality requires, as a matter of its
much
univ• r sa lizable
mor e
univ e rsal
pr inciples .
rePultan t
i1,tersu bstlt uti vit y
fairness,
eq u ita billty and
of
value
and,
And morality thereby imposes, through
principl e s,
jus t ice.
distributio n
c ertain
requ i rements
of
general
Ex pe di e ncy yields an unfair , inequitable
value system, one tha t subscribe rs would not a dh e re to if differe n tly
Ttie
no t
It assumes, or
what really coun t, and ov e rride or are t o be max imized at the expe ns e of
or
to
cruci al
simply
narrowl.y-co nstr;.icd l oca l a dv anta ge or powe r a s wha t i s valuable .
even
bound
moral i ty a nd expe dien c y fall within the same,
eq 1:. 'J l y f~lrnky or equally sol ! d , doma tn_ of v al ue
miraculousl y
are
placed
1 :.,
.
Jeep thcorcL ical u1 s ati sfact orinc ss of ex pedi e ncy, and associa t ed strategic
Lhinldne , n l so Jer lv ci; from Lh i s faU. ur e
of
·va l untioi1~:;
pe r so ns X and Y are interchange d under
14.
11nd r es ults not ho ld -f ng whe1
i nt e rr e pla cement,
from
the
same
As Wa l zer a r gue s, p. 24. An histori cal ex ample i s the era of ge nu inely
I imi t cd w:1 rs l n Europe fo ll owi ng t he hilrba rl s m o f th e Thirty Years war.
B
.
expr d 1e1cy
assessm ents 16 •
ic
c~ n
For expedie ncy loes not elude
deontic
presen tation:
be pr er;ented as through such popul a r slogans as "local might i.s right",
or ft lvcn tight formal
rest•mb le
charac terisat ion .
The
charac terisat ion
will
normal ly
that o[ utilita rianism , except Lhat util i tic . are only assigne d to,
or
arc bi asse d in favo ur of, certnin indivld u~ds.
Howeve r, theorie s of ut.llity
~ol have to he posi tions of expedie ncy if utility is 11ot locally confi
ned.
util llariun ism prope r is not to be dismiss ed as
cnn
Thus
onside ring only expedie ncy;
intcrsu bstitut iv:i. y rc'quire ments of morali ty ;
meet
do
it
Lt does not, unlike the
me hods of war game theory, assign differe nt weights to the
individ ual
uti.lity
of ( ce rtnin) Americ ans, as opposed to Russi ans , say.
There
are
dc•ont.o .logis ts
r egardin g war
mora ll y
howeve r
signlfic a11t
e.speci ally,
17
•
which
differe nces,
between
utilita rians
serve to further compli cate the moral pie t u re
In particu lar , utilita rian approac hes have
permis sible,
or
to
seemed
to
effect
some
to
rend er
justify , ugly strateg i es and practic es as regards
~nemy civi. lians, that deonto logical princ iples wo uld not
permit.
already
and
partisa nship ,
since
utilita rians
But
this
is
would
reject the
descrip tion of pr.ctic es permitt ed under thei r princip les as 'ugly';
wherea s an
a im
in
what
follows
is
to
avoid
meta-e thical
me ta-ethi cal neutra lity, though of course not
there
is
a
neutra lity.
to
achieve
And
morally
large area of consen sus, or at least moral converg ence, from which
ar gumt'n l ,an bt'gtn.
S('Vcr al
moral
partisa nship,
VJ.rtua ily all positio n s
grc•
that
the
obltter ation
of
major ci ties ln a LSN war. would be wrong, indeed morally outrage ous.
If
tltere is diss e nsion, as there may be among nuclea r stra tegists
who seem to
feel
no qur.Jms when lt. comes to trading loss of some Americ an cities for
some Rus si a n
ones, s imply increas e the costs
involve d,
up
to
loss
of
whole
nations
if
l.5.
The severe limitat ions of t:hoBe l esse r ''virtue s ",
nationa lism
and
pAlriot isrn, also come from the failure of replace men t which
exces siv e
applica tions of nationa lism easily engend er. Try for example swappi
ng a
person from inside the homelan d with one from outs i de as regards
treatme nt.
The point of, and reaso·n s for , intersu bs t itutivi ty as a require
ment of
morali ty, is well explain ed in Har e , p.78ff. Hare applies the require
ment
to make a telling case agains t nEtion ali sm (a case which exte
nds to
strat eg ic decisio n-theo ry).
Nation alism, al ong with fanatic ism, is the
main cause of war, so Hare conten ds, p . 72.
16.
The case aga inst expedie ncy was develop ed in detail
especi ally the critici sm of Thrasym achus in The Republ ic .
17.
Thus the differe nces between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and
Hare
the other, i.n Collen et al.
by
Pl ato ;
see
on
:iccesi:iary , unti.l moral repugnanc e :fs
Tile
ncounlere d;
_!: hen try to work down
again.
fact remains howe ver that Jn the nuclear area things have got substanti ally
oul of perspecti ve, morally.
abandon
or
Strategic thinking, i n particula r, has
tended
to
suppress moral considera tions ( as indeed theories of the state also
do, somet imes flamboyan tly, in favour of partisan values).
Naturally Lhe fact of broad consensus as to the morality of th e matter does
not
m ·an that there are none who would welcome such outrageou s happening s, that
to t al nu clear destructio n of the North even, would be
Cons id er
t he
w11rld ,·inpl r1•.
be
so thern
risi.ng
(hemisphe re)
no
one's
advant3ge .
strongman , SS, who has v :lsions of
Wlillo l.lH' t,uperpowt• rn of lli<' no ·t. h rcm:i in, SS ' 1.1 dnwm ·a n
realised.
Thus
his
best
strategy,
having
rid
s ubmarines and ·outhern lands of US bases, is to try
nil lear
to
exchange
in
the
North,
There
would
southern
to
be
waters
encourage
a
hardly
an
of US
all - out
point then in securing
institutio nal arra ng emen ts so that potential SS's do not accum ulate much
espe . ially
given
the
apparent instabi lity of crucial world arrangeme nts.
tlrnt is to nnt1eipnt e:
lhc present point :1.
has
and
tts
power,
limitatio ns,
is
an
thnt ( t he fnct of) moral
inadequat e
But
conse nsus
const r aint without accompany ing
struct ural adjus tments.
For , typJrnlly ,
<lifferc11 tly
to
nationa l
impose
interest
ls
taken
hosta ges
or
override
morality,
e ven
holding
civilian
populatio ns
kill:lng m111.lons in the national :i.nterest 18 ).
unfortuna tely, these assumptio ns are not confined to more totalitar ian
such
as
of those
those of Eastern Europe.
things.
substitut ion
of
jus tificatio n;
fails
in
The
first,
expedienc y
,
.
C.!.BSSC,S
And,
regimes,
But morally national interest can do neither
the
overridin g
for
morality ,
of
morality,
which
the second, the alleged mor a l dominance of
:important
or
irresi stibl e ethic a l claims t ha t dominate mo r e ordinary
cthicnl considera tions (such as those conc er ni g
nuclear
to
is
entirely
national
simply
lacks
the
mo r al
interests ,
of cases, including , so the argument wi.11 go, the
case of LSN war.
18 .
As Sche ll blun l:ly puts it, 'What io being cl.aj_med is that one or two
countries have the right to jeopardis e all countries and their descenden ts
in the name of certain bel iefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it
leaves room for ambiguity , since the belie fs may be morally grounded rat her
than based on national interests .
Stales may i ns i st upon opera ting one self ish national interest basis ,
Ii:!.
It
nol
be
pretended
expcJ i<"ncy (na me l y ,
that
tha t
of
it
i.s
"group
but
n montl basi, as distJnct from one of
ego1 sm " ).
There
no
1s
special
moral
d.ispensa ll on
fo r governments.
j ndiv iduals :
ther e ia no loe;i.cal diffe ' nee .ln the patter1 of jus ti fi.cation, or
analys is of obligation.
Morality works :ln the same way for groups as for
For e xample , what ought to be as regards Xis (analy~ed
semant i cally) what would happen as reg a rd s X in all ideal worlds;
no
di ff e r e nce
organisation.
extenuating
killers:
whether
X
is
an · individual
States such as Israel (in i ts recent invasion
reaso ns
aside,
be having
just
as
beeu
conce ded , special moral dispensations;
more Lhan tha.t and do not sta nd up to crit.i.cism.
cannot
immorally
makes
system, grou p or
of
Lebano n)
are,
as brigands or mass
there is no moral difference.
Certainly t here are gro unds on which states
or
individual
or
and it
f11rnish
two
(incompatibl e)
their a gents
01:
have
claimed ,
but the excuses offered are no
A
moralities ,
a
s atis factory
state
moral
theory
or public one and a
private or individual ci tiz en one - state expediency Rnd individual
morality
becaur;e thi s would lead t o violations of sub st itutlvity , neutrality, etc. 1 '3
ins t ance , a state ope ra ti e X could us e s tate
mor~lJy impermi ssi ble ways, ways ruled
Y are permuted .
special
01 1t
cover
(e.g.
to
considerati.ons
citizen
Y
in
by state interests) when X and
A group or organisation or pe rson can be
der iv ati ve
damage
For
bound
of
course
by
in virtue of role, but these are der ivative
prin c iples - good for any such 1nstitution - which fit within and answer back to
general
moral principles.
So it is also with a state which is an institutional
arrangement justlfied ( i nsofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some
least)
of
its
citizens:
its
charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly
1orR l principles which convenien tl y coincide with those of state expediency .
particular,
a
sta te is not
1 morally)
survivrd .
In
entitled to risk the lives of many of its
own citizens and of other p~oplcs and creatures for its own ends, even
ow n
( at
for
its
Thus it is not entJ.t led to do what both nuclear war and nuclear
de terre n ce r equ l re, as will emerge.
19 .
There a n ~ also othc•r arguments agai nst two (or
see Routley a nd Plumwood.
multiple)
morality
Lines:
11
!-: ' )
'j.J.
The i_ni t i<d argument
p:1cifli;m
yield
arguments
to
the
tmmora1 lt.1_
of _ LSN
wars.
to
tb e
1mmora1it.y
of war.
But 1wch a rgum ents ;ire
controversi a l in an area where th ere is no
go od
r·ason
to
Argumen ts
be
for
controve rsial.
Pacifism can accordingly be se t aside as a spec i a l case, stnce the immorality of
LSN
wars follows .
All but pacif is t positions concede that war in itsel f is not a c rime.
nil
wars are immo ral, though eve n inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior
ways of settling po litlcal issues between states .
wa r s
who
Not
are
Among more or l es s admissible
th e inte rna tiona l " tourname n ts '' of arlstocrat ic young men or warriors
volu11l'cer
:w
Ho ldlers
nnd
whos<'
actfon
does
no t
6pi.ll
ov er
on to
noncombar.an ts , a nd some early a nd medievvL wars , wh ere few or evet no combatants
were kjl.led in war.
conscrip tlon,
Since the esta bl i shme nt
press-gangs
and
recruitment
of
such
of
the
lHrgely ceased to take these less offe nsive for ms;
induction
prac tices
as
near-d es titute, wars hav e
modern massive war s are
far
removed from the ideal war-tourn ament typ es (which fea ture now only in ecotopian
por traya l s, in ways that are in creasingly dub ious ).
imrnornl,
Most
s orts
of
wars
are
because of what is done to the essentially un5_nvolved, but few to such
a n exte nt as LS N war s .
The first argument to th e
immorality
of
LSN
wars
and
of
sufficientl y
larg e-sca l e wars ge neral ly, takes the following form:
Pl.
The (deliberate ) killing in mass of noncombatan ts is wrong.
P2.
LS N wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatan ts.
P3.
Wha t inv olv es wha t Is wrong is wrong .
( KA)
LSN wnrs ar• wrong.
The parttcular a rgument g lven i s ju st one r epresenta tive of a set
of
Lhis
type.
the
(KA )
t·cpL1ccs
But the
qu1. te
'kl.11:!.ng
su ff i c l en tly
11v :i.l.
crcH tu res' .
Thu s
t n ma ss o f noncombatan ts' by a
cl~rnse concerning 'huge des truct-lon of 11.f esty l e of uninvolved or
i. nvolvecl
f ocus
can
destructio n cf li.festyle of nonhumans and humans
fJJ i k(~ Ll w t :in L'., N war wJ 11 brf ng l a
on
arguments
Cha racte ri sti cally, in Western culture, it is thought that mass
kl l Ling of h11m<1ns ls a bout the worst th i ng that can happen.
vadu tlo n
of
not
ll
fir s t
uitable
directly
Other vuriatlons will emerge in the di.scussi.on (i.ncluding
th at: where the bracketed 'de.liberate' figures ) .
The argumenL Js valid,
,1L t a .kcd)
on
the
basi :3
but
of
may
each
be
attacked
( and
of its p1·emisses.
has
in
ef fe ct
been
Let us consider these in
reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves
11
what
is wrong" is -wrong, has been c hallenged on r:1ther Scholastic grounds. There are,
in partic ular. problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments,
purport
o shot.J tha t some proper obligations involve wrongdoing.
as~~lst.i.ng :rn in jured robbed per son is said
robbed;
but, s ince the ro bbin g is wrong,
to
"involve."
providing
For
which
instance,
that person ' s
assistance
belng
is also wrong.
But thes e pr oblems derive from too slack a not1on of i.nvolvement; w:i:th a tighter
accoun t of invo lvement th e problems disappear and P3 stands . 20
As aga inst P2, it may
legitimately
directed
be
argued
against
that
mi lit ary
nuclear
targets.
wars
can
be
encounters
But given the character of
nuc lear wea pon s, LSN war s could in no way be co nfined to such targets.
net
merely
the likelihood that many missiles ex plode off target, ther e are all
the ot:he r eff ects of large-scale nuclear. bombings.
fnlloul
There i s
down-wlnd
from
military
pcopJc, es pecial Ly in the cas e of
uninvo.lved co u11 t rl cs aucl
tnrgcts
US
and
For example, t he radioactive
will affect large conc entratio ns o(
European
t argets ,
and
may
affe ct
as Conn <l o.
There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties
by
appeal
cffcrl ) 2 1.
t o s uch dubious pri nciples as the doctri ne of double effect (or side
If missiles wer e c haracte ristically
r.eliAbly
on
target,
and
one
20.
The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of
obl igat ion over entailment " pd.nciple ,, can be removed by a ti.ghter
involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment.
For
de t a il s s ec Routley nnd Plumwood, where Good Snmar.i tan problems arc
diagn osed.
21.
According t o the doctrine , which is one concerni ng responsibility, we are
rcs ponsJblc
only
for the intended e ffects or consequenc ~s of our
freely-c hos e n actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences,
even U
these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended
conseq uences .
Unless carefully hedg ed, the doctrine is
pernicious ,
a llowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility
for evi l th e y knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme
comma nd which intended only to take out US military targets would, under
double effect , have no responsi bil ity for the resultant effect on American
and Canadian cities!
Taking the i ssues concerning do ub le effect to a more
satisfactory
conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly
dis tingui s hed acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions .
whicl1 was
intend ed
unfort unatel y
only
went
off
to
destro y
an
unma1H1<HI
und e r g round
Such claims shou ld be reject ed :
ci ty.
dou bl e
effect
Noneth e l ess
the
circum sta nc es
differ ence , for they m.ay mitiga te atti tu des to tho s e rcflpo
ns lbl f'
,1
for firing the nd ssi.le, .·i.nce
the
the
thr actjo n would be wrong, and th e
~.:_~:~ ~css nol ]c$sen cd by the g lv n lntent l.on.
innkc
silo
course and destro yed a large ci ty, it c ould be claime d
th.:it t.h ~~ (uni.nt cndcd) mass dest ructio n is legitim ised under
could
missil e
j
t was not as if t he y had
del iberat ely
aimed
at
The double effect princ ipl e confla te s [dimin u tion of]
respo nsibil ity
Assign ed for an act with the [dimin ution of ] wrong ness of
the act.
~s agains t Pl, and as regard s the middle term of
argued
tha t there is an impor tant equivo cation .
the br~cke ted term, ' delibe rate ' .
killin g
and
P2,
it
The equivo cation is induc ed by
be
conc eded
that
de libera te
milJta ry ,
e . g.
farmer s
or
goods
or
servic es
bootma ke r s or ente rtaine rs .
used
exclud ed
as
innoce nt .
The
s econd
d~ten sible - versio n of pr emis s P2.
other.
for
re a sons,
it
by
proper ly
point concer ns a much narrow er - and les s
Bec a use P2 s o amende d is
less
defen sible,
is bes t to l eave out the "modi fier" 'd el ibera te'.
What is import ant for the presen t purpos es i s the moral status
of what is
mixtur e
of
tha t wi th the motive s of the perpet ra to rs.
requir e
the
qualif icatio n
'delib e rate'
or
done,
So 'delib erate'
gets left out, equiv ocatio n is avo ided, P2 stands , and so
does Pl.
not
t he
Second ly, it will be
conten ded thAt LSN wars do no t i nvolve t he delibe rate killin
g of t hos e
a
It
no means al l inn ocent , many being direct ly involv ed in mi
litary ef f ort,
whethe r just as taxpay ers or as s upplie r s of
not
be
charge d firs tly that noncom batant s, insofa r as they are distin
guish able,
by
and
ma y
of genuin e innoc ents is imperm issible , two challe nges will
be made .
will b
are
While it will
Pl
For Pl
do es
'int e ntiona l' or the like. 22
Admit tedly nlso 'nonco mbat a nt' is a fuzzy term , but none
the worse for that, and
Lhere
is
no
seriou s
p·o blem
in
markin g out a class of clear noncom batant s,
people who a rc not <lir cctly involv ed i n the comman d and
J.s,
mnrco v'r,
no
need
to
adopt
action
chains .
There
the prncti c e , derivi ng from catho li c ism, of
statin g rn init i.al verslo n of Pl in terms of in noce nts at l e ast as proble matic
22.
Despit e Na3el ' s sugge stion that it does (p.158 ).
The sugge stion depend s
upon oimila r mistak en assim ilati ons , of ac t wi t h intent
ion, and wrong ness
with respo nsibil ity, to t ho se of the double effect doctri
ne.
,1
rlns:;
":'i
,c mnk.t~
t,-,nt of r~on ,~omb:1t ants to try
t:(,
endenvourlng
c..hnrac t er i z .. , -- Rnd then
i:h c dif f ic11.Lt transiti.on to noncombatants.
there
Nnt only can arguments aga i ns t the premlsses of the argument be met,
.tr,~
for
;ir311mcnts
the
prt:'ndsses, thongh for t he subc-tant iv e moral premiss Pl
and
Lhcy aru of the cha tacterlstlcally nonconclu sive moral sor t
tend
will
For examp le, one argument for
v3ry sowcwhat with th e underlyi ng ethical th e ory.
Pl, .rnd for objecting to the kil l ing of non~ombatan ts, ts the Kant i a n one,
(to
poi.nt)
,
re s pect: owe d to tnem a<· pc so ns
mi n f nn l
from
-~_gume nts
§4 .
the
understate
sc,rio usly
doing
so
23
histori_ca~ __ ..::_e~qu i rcm nts
on
wars,
just
ur
dreamed
by
conlemporary
"free·-enl<'. rp r fs c" cap:l. Lalist st.ale (and
opponents
communis t
im portant
the
The conclusion t hat LS,'
wars cacno t be justly waged - nnd accordingly are ?njustified -
1e
that
fail s to treat them with the
.0..1~Jl~l5:!..'..~- from con-:_er_ger~£:::J and cnv.t ronment al arguments .
r.;omet. lti
to
of
is
Americ a
inspired,
me r ely
not
or
et c),
th e
of
same
The
conclus ion fnlls out of vc1rlouR trc1dj t i0nc1l requirements, worked out i.n mediev al
t:irnt•s ,
(or jusL
wars.
first
One of t h e r equi r ements gives but a varia nt on the
;>1
:irgumen t (KA). · 1 For a necesso r y co nd i Lion for fighting a wat· justly was th a t it
to
no t be the case t hat large numb e rs of [innocent] noncombatants are bound
killc.:<l (cf.
be
Barnes , p .77.5) .
A just war req ui res just means , that t he war should be
fought
by
morally
which
impli es in partic ula r that there is no indis c riminate
killing of noncombatants .
The implied principle was escapsulated in a princi pl e
legitimate
of
means ,
discrimination
(betwee n combata nts and othe rs) whi c h 'prohibits all actions
directly intended to take the lives of
p.312)
/. ~:,
.
civilians
and
of
noncombatants'
(PL,
LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate
')
(
I.lits ·cqulremcnt '' .
7.3.
Of course there are co~nterarg uments too , and not merely from t c military
in the case of small numbers of obst r uc tive noncomb a tants. One
;.rngLP
favored argument is a va r i at ion on the Bald Man: the re is no clear line
between combatants and noncombata11ts. Howe v er a s Nag el a rgues (p . 20) there
in
are distinctions between t hem, firstly in terms of thei r roles , e.g.
c,irry-Lng or u!,in? ;irm · o r dircc . ing t. lnBe who do, a nd s econdly in terms of
See a l so PL , p.312, where a
their liarmf.uJ.ness , the threat they offe r.
uj rr.p1, and ef fec ive paradigm case nrg11mcnt is up pli ed .
2 1~.
Note th at throughout, tile• te:xt adopts Llie OED eq u.:itio ns, reflecting common
lust wit h mo~ally right or correct, and unjust with morally
usage. of
- - - -··---·--
Overlapping the requirement of Just means is thac 6f
being that of net evil to net good:
pro ro rLi on
cor; tr-:
up
proporclonality,
'the damage to be infljcted and
lnc urn.> d by the war must be pro porti.onate to the good ex pect ed
the damage and costs ,
req 1irement:
disproportio nate
to
goods
moral
pr0p0 rt lonnl ·l ty re qui.r ement i R
er i t1! rlon
of
the
which
doctrine
through war .
"improvement"
ln
achieved
of
confined,
nationally
no t
ar
that
way.
ov e r a ll
co n sequences
of
abstaining
i mprov ement "puts wrongs to righ ts":
c ondi. tion s
"nmel.ioratlve "
wn y
the
'a nation wages war
justly
than
Similarly
on l y
if
the
for that nation or the wronged n8tion it is supporting have a decent
s:1tisfy
for
bad,
from war ' (Barnes, p.72) .
LSN wars can
in
these conditio ns, as scen.-i:rios depicting the aftermath of s 1ch
Some oft.h e lesser r e quirements for a just war are also
wa rLl ,
nnd
war
According to the fl.rst, 'X wages wa r
c han ce of be ing better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20).
no
are
Entangl ed with the
justly upon Y if the overall consequences of wa r a re bette r, or less
th e
taking
by
p,312). 27 Tt Ls not difflcu lt to see that LSN wars violate this
(PL,
arms'
the
e :a mple
that
of
infringed
reasonable expectation of success.
by
LSN
It seems that
tl ie r· c ca n b e no rea onable expe c tation of suite success in nn LSN war ·- whatev e r
t!il'
v0 ry
d lf !<r<' n t'Jy,
cx rhanges .
1 lmilcd
prospccUJ
of:
succl'SS
for
whatever the p rospcct:s of succf•ss in
Wha t
some
sm11ll
strictly
state
limited
clltc ,
or
nucl ea r
is le ss clear cut is th e question of whether LSN wars conflict
with th e requir ements of just cause or due fnu lt, and of right
intention.
Fo r
One (by no means
be arg ued to in various ways.
c onclusive) way is Nage l's way, from the requirements of directness and
r e l e vance in combat, the underlying ( co ntroversial) principle being that,
1
wh<1tcvcr on<.> does t:o another person inte ntionally must be ai med at him as
a subject, wlth the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15).
25 .
Til e principle can
26 .
wars where t he targets ar e
c8 s cntially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed
"!nd:lrectly",would b~~ :i.ffe r cnt. Such wars are no t however excused by t he
For such wars remain unjust on
pe rnicious doctrine ~f double effect .
on lif e
several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g.
As Zuckcrmnun says, 1 Tt is st ill inevitable t hat were
s ys tnms, etc.
mil i tary i nstalla t ions rather than cities to become the objectives of
nt lack, millions, even Lens of mlll.lons of ci v.Lli a.ns w-ould be
nucl 'lH
kill e d .. • ' (quoted i.n Thomp s on and Sm i.th , p .14, where the italics are
The situation witli strlctly llmi ted nuclear
ndded ).
Zi.
Tli! r; i s riol Lo b e confus0d wi.tli wlwt lB very different, the vi.cious anclent
doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so
on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest offi cial policy of
fli>;,cib1e r e so0T1se. ,vii11~ted to the level " f att ack,
t hi i, ilc> p e nds on the s e nsitive jssue of the weight assigned to what
are
se e n
as
b:J1; i c human r1. gh ts and fundame ntal value s , a nd the extent to which just wars
can
b e i.dco J og i.c a lly justif i ed.
Whil<': the ma instr eam pos1.tion
of
medieva l
theory
oppo s ed to id e ologica ll y jus tifi ed war s a nd "humani tarian" wars, these wer e
was
no L ck f' nitlvely exclud ed by the trndiU.o nal theory ( cf.
lltt J e
is
wlw n 1.;o m,rn y arc
se nsitive
howe ver,
me rit,
( a nd
when
issue s will ari s e again subsequ ently).
a r g uments
are
not
do
There
.In puzzling ov e r dubi usly effcctlv e requirem ents,
dec isive ng a lnst LS N war s
h i st orica l r e quireme nts
Barnes, p .778).
not
simply
commit
argumen t s
matters
underlyi ng
the
Finally , these argumen ts from
any
presc r iptive
fallacy;
from
historic al
autho r ity
for
to
th e
mo r al
c oncl 11 s i ons, but use also premisse s to the effect that th e requirem ents imposed,
a nd
nome times applied , were justifie d.
As they are.
I n the Christia n traditio n t here were two main strands of r eflectio n on the
mo ral
rightnes s
or
justness of wars, the just war t heory and a rival pacifist
str a nd, promine nt in early Christia nity, but largely submerge d from Augustin
e on
co ntempor ary
u n ti l
times.
Both exc lude nuclear wars, one strand because they
arc ine v i tably unjust, the other because they are wa rs and
This
ls
the
involve
beginnin g of the converge nce argumen t agai ns t nuclear wars :
such wari, a re exclud e d from all ethical perspec tives, once
remov ed
( a nd
e ven,
howr• vcr you look
conse ns us
violence 28 •
Ht
very
f requentl y , when it is not) .
il morally .
a r gument;
it
The argume nt i.s not
proceeds
expedi.en cy
that
is
duly
They a re morally wrong
the
same
as
the
weaker
fr om similar results from the full sweep of
ge nui nely e thi c al position s, not from massive agreeme nt of opinion.
The deta :! le d conv ergence argumen t is an exhausti ve case by case
each
type
of
moral
theory.
Fortuna tely
deta ils
can
be
de ontolog ical a nd contrac tual theories l ead back to requirem ents
28.
one,
from
shortcu t.
For
for
just
war
These alte rnatives are not as far. removed .r..ractic ally as may appear.
For
the aim of just wa ~ theory is not 'to legitimi ze war but t o pr event it.
The pr1~sump tion is against the use of force ' (PL, p.312 ) . And ~..£. types
of wa r s a r c ruled out by Lite theory. However not all wars or violent
revoluti ons a re excluded , and that is enough to guarante e the distinct ion
be tween t he a ltern a tives. In particu lar, defensiv e ware are allowed - at
l e ast for th e defendin g side, though from a wider viewpoi nt these too may
be co nd emned
'the classic case [of the just war] ••• was the use of
l et ha l forc e to prevent aggressi on against innocen t victims' (PL, p.311).
Und e r rec e nt internat ional law, defence , narrowly construe d, is the only
legi Uma t e basis for wa r; Roma n law was only slightly more generou s, in
a llow i ng for th e restitut ion of eoods (see Barnes , p.780).
.l /
whi c l1, it ha s ,ilrcady been s hown, LSN wai·s violate.
w.1r
were
i_;ornctimes
a rriv ed
at
or
l n fact conditions for just
defended through pr inciples of such moral
th12ori · s , so tl,at a good deal of the r equls i. te argumentative
been
done .
work
already
The latter point hold s a lso as r egards ut ilitarianism, where it has
in c[fec t bee n c•hown that whatever br a nd of utilitarianism is
maxim j.sati on
utl lHy
has
is
final ly
ac complished,
LSN
adopted,
wars
are
howe ve r
excluded
ut1· 1 ·Ltar1an
·
g r oun d s . 2 9 Tl,e reason f or suc1
l converg nee .i snot f ar to see k ;
wars
Llw l
involv e
on
LSN
1:uch ma ssive infliction of pa in and colossal removal of pleasure,
tills dominates i n assessmentn howev •r Lhey 1:1 te accomplished in
utllitarlan
Tilu s any genuine alternative to LSN war ls bette r 30 •
L1i; ldon.
The arguments
ovcrwhc .lming
so
moral
far
case
outlined
against
such
mora J princi ples whi ch the waging of a n
principles
are
de riv able
from
agains t
some
LSN
wa rs.
LSN
would
su bstanti ally
wo rse
are
tha n
exhaust
th e
violate
thes e
of the theories just considered).
These
ac countable,
condition
not
( again
th e obligation to maint a in
earth jn proper shape a nd not de grade it s systems :
we
do
For there are oth e r significant
war
pri q•f pl es include e nvironmental ones, such ns :
p,cnera tions, to whom
wars
we
the r.-esponsibility to futur e
pas s
to
th e
" recei ved
the
world
it".
Such
on"
not
in
conservative
principl 0s - howeve r they are finally s atisfact or i ly formulated - are
bound
to
be vio lat ed in t he event of a n LSN war.
§5.
The shi ft to nuclear deterrence:
suppo rt
nuclear
arguments to its immorality .
Those
who
arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating,
certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars ,
by
pointing out that there is no actual engagemen t in any such wars.
What i s being
done ls, it is cla imed, quite different fr om
war:
deterrence
is
most
important
precisely
engagement
in
preventing
in
LSN
such
wars from ever
occur ri ng , as we ll as in mR int ai ning other fundamental Western values.
it
is
continued ,
deterrence
is
the
.9nly
practical
d e siderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values.
way
indeed
Indeed,
of obtaining both
Similar arguments
29.
For details see, e.g ., Lackey, especially MM.
30.
An argwnent of this sort is devel oped in more detail,
complete gc ner ality, j r Goodin, esp •c i £tlly 'Disarmame nt'.
are
But compare Hardin.
though
not
in
a<lvnncerl for all tl1e va ri ous guises that de terrence is presented
in:
mutually
;.~ssurcd des truction as fnrrnerly, fle xi ble r espo nse as latter ly, or otherw.ise. 31
Su,h c1aims as to the roles and
dubious,
for
seve ral
reasons.
objective s
of
deterrence
If i.t t.rere, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal.
s uperior ity.
than
th i s,
and
sometime s
even
a
mili ta ry
goal.
In fac t there ha s
renewed
driv e
for
Pure delerrence can account nei t her for act ual nuclear weapons nor
for orthodox Wester n military strategy 32
process
decidedl y
A first reason is th a t there i s much e vid e nce,
despite pronouncements, that dete rrence is not the - the only -
been a que st for more
are
Nor has deterrence set in motion
the
of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels ap propriate
for dctct"rence .
On the cont rn ry, un<ler " its"
impu.ls e
there
has
been
almost
unli mi te d acce l era tion in building arms (to pa ra phr a se PL p.318).
A other major re a son for serious doubt a bout what
sold
31.
is
being
11nder "d e terrence" labe ls conce r ns th e _proba bility f actor:
marketed
a nd
deterrence has
It ts important to observe that the di sc ussion is not restricted to one
form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but
applies t o al l for ms of response likely to engender LSN wa r. This includ es
"flex ible r es ponse", since the lik e ly further development i s massiv e
ret al iation to a n ini tia l Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for thi s
is the extreme vuln erabilit y of the US defence systems, especially the
communication systems, e.g.
to early strikes a nd to electromagnetic
pulses.
In the result i ng great confusion, escalation appears the likely
out come . I n a ny case, fle x ible response includes massive retaliations, as
part of its ra ng e and is ultimat e ly backed by it.
It is a l so im portant to observe that deterrence as practised is not
confined to responses to (nuclear) a ttack. The threat of nuclear action
has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a
nucle a r power. I t is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses
to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of
deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does.
32.
As to the firs t po int, there is not onl y overkill capacity and the driv e
for suped ori ty ( oft e n repr esent ed as '"negotiating'" strength) but the
matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the
second point, US policy has been de cidedly expansionist with regul a r
intervertion in o ther nations; there have been r epe ated US threats to use
nucl0ar weapons, espec ially to deal wi th revolutionary activities in t he
third wo rld , but also in Europe in "li.mited'" nuclear war; and i n official
military stra tegy no s ha rp line has be e n drawn between c.onventi.onal and
nuclear weapons: on these and other r elated points see furth e r Lackey MM,
p.19lff., and also Thompson and Smith.
The argument can be pressed
[1rLher, to the alarming conclus ion that deterrence is larg e ly a front,
which plays onl y a minor, but justificatory, role in actual US policy.
Among fu rther evidence is behavioural data: a government with a genuine
deterrenc e policy would repeatedl y emphasize its strength (even when it
la c ks strengt h), whereas the US govcrrnnent ofte n parades its vulnerability
and weakness in public . For other evidence see Smith, e.g. p.46ff.
i.ncrt.:ascd the probability
nrms-race
type
t hat
of
LSN
war.
More
precis ely,
deterrence
of
th e
is being practised, which invol·es full-scale prepar a tion
for Lota] nuclear war, has prepared the cond i tions for nuclear war to occur, and
hns
to
that
,,,·te nt
least en hanced its prospect s of occurring .
at
r easons also, connected with pure
original
setting),
the last 30 years.
the
deterrence
and
with
the
For other
"cold
war"'
(its
probability of a LSN war has increased consid erabl y in
The reasons include the threatening posture
called
for
by
deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated
to main tain credibility
overridden
or
with
''sacrificed"
a
population
whos e
real
for
military objectives;
state of military readiness;
etc.
The situation has
many
ther e
sober
analysts
century , i.e.
think
before 2000 .
is
a
high
There are s e veral
interests
are
being
the dangerous and risky
now
been
reached
where
pr obability of an LSN war this
routes
to
such
a
probability
assir,nrnc•n t.33 It wo uld only rccp ii re one in ' id e nt wi.th a 20% chance of leading to
an rscalating wnr every 8 years between 1960 and
Amer lean
2000.
alerts,
hav e
been
lucky
already .
In
of
nuclear
markedly.
the years ahead it appears likely that th e
For
the
danger
supplicant
nations
resources declines.
and
the
worsens
and
the
extent
The danger is enhanced by
connected
increasing
chance
of
the
lot.
33.
Cox).
easily
as
the
plight
extractable
continuation
of
of
crucia l
the
arms
of nuclear acci dent and human or
t ec l1nical error, none of them negligible factors as
(cf .
:l.ncrease
zones separating the superstates are increasing in
sjze and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and
r e veals
the
exchange .
number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war wil l
race,
on
sidE? ;i.lone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes , as with the
Cuban missile crisis , carry a considerably higher chance
We
Full
past
experience
copiously
Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a
Even so every substantial point involved can be contested,
and
many
are
Another route to a moie than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi
methods:
weigh up the experts' a sse ssments. In this regard it is worth
noting that it is not only ''nuclear doves" who consider the probability of
nuclear war has increased in r e cent years.
Amer ica n officials have themselves admitted that the policies of
r ealis ing th e st rategic potential of counterforce attacks and of
selective and flexible responses have increased the probability
of nuclear wnr (Hall, p.128).
20
conlcntlous (thoug h not always for good reasons) .
s e em s
no
way
Fof better
or
worse,
ther e
to rna~e such an overall probability argument particularly tight;
a nd ti1t: r E:! arc p] a usi. b le arguments , from the complexity of th e data concerned and
t he conti ng ency of the future, that it cannot be made tight .
IL is bad enough however that l.t 2-._~_ de c idedly pla usible that it
proha bJ~
that
LSN
an
war
will
d i st r ibu tion pri c iples) that it
proba bl e
that
c entury.
And that is enough
a
grossly
occur this ce ntury.
is
immoral
to
decidedly
morally
on moral grounds, to change deterrence as
policy
is
i.mmoral.
For then it follows ( by
plausi ble
that
it
highly
is
sequence of events will be perpetrated this
warrant
morally to take acti on to avert the outc ome.
de terrence
highly
is
evasiv e
act.Lon.
We
ought
That in turn implies taking steps ,
presently
practised.
Thus
present
That i.s but the first of several ways we shall
nrrivc at that damaging conclusion for pres ent super-state deterrence policies.
The plnusibil ity of claims as to the hi gh or increasing probability of
war h a s of cour s e been disputed.
LSN
The mai n counte rargument runs as fol lows :
Nuclear war is unlikely , be ca use the consequ ences are too horri fying.
The underlying assumption i.s that wars and the like, with
ar c
improbable.
assumption.
Unfortunately
however
horrifying
outcomes,
much ava i lable evidence counters this
More th an enough humans have not shrunk from brutal
exchanges
horr if y i ng wars , or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf.
Kuper ).
What ts le!;s assailable than the high probabili ty claim, what the
ce r tnin ly
Ther e by, through det errence, we
si t uation,
since
have
already
got
into
t.h e probA.bility.
immoral
of
r aising
The mor e detai led underlyi.n g arg ument s , then, to the immora lity
of nucle ar deterrence proceed by
LSN
an
deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for
thereby perhaps helping t o bring it about, in the sense
war,
against
evidence
s eems to support, ls that there is a non-negl i g ible probability of an
LSN war .
LSN
a nd
way
of
princ iple s
mapping
war into ar.gum~nts a gaJns t deter r ence of LSN war.
mi.gilt appropriately be called deont:ic
connecti ng
pr inciples .
moral
arg uments
Such principles
The
fl rst
of
the s e principles t a kes the foll owing preliminary form:
Cl.
should
If 1t is wro ng that X s ho uld occur, t hen not only
be
pr ob3ble
is
it
wrong
that
it
that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly
i ncrease t he pt' o ba bility that X occur .
Thus, f or
example ,
s i nc e
is
it
wrong
to
ki l l
a
large
noncomb atant
po~ulatf on in LSN wa r (by §4) it is al s o wr ong to put the populati on at ris k
and
wrong to increase t he chance tha t the hostage popul a tion is wiped out,
which
nuclea r de terre nce does .
botl1
of
For simil ar r eas ons a super s t te is not morally
entitled to im pose nucl ea r r i sks upon un invo l ved noncomb atants, esp ecial ly t
ho se
of third part y no nal i gned
most
Like
"' t tuations .
defeat by
example ,
0
t a te s .
sub s t an ti ve
Unless
mo ra l
count erexamp l es,
the
second
principl es oc c u r s.
probabi lity
that
par t
princ ipl e s
in
Cl
runs
into
dilemma.
and
of
a c c ord i ng l y,
Cl
e ncount e rs
to
require
complic ation.
For
apparen t trouble where clash of
Thu s it may be argued th a t it is permiss ible to increase the
oc curs
X
ord er
to
apartmen t bui l dings 3 4 •
nuclec1r
ethi s,
d l l emmas a r e duly all owed for, Cl appears li a ble to
t o avoid a greater evil.
pilot who increase s the pr obabilit y
c r ashes,
in
dct:crrcn ce ,
make
that
t he
Cons i der for example the
passeng er
plane
he
ic
flying
sure that the troubled aircraf t does not hit cit y
Suc h a defeatin g cond i tion do e s not apply in the case of
ihe r e
(though
the r e
explains ) wro ngness of a pr a ct ic e is not
ls
a
of fs e t
clash
or
of
principl e s, as §6
removed
by
its
role
in
avoiding greate r e vil.
I L can be a r gued that it is:
argumen t
from
t he
pr e vious
a r gumen t. de s erves lit t le
perhaps
f rom
more
such is pa rt of
succe s s
credence
t he
de terrence .
th a n
the
of
the
popular
However this inductiv e
racing
world
As Barnett argues,
driver's
argumen t,
'the
happy
acciden t
has surv iv ed the first thirty-f ive years of th e nuclear era is
unimp r e s si ve e v i d e nce that we can avoid nuclea r war
34.
point
a s imilar time base, that because he hasn't had a fa tal crash yet
(des pite some close calla ) , he won't,
th a t
of
the
in
the
coming
era,
This dilemma exampl e was s uppli ed by D.
Johnston .
There are more
dif f i c ul t putative coun t e rexampl es.
For example , in inciting people to
c ivil disobedi ence, the ri s k of stat e violence in r etaliat i on is increase d.
Thus, t o ta ke C,
Pigden's example , 1.n encourag ing disobed ience, Gandhi
i nc r ea s ed t he proba bility of wrongdo ing by the British Raj.
But surely
Ga ndhi, un l i ke th e Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi
d i d no t d irect ly incre a s e the probabi l i ty of viol ence .
But spelling out
what 'dir ec tly' means
in terms of short causal chains over which
r espo nsi bil i ty ca n be distribu ted - i s not only problem atic but leads on to
ot her connect ing princ i ples.
·2
(p. 100) .
lie offers fami.liar reasons suc h as the changing power
incrt.' ,ise
111
Russian
strengt h,
the
ri se
r e 1aU. ons,
th e
of other nu c lear powcr·s, etc .
(cf.
simllarly Cox ).
There ar e, a ccordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that
Dl.
De errencc will not continu e to work,
and. more lmportant for the present argumenl, that
D2 .
De t e rrence does increase the proba bi lity of LSN war.
The themes are of course i.nter related, and t he re as ons for t hem (which are again
persuasive bu t in: oncl usive) can be t a ken together :
some respects) weaker D2 ·- the probability facto r.
proliferati on,
the
emergence
bu t the focus is on the ( in
An initial
of lesser nuc lear powers.
reason
concerns
As a result there are
many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagrat.i on, and so enhanced prospect
Some nnnlyula co ns id e r that
lt. -i~i
us e of nuclear weapons by
confrontation
a
11
lesser
very Jf ke ly route to I.SN war l · th
stat e .
Moreover
scarcitJ
;::i nd
o f chea per suppli es, etc ,
weapo n
systems,
more
or
Lcrror
s ltua ttons,
deterrence
power
lnvolv e s 36 ,
being mainta.ined :
costs
Wi t h so many more
Arms races, and interwoven
balanc e
of
have an exc eed ingly bad 1,istorical track record.
lncr cas lng as tl1c race p roce eds .
of
resource
A second group of reasons concerns the
Ther e is substantial inductive evi dence that
pres en t
for
wi<iel y d lstributed, the probabili.ty of war
through accide nt o r e rr o r is inc reased.
powrr
opportunities
growing
nuclear arms race which deterr e nc e, as practised, is ti ed to.
wec1pons
.lnltlnl
to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political
Jnstnbillty , relat ing to thlrd world economic de cline,
and
the
of
lead
escalating
eventually
to
arms
war ,
races,
with
such
as
probabili.ty
Next, deterrence dep ends on a certai n
balance
if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen
during escalation, deterrence may well fail.
A related reason for
35.
that
deterrence
practice
increases
It can be the or etically a r gued t hat the fewer the nations
weap ons, t.he l ess the chance of nuclear. war: cf.
n 1clcar
p .. 2JO n.
36.
supposi ng
th e
armed with
Lackey, MM,
The standard ar gument for deterrence as significantly decreasing the
proboblli y of wa r, would be decidedly better if the arms race were
nbandoned, a nd weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for
dcle rrenc e.
Of c our se s uch a probability-well assumption is only one of
scvera l_ thi. ngs required if det erre nce i.s to be just:!.fled.
probabili ty of war conce rn s the continuin g shifts in
poli c y,
US
especiall y
th e
rcncwc<l quest for superio rity wh i ch is in creasing the inc en tiv e of both sides
to
rcsorL to nuclcJr war, the USSR t o avoid being
advantage
of
ov erwhelme d,
USA
the
to
take
superiori ty ac hi eved . 37 Rece nt dangerous shifts in US poli cy
the
tow;Jrds war fighting a r e .in part induce d by a much inc re ased accuracy of nuclear
missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrenc e (sinc e mi l itary tar-gets
con be selected for strike and ci ties to some extent r emoved as
hostages ),
thereby
war.
also
weakens
the
case
against
resort
to
nucle a r
detrrrenc c requires a certain (admitted l y r a ther minimal, ye t
of
mutual
understan ding,
leaders, and even some
nuclear.
sha r ed
principle s ,
cooperati on
supe r-states.
and
soundness
transmi ss i on
Finally,
impor tant)
level
judgement
among
of
of
and
informati on
between
It is not just that t he increasin g numbers of operator s
in n position to J.aunch nuclear weapons must remain of " sound mind" and not, for
instance,
follow
through on delusions of one sort or another.
deterrenc e depends upon judgeme nts
seriously
mistaken:
'each
is
regarding
the
other
It is al so tha t
side ,
which
slde ' s
threat
is to the other' (P L, p.313) .
we
think' • 38
But
about
what
the
o t her
considera ble , and perhaps catastrop hic , margin of
evidence,
that
on e
perceptio n of what is
possible
resul t
As
s ide
side
thinks
e rror.
Not
thinks ,
there
only
not
can be
is
a
there
sid e (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's)
rational,
as
regards
limited
nuclear
war,
of a first strike countered by massive retaliatio n;
must now be severe doubts
cffectlvc ly.
"conv inc ing "
There is a grain of truth in
the c1a"im that 'deterren ce is primarily about what t he other
what
be
a t the mercy of t he o the r's percept io n of wha t
strategy is "r.atio al", what kind of damage .is " un nccept able", how
one
may
as
to
whether
rationa l
principle s
are
with
the
but there
operating
to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous
37.
The point is discus sed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for
super iority is doct1me nted. The v.lci ssi tudes of US "d efenc e" policy - not
to say its shiftines s and occas ional incoheren ce (as in strategic forward
defence)
have confused many of lts supporter s even . Perhaps there is
some advantage in the ver y incomplet e and limited exposure of USSR war and
imperial policies :
we don't see, wit h alarm, their incohe renc e and
i.rrntiona llty .
J8.
Pym, quot,.• d .Ln Thompson , p .19. Yet a fundamen tal problem Russi a and the
West fac e, Lt is sometimes claimed, is not merely that they do not
understan d one another but that 'ther, is a lack of a wish to understan d'.
This casts into douht the psycholog ical basis of nuclear deterrenc e.
24
idea (alread y allu<led to , as he l d in hi.gh pl a ces of powe r in USA
and in UK) that
LSN war cnn be sur viv ed i n r ud ime ntary s hel ters , and also won.
The suppor ter of det er rence
connec ting
rrlnci ple s
ri val case.
such
J1as
not
onl y
to
defeat
a rgumen ts
Cl, but, more difficu lt, to fie ld a convin cing
as
For the onus of pr oof lies in showing that the costly
~:.:..!.~_rr.cncc Ls justifi ed_.
t hr o ugh
practic e
of
Bu t for from th e fair ly decisiv (~ case that i s requi r ed
( Lo contras t with t he argume nt through Cl),
only
a
feeble
case
through
the
questio na b le obv ers e of Cl,
Cl i.
If Xis wr ong then it is right to reduce the probab ility of X,
nppears open .
•
For it has to be shown that
deterre nce ( s ubstan tially) r e duc e s the proba bility of LSN war ,
and st ri ct lt (this indica tes part of the trouble with Clt) that
deterre nce does this bett e r (more morally ) than availab le options
.
o
The latter uniquen ess condit. ion ce rtainly fails, so it r,.,ill
be argu e d.
reasons already gi ven, does the probab ility claim.
up i-hc v ery
cond 1 t:1.ons
probab ility
of
suc h
for
a
an
LSN
war,
it
So ,
for
When nuclear deterr e nce set s
can
ha rdly
have
reduced
th e
war , e speci a lly over the situati on a mere 25 years ag o
when such an LS N wa r was not technic ally possib le.
More genera lly , i n showlng that nuclear deterre nc e ls justifi
e d, it i s
c..! l1 0l l f',h
refute the theme Lhat deterr e nce is wrong.
LO
out that deterre nce is permis sible, or alrigh t.
altcrn1 1LJvc
pe rmissi ble
courses
of
a c tion
condit:f . on ha s to be est a bli.shed ;
to be no t merely
alrigh t ,
bu t
;H:cc·p ' ah l<' cvidt!n tin l ato nd nrdA,
r ig ht.
But
I t is not enough to make
For t he re certain ly seem to
withou t
deterr ence , wh ic h appear more morally satisfa ctory.
uniciue ne s s
includi ng
fright
To surpass t hese option s, a
nuclea r deterre nc e has to be shown
es tablish ing
such
a
39.
LSN
war s ,
withou t
.(cf.
Jl
11
claim,
to
fear
or
is vf.nunl ly tmposa iblc. 39
OED)
40
•
For
most
people,
portray ing the horror of LSN wa rs would serve adequa tely enough
from
be
the costs or problem s of
Deterre nce cons ists in preven ting someth ing (often some wrong ) by
t hr ea t s
not
the
enormo us
expense ,
t rouble
vivid scenari os
to
deter
t hem
and wastage of
An analogo us point will ap pea r whe n i.t is asked whethe r deterre
nce is the
way o ut oft.he nuclear fix, the thin g to persist with in the circum
stances .
Given that there are appare ntly super ior, le ss dangero us procedu
res , the
an s wl!r hn-, to be, No.
- - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - -
p r epar i ng to e ngag e i n th em.
det t·r rl'ncc
And
deterren ce
i.n a ny cas e de pends upon) is of
by
such
means
ourse not immoral .
(whi ch
miJit4ry
(Sc.h e ll was not
immora l in publ ish ing hi s gra phic descri p tions of the nuclear destruc tion of New
Yo rk .)
But t hou gh de te rrence per se is permi ssible, nuclea~ deterren ce, that is
deterren ce by complete prepa ration for the object to be preven te d , is no t , where
this
o bj e ct,
a
LSN
war., itself is no t
permiss ible.
The argumen t for this is
thro ug h t he pr lnc J ple
C2 .
l f X is wrong then c omplete prepara tion for (carryin g out) Xis wrong.
Hence
since
p re para t i on,
LS N wars
nuc l ear
are
wrong
and
nuclear
deterren ce
deterren ce of LSN wars is wrong .
claimed th a t prepa ring for Xis just as bad as doing X:
wr ong a n d Z ( mue h) worse t1wn
i
Y•
wi11at
W.'.1 S
wrong.
complete
It is not however being
Y and
Z may
both
be
41
i s wrong i s b y no means un if orm l y ev1.1.
"
Tn 19115 Lhcre would ha ve been littl e doubt that
L SN wa r
implies
complete
prepara tion
for
Among the three types of crime s pecif led in Article 6 of the
Cha rt e r f or th e I nternati onal Military Tribuna ls
(which
tr ied
the
major
war
c r iminals a t Nurcm burg) we r e
Cr1- mes a ga ins t peace: namely planning , .:e_repar ation, initiati on or
waging o f a wa r of aggr e ssion, or a war in violatio n of internat iona l
tr eat:!.es , ag reements or a s surance s, or particip ation in a common plan
or cons pi ra c y for the accompl ishment of any of the followin g ( cited in
Ku pe r , p.2 1; ita lic s added).
But af t e r ma ny yea rs of nuclear deterren ce, the
become
J ncreasi ngly
liable
to
question .
wrongne ss
implied
in
C2
has
However the doubts mainly come from
40.
De t er r e nc e a lso commonly includes elements of mendaci ty,
deceptio n,
mi si nforma t ion, that is elements of what a re, for the roost part, morally
unde sirable traits.
Li l .
Nor a re
ordered
be cause
wrong,
equally
degr e es of wrongne ss required :
wrongs can simply be
as
reg a rds relative worsene ss. The point requires some
it has been quite erroneo usly assumed t hat if y and z
cat egorica lly or absolute ly , then they mus t be equally
evil. Thus, e.g. William s:
.
partiall y
labourin g
are both
wrong or
.
there is no moral differen ce between running a deterren t st r ategy
on the one hand, and intentio nally - indeed wantonly - start i ng a
nuclear war on the other; so that the first is as totally evil
a s the second.
This is because both are held to be absolute ly
forbidde n.
Not a t a ll. The argume n ts from "Y and Z are both absolute ly forbidde n" to
"S o Y i s a s totally evil as Z"
and
to "Therefo re Y and Z do not differ
mor all y " a r e both ent:i.rely without validity . Compare : 2 is a number, and
3 lg a numbe r;
s o 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ
numeri c , lly from 3!
26
a~sum ing t!w l comp l e t e prepara t.i o n i nc }udc i:; l ss t: lwn Lt nee ds to or do e s.
Complete prepa ration for something, s uch as
sever~]
other
fea tures.
LSN
war ,
already
writes
in
In particular, i t presup po ses the preparation is no t
ha1 (·-hea rt ed hnt is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply
pret e nce.
Obser e tha t mere pretence, or ot her more psychologic a l ploys, cannot substi tut e
for comp l ete prepa r a tion in nuclea r deterrence.
too
sophistica t ed
for
bluff
alone
to
Military
succeed:
t here
preparatJon for wa r accompanyin g the t h rea t s involved in
t he
ot her
hand ,
has
to
is
now
be serious
deterr ence .
But,
on
c omplet e prepara tion does not imply that what i s prepared for
wi l l be attempted other than condi tona lly:
imply attemp t ed X.
c omplete preparatio n for X does
not
It does however 1.nvolve a conditional undertaki ng to proc eed
with wha l is prcpa·ed
whell1er
intelligenc e
for
under
c ertain
conditio ns.
Comple te
preparation ,
for a we dding or murder or wha tevcr, wo uld be po int les s otherwise, so a
(proclaimed ) comm itment to proceed under given circumstanc es c an
be
taken
of
connecting
for
granted .
Principle C2
principles .
is
part
way
not
the
line
in
a
series
pr inciple of the same sort that is hig he r in the series is that
A
con necting X with a tt empted X:
perh,ps
down
if Xis wrong then attempted Xis wrong
as bad ) , whether X succeeds or not .
But the se ries ends ;
off well before th e l ower limits of i nte ns ionalit y, contrary to
the
(thoug h
it cuts
claims
of
various religious pos i tio ns.
For example, it does not foll ow that if Xis wrong
then
X
the
co n temp l ati on
con sidcra t Jon
of
of
is
wrong
carrying out Xis wrong.
or
that
non-action- oriented
The point ap plies equally to sexual
fant asie s, power fan tasies, and nuclear nightmares .
no Lhing
mere
In
particular,
there
is
wrong with contemplatin g nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are:
nuclear wars, even lf their horrors don't be ar thinki.ng on, a re not unthinkable ,
and in some senses are all too thinka ble.
Indeed one of the reas on s why the connecting principles appeal is that each
common ly
involves
lt connects with.
decidedl y increased pro ab ility of the wrongdoing or outcome
Accompanyin g the increased probability are
certain
r eprehensibl e atti tud e s tied t o the ac tion t he evil outcome involves;
nol
I ho:a·
of
mere
pas s ! vc
.o nt emµ l at f on
I,,
1
'.
Howev er
oll
the
sets
of
these are
connectl.ng
n
prL nc lple s
invoked
except Cl ho l d, where the y do, ~, a n when the proba bi lity of
wrongdo i ng ev e ntuating is not inc r eased.
c ho:;c n
One rea son for th1s is that the
means
o r epre hensible end s may be ineffica cious, for instance intendin g to do
s omeo ne harm using witchcr aft .
The inc r eased prohabi llty
of
an
evil
out come
o l.mply makcB things worse .
Nu clear deter r ence involves not only war pre parat ion, but
thi s
accompa nied
by
threats
and
a threaten ing posture .
pot e ntial e nemy, has to be sui tably frighten ed or moved,
announce ment
For some pa rty , th e
if
deterr e nce
s ucce ed :
the threat must be recognis ed as s uch and be cr edible .
n uc 1 L' i1 r
deterren ce yie l ds a further conne cting princip le:
CJ.
of
is
to
This aspect of
if Xis wrong the n serious threat ening of X und er gi ven conditio ns is also
wr o ng ;
or , in br ief, If Xis wrong then conditio nal thre a tening of Xis wro ng .
The r ema in i ng connecti ng conditio ns invoked all take this general form
CG .
If Xis wrong so is a cond itional
r eq uires
some
further
ex planati on.
the fo rm, ~ ( X if C), wl1ere
of' • 4 3
thre ate ning
~
Apar t
intensio n
to
A condit'o na l
do
intentio ns
e . g.
themselv es,
1
the
t ha t ) .
C
to
(or
in pr opos iti onal ra ther than event style:
the
most
cond i tion a l lnte1slo ns are conditio nal obligati ons where~ is the
oblj gati on
form
a
are
not
impossi ble
claim
in
whnt
or even remote or imp r obable:
(spe c ifica lly those involvin g
cornmitn e nt)
for
follows
certain
is
tha t
s ort s
there
of
discusse d
an
it is obligato ry
conditio ns
the conditi ons
typicall y conc e rn those specif ying a rtuclear st rike by a potentia l
fund ame ntal
cred1ble
functor:
To r emove complica tion it can b e ass umed hencefo rth that the
involv ed
whic h
intensio n is a judgemen t of
is some intensio nal functor,
f rom
X
enemy .
The
are intensio nal funct ors
threaten ing ,
intendin g ,
and
whic h CG holds , and that these versions suffice to demonst rate
the
immoral ity
42 .
There is plenty of scope for f ur ther
elabora tion
here.
Passiv e
s pectntor shJp of evil e vent s where one is in an appropr iate pos i tion to
make a differen ce i s quite another thing, from contemp lation of other
worlds where e vil oc curs .
43.
The condi tionnl i.nt nsion, ~ ( X if C), whic h is an intensio n , should not be
confused wit h the provisio nal form, 1f C then ~x. which is not . The
Ame rfcnns nre t hr eatening the Russians with retaliat ory action If tl1ey
strike :
Lt is not that: if the Russians strike the American s will threaten
them with reta l ia t ory action . Such confusi on has arisen because of the
problems of formalis ing conditio nal obligati on given usual defectiv e
theories of condi ti onality.
of
nuclear
deterren ce.
Natural ly
again
there
are
many
28
no11-;-1ction ·-oriented functors for whi ch ve r s ions
c.ont. :•mplat J.on,
t'1l nld.ng,
dreaming, etc.
of
e.g .
fail,
those
of
The.r e is also a n interesting group of
more borderline functors, those of hoping ( for) ,
expecting,
awaiting
and
the
like, for which CG is only dub:i.ously correct:.
Connecting pri nciple C3 evolved from the simp ler pri~ciple, if X is
then
threatcn.ing
X 1s also wrong, or, as f ormulated by Ramsay:
is wrong to threaten .•• ' 44 The r e ason is that
to do
into
prac tic e
(e.g.
if
wrong
'What is wrong
putting
something
committ ing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into
tlin•at<'nl ne t o pu t that lnto practice , in pn rti c ul ar the declflred intent to
that
into
pract i ce.
beginning as fo] lows:
The
point
ca n
if worlds where
alternative ly
X
happens
be
are
put
argued semanti cal ly,
exclude d
then
so
are
adjacent wo rlds where Xis poised to happen.
The comp li cat lon of the simple form is required for two reasons.
nuclear
war
obta i n.
However t he required c onditional form can be derived
form,
is
through
only c onditionall y threatened , i.e .
the
f ollowing
wh ic h is pe rf ectly general , X if
argument:-
c.
should certain cond itions
particular,
(of
§§3-4)
LSN
oppo si. tion has struck, or not , and so wrong when it
wrong,
44.
so
a lso
is
simple
if it weren't it wouldn't
(The converse route fails
arg uments
the
Observe, furthermore that if something Xis
have b en wrong in the first place.
ear lier
from
su bstitute for X in the simple form,
wrong, it is a l so wrong under restrictive co nditions;
by
Firstly ,
threatening X if C,
war
has.
of
course.)
In
is wrong whether the
Hence,
where
X
is
More generally, to e sta blish CG it is
Ramsay's formula tion of simplified CJ is considered in Wal zer, p.272.
It
i s this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian
who is a nuclear hawk , int o the awkward position he ends in, whi c h as
Walzer explains , really leaves no room to move.
For in virtue of
slmp li.f led CJ H must he allowed that the threatened wars are permissible
to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to
be effective as a deterrent, Lhe exchange permitted must both threaten and
also,
i.n view of CJ,
not threaten nonmi.lit ary targets, collateral
oon-cornbata nt populations . It appears that Ramsay's position, if worked
out, wou1d be inconsi.sten t.
S!mpllf1cd pri nclple CJ 1.£ nlso invok<'d by the US Catholic Bishops:
se
PL, p.316.
They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared
"i.ntent to use nuclenr we apons, which they pronounce morally wrong.
Ho wever s implifi ed CJ is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to
nssess Lhe moral stntus of u threat by way of expected utility. This is
open to Rll the objec tions to expected utility as a test of morality
mentione d below.
29
enough to e sta blish the s i mpl e r
If Xis wron g s o i s a n int e nsion t o do X.
CG'.
The s e cond com plic ation in C3, modifying the threat to
ca us es
more
t roubl e .
a
serious
threat,
Some modi f ica tion a ppears required, because it is often
contend e d tha t empt y t hrea t s or bluff a r e wa rranted on occasion even whe r e
is
t l1r e o.tene d
what
l
.
i s wrong , to prevent t,1c
occ urrence o f som et h.1 ng worse .11 s A"n d 1.n
f ac t one wny o f tr ying to vi ndica te de te rrence , a s morally permissible , has been
by pre se nti ng de t er rence as lnvo lv ing thr eats which do not involve any i nt en tion
at all to pr oceed t o action on
plaus ible
Lhrc a t s .
removes
i t
the
support
bas i s
for
of
threats.
s i mpl i f ied CJ.
Insofar
A seri ous th r eat th e n, in the slJ ghtly t echnic a l.
sense
co nditi on s,
is
con s i de r a
accide nt .
intended,
For the challenge
grossly
immo r al
unconvincing,
case
wh e r e
conduct
under
certain
not
and calls for moral double-think.
ci rcum st ances
th e
result
from
improbable
To bring this
an
intricat e
Eithe r the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by
Doomsday Mac h in e c ircui try, etc.) or w1th further choice, or - somehow Eit her
not .
is
in ef fect tha t it is perfectly morally permissible to issue serious
thr ea t s to under t a ke
out
is
Principle CJ is not
ope n to the same c ha l lenges as sJmplified a nd unqualified CJ.
says
this
Hence the shift to serious
one tha t i s no t a pre t ence, empty or a blu ff , but credible.
which
as
it
is
way the out c ome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously , in
the s e c ond cas e be cause the intermedia te reconsideration makes it plain that the
thr eat
nor
ought not to have been issued at a ll, be ing justifiable on neither mo r al
more
.. pra ctic al "
rep r es e n t atives
grounds.
Further more,
while
states
thei r
and
ma y accept moral double at t itudes, such as morally assenting to
immor a l threa t s, les s corrupt agents cannot:
it
moral
principled agents they ar e or take
natu r es ,
to
t he
kinds
of
th emse l ves to be ( a s Benn exp lains).
i nsignif i c ant
mora lly
would
run
For su c h agents , who may
counter
to
comprise
their
a
not
proportion _ of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such
a s CJ are no t in doubt.
The a r gum e nt agai nst nu c le a r deterr e nce using C3 is as follows:- Either th e
--- ---- ---- - - -- - - For a di sc us s ion of threats whe r e the threatener has no intention of
ca r r ying ou t t he threat, or inc e ntive to do so, see Schelling, p.JSff . The
quest ion of t he mo r ality of th e s e threa ts, where the item threatened is
i.m,-,, or a l , ca n be left ope n.
30
t.hrcnt involved
then
is
it
Ln deterren ce is ser .!. 1);..i1.. or l t is m 1 t,
inadequ ate. s o deterren ce is no
Lhen by CJ deterren ce
depcn<l
is
wrong .
The
maintain ed.
sub-argu ment
on se ri ous threats is a practica l one:
Lf
it
s
no t
seri ous
Bu t if i t j s ser io us
that
nu c l ea r
dete r re nce
name l y , that if the t h rea t s were
not serio us , but merely gave the lmpressi o n that they would be fo l lowed thro
ugh ,
then
the
op posit ion
would flnd out, in one way or a nother.
could not be entlorseJ i.n an open or democra tic polit i ca l
wi LhouL
A policy of bluff
system ,
f or
examp l e,
coining some discussi on, and so giving the game away to the oppos iti o n .
Even i n close d non-demo cratic systems
maintain ing
such
a
po licy
weapons , espec ially
informa lion
would
clown
during
l i kel y
times
escape
the
of
there
would
be
ma jor
di f fic u l t ies
i.n
chains of c ommand i nv olved wit h nuc l ear
change
through
in
gov e rn ing
el i t es ,
a nd
the
op pos itio n i ntellige nce.
But then ,
since t he bluff could be called, deterren ce wou ld no t ha ve su c ceede d .
Ther e a re
as
we l l ot her argumen t s t hat the thr ats invo l ved mu st he s e r io u s.
On e is t hat
nucl e ar d terrcnce already faces a cred i bility probl em , namely tha t do ubts
a bo ut
the
r ationa lity
of
carry i ng out t he big nuclea r t hre a t weak e n th e c r e di bil ity
essentia l. to its effec t iven ess .
To be effec tive then i t mu s t
be
s e r i ous
( c f.
Benn).
Meeting obj ec tions t o pri ncip l e C3 leads on t o two fur t he r ve r sions of
one
centred on intent io n , one on commitm ent.
CG,
Princ ip l e CJ is int1ma t e ly linke d
with , and it some times co nside r ed bu t a variant upon , t he pr i ncipl e
C4 .
If Xis wrong then t o conditio nally intend to do X [kn owing it is wrong ] is
n!so wr0ng.
The' prJrcJpl cs arc intimate ly a ssoci at ed because a th ea t is, ac c ordi ng t o
die tionarie s,
etc . ' .
of
'a
d claratio r
of
intent
to 1nfU.c t puni shment, l oss , injury,
It i s their intercon nect i o n which lies a t the bo t t om of
deter rence,
which
in tend ing to go to war .
princip l e ,
th a t
turn
0 11
C4
is
s ome
pa r a doxes
the prob l em of c red ibly t hrea tening war wi thout
Princ i ple
C4
is
j us t i f i e d
th rough
th e
s i mplified
inte ndi ng to do wrong j_s wr ong, a nd s o al s o i s i nte ndl ng to do
wrong unl es s favoura b le circums tanc es f o r one' s
p inc.iple
some
an
ex tr emel y
position
prevail.
Si mplif i ed
wi del y assumed mora l thesis, 46 perhap s for the
excellen t reason that it holds a nalytica lly.
Its ela bo ra t io n C4 can be us e d
to
Jl
agains t nuclear deterre nce , ea follows :
argue
siQ ~a pfoce eding to LSN war when
the Qnemy duly misbeha ve s is wrong (by §§J-4) , by C4. intendi ng
to go to LSN wa r
when
the enemy duly misbeh aves is also wrong .
Nuclea r deterre nce involve s such
an intenti on, all the availab le evidenc e shows.
He nc e
nuclear
deter rence
is
wrong.
But like virtua lly every
utilita rian
princip les
utiJita rian grounds .
deontic
t hems e lv es ,
princip le ,
princ i ples
For it is not difficu lt to
except
thos e
flowing
from
CJ and C4 c a n be challe ng ed on
outline
str a tegic
situati ons
wher e mnxlrnum ex pected utility result s from a poli cy of nuclear
det e rr ence.
But
on il s own this conces sion casts but little doub t upon
C4.
For
it
likewis e
fs
not
princip les
C3
difficu lt t o ou tli ne situati ons where the hanging oE
innoce nt people , or other injusti ces , are sa nctio ne d or enjoine d
by
maximum
expe cted
a nd
utility .
pu rsuit
Those who appeal to utilita rian assump tions try t o
avoid suc h more obvious di fficult ies with .elianc e upon utilita rianism
,
scrappi ng
the
sp ots
not
by
doctrin e, bu t by hedging app licatio ns of their princip les around
with quall ficatio ns , whic h, they hope , will
trou bl e
of
wit h
utilit a riani sm.
enable
So
.i. t
them
to
evade
the
worst
is with Kavka, whose work ni ce l y
illustr ates that whatev er (little ) deterre nce has in its
mo r al
f avour
depend s
upon uti.lita rian ass umption s .
Kavka 'bcgin[ s ] by no t ing that any reas ona ble system of
fwbst,r ntial
1itil.ita ri a n
e l ements '
(PD,
p.287).
consequ e n tia l
elemen ts
systems
incl ud e
must
infiltr ate,
an
with
the
' ass umption
if
Eve n
observ atio n were correc t - it is nox, dep e nding f or one
e thic s
thing
this
upon
must
hav e
astonis hing
confla ting
utilita rian - it would not follow that reasona bl e
particu lar
that
assump tion
produce s
normat ive assump tio n involv e d is that t he
a ct
Kavka
thereup on
t ries
the paradox es of · deterre nce'.
wi t h
maximum
expecte d
to
The
utility
'( the most useful ac t) should be performe d whe never a very great
deal of utility
- -
46.
·•---- ---- -
Ka vka , who labels simpli fie d C4 the Wr ongf ul Inte ntions Princip
le (PD ,
p.289 ), attri butes th e princip le to Abela rd, Aquina s, Butler,
Bentham ,
Kan t, Sldgwi. ck, Kenny and Narveso n. Ka vka also gi ves reasons as
to why the
pr i nciple ap pe ars 's o obviou sly tr ue'. Kenny and others apply C4
to argue,
like the US Cathol ic Bishop s , that ' nuclea r deterre nce is immora
l' (cf .
Kavb p.29 1 ).
It is the clas h of C4 with certain utJ li tarian princip les
(espec iall y the
maximi sation pr inc iple of p. 28 7) that directl y genera tes Kavka
's f irst
paradox of dete rrenc e and l ies behind his other "parado xes'' : see
PD.
.
, •"
.
12
i.s
s t. a ke ' ( p .Z87).
:;t
obj ec tions
as
This as s um p t io n is ope n to es s e n tia lly the same ba t c h
ut il i taria nism
i self:
it is mainl y a mat t er o f i ncre a sing or
vary! ,1g the s t okes i nvol ved s uf ficient l y in a y co unte r examp l e .
usud l
stratc ~y
of
of
Kavka tries t he
weakening a nd fudging the nor mative a s s umption to a voi d the
~o r sl pro bl e ms of distri butive i n justice , and t he like , t hat max i mising
u t i lit y
can mora l ly e njo i u.
But the c ru cial defect in Ka vka ' s argume n t l ies
fo l Low
fr om
t he
normative
( p . 28 7) • 11 7
what
ov erridde n
by
C4
s u ppo sed
u t il i t a rian
to
a ssumptio ns '
Though Kavka tends t o a pply t he fudg ed normat iv e as sumption s in thi s
way, as If it domina ted C/4 ( see e s pe c ia lly p , 29 0), wh a t
and
is
assump t i on howeve r fudged, namely that ' t his mea ns
o t he r mo r al ass ump t io ns a r e
t h at .•.
in
produce ,
situa t i on s ,
are
whe n
moral
c ombi ned
dilemmas .
in
si tu a t i ons
These
are
not
s uc h
th e
f udg ed
as sump ti on
as
special
de t e rr e nt
c a ses
where
one
decnti c
pr inc ipl e , tl1a t yie l ded by ut i l i t a r ian i sm , ove rrid e s o t hers, but wher e t he r e ar e
c ompe ting, ev en c nt ra d ic tory de ont ic pr inc i p l e s , such a s tha t it
int e nd
right
to
to pro c eed to LS N war whe n t he e nemy mi sbe ha ves (on specious u til i tarian
gr ound s ) and. also wrong to i n te nd to do s o ( by C4) .
wr ong :
that judg ement is not ov e rr i den.
Nuc lear de t e rr e nce
is
also
t he
case
is
t hat
in
r emai ns
Nor do es it in any way foll ow that C4
i s in 1eed of qu a lifica ti on as a r es ult (Ka vka' s a ssump t ion,
what
is
th e~e
s pe cial
p.290) .
situations,
Howeve r ,
t her e
ar e
count e r vall i ng u t ili t arian cons i dera tions s ugge sti ng different imperatives .
For
.ln
t he s e
is
wrong .
s pe c i a l ci rcumst a nce s a greater uti l:lty can be realised by doing what
Howe ver
it
is
ha rdly
ne ws,
but
a
standing
objection,
that
ut ili t a ri a nism some time s en joins wl1at is wron g .
Spec ial
s pons on s hip
de t e rre nt
may
appea r
s itua t i.on a,
where
under
ntl lit a ri a n
t o get a foot i n t he moral door, ar e very speci a l.
char a c ter is ed by Ka vka , the y a r e s uch that t he
47 .
deterrence
de t e r r e nce
is
very
likely
As
to
Lacke y ' s utiljt a rian app ro ach r e s t s on o similar fallacy, that u ti litari a n
cons iderations predom~n a te wher e s t a k es are larg e enough: see hi s argument
f or the ;i pp ro nch in MM p. 192 .
Wha · hap p n s i s not that importa n t c ons quenc es ov e rrid e moral principles,
but tha t Applica t ion of one pr inc iple wit h important consequence s conflic t s
with t hat of ano t he r pr inci pl e wi t h less s i gni f i cant consequence s, and in
the we igh-·up of what t o do in t he pro blemat ic circumstanc es the principl e
with impor ta nt con s eq uence pr evai l s .
sucr<"£:d , and nothing else .i s likely
tp
lodc ed in a deep pr.obability-well.
This is ve ry far removed from the real world
su.:, ceed (see p . .2~16), i.e.
si.tuat.J.on whe re nuc lear deterrence appears to be increasing the
deterrence
probabiU.ty
is
of
LSN wRr, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at
least as J.ikely to succeed as deterrence .
that
<l1~ont <:
principles
sllbject
Even if it were
mistakenly
to real-life d .1 .lcmmas should be qualified to
avoid di.l mmas, there is little point in qualifying working
such
RS
supposed
de ontic
principles
C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situati ons.
Instead of pul ling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral inte nt:lons it
involves, it can be criticized more broadly throug h the commitments it
equi. r es,
by wa y of the following principle:
CS.
If Xis wrong then a conditional commltment to carry out Xis
The reason is that the commitment is a commitment
circumstances;
and
that
commitment
is
to
act
itself wrong .
lso wrong.
wrongly
in
cer-tain
Nuclear deterrence is
however a poli cy which commits states to war under certain conditions .
And
as
wi th
conditional
intention,
so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt
th a t
su perstates
and
controlling
commitmen t
and
their
intention
to
use
representatives
nuclear weapons.
did
not
occur)
is
enough
to
establish
the
relevant
The dangerous strategy of
launc h-on-warning (which could , for instanc e , result J n a
thut
have
response
to
attacks
the point, for which there is
otherwise quite s ufficient factual evidence.
Now the connecting principles
suffice
logically ,
but
are
nucl ar
deterrence,
for
weighty
principle
would
detachment
from
the
by complete preparat i on fo r and
Deterrence of this type is
wrong.
also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence
trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so
parad ox ical:
det e rrence.
ir self
By
case .
i nstance
conditi.onal comm.ltment to LSN war, is wrong.
This
sound
wh n all are liable to be disputed, several defensible
ones, ideally in concert, make for a
principles
one
applied:
it
ou t
the
connections
between
and
not
be
engaged
in
(unl ess
i ts
ha s
appeared
nuclear war and nuclear
Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that
should
chang ed, e.g .
left
bizarre
nuclear
war
direct ion can be drastically
at .least limited, per impossibile in the case of nucl ea r warfare,
to purely mi l i t ary targe ts).
Til e a rguments t hrou gh conn e cting pr i nc i. ple s, can be reinforced by different
sort s
of
ar gument s agai ns t the mo ral c orre c t ne s s of nuclear deterrenc e .
a n 1 a r g uments from lim i ted c~nv erge nc e of et h i cal t heori e s
I
There
wh i ch start from the
commonplace ob se r va ti o n that
~
All the ethi c al a t"gum ents in
favou r
of
nuclear
deterrence
are
broadl y
ut ilitar i an.
In f nct roost of the arguments i.n favour of de t e rrence, including many
t hat
inf iltra t ed
hav e
the
e thi.c a l
l i t erature ,
ar e
those
of
ge ner., l ly drawn f rom game t heory, and primar :tly intere sted in the
one
playe r,
t h r>
USA.
Utilitar ia nism ,
t hough
s till
looking
of
those
expedie ncy -·
advantage
of
basically
at
~dva n tages , i n t e r es t s and ( t ypi ca lly ind i vidual) utilities, has to take
a
partisan
pain of
posi t io n,
a nd
consider
[ or[eiti ng i ts claim t o mor a lity
sup po r t t d
by
o t he r
na tional i ties
othe rwi s e .
The
as
well,
commonplace
on
less
observation
is
the fa c t that such qual i fied moral support as deter rence obtains,
dflrive s from ut il i tarianism.
118
Th e re a r e two d ir e c tions on to a gene ra l cla1m ag a i.nst
de terrence,
either
by wa y of t h e pro- ut il itar i an theme
Uti l ita r ianism properly a pplied also comes out against deterrence
or, 1n o r e s t rongly, by way of the a nti- utilt t arion t heme ,
Utilita r la nism doe s not furnish satisfactory moral arg uments.
The n , by t h e ;rnti. -utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory
in
f av our
d ir ec tion:
48 .
of de terrence.
moral
arguments
Na turally, it would be easy to strengthen the second
a ft e r all it is widely
thought
that
u tilitarianism
is
a
false,
Thu s t he hed g ed utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and J oynt, and
a l s o within th e broadly utilitarian r ange , of Gautier . Showing that cogent
de f ence s of nuclear deterrence have to take a util i tarian r ou te would he a
much t oug her ent e rprise.
Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the
e n te r pr i se c ould be carried through, much would depend on what was
· cc oun t e d cogent. For ce rtainly biz ar re principles, e.g. obverses of the
conne ct ing pr incip l es, · can be i ntroduc ed, which afford deontological routes
t.o deterre nce .
An,l, rl e spi t r some back sliding by bi s hop s , all other ethical positions can
be m., d c to "' penk again s t deterrence and i. t s cont.l.nuntio n . • A deontological
~RRC ngnln At dctc rr c nc · , pr ima rily
he way
of
<lcontic
connecting
pr i ncip l e s, has been a rgued i n some detail.
In the light of these
prlnciplcs , Lt i s not difficul t to s e e how c a ses from other ethical
positi ons would go.
After a ll C4 ha s been defended from a wide range of
stanc es , e.g . contra c t ua l, natural law, utilitarian even.
seriousl y as tray, or even shabby ethic~ ] pg&ition.
pol it i ca l
s yst em
whic h
depends
in
some
uL l l lt:arJan a rgum e nts for its policieo.
It hardly does
measure
then
for
a
upon consensus , to rely on
Yet with nuclear de.terrenc e
just
thnt
appe;1rs to be happe ning, with readily ove rturned arguments at that.
For whether even utilitari.a nism supports deterrenc e depends ess entia lly on:
how
it
ls
applied;
with
which
maximisa tion recipes; along with what other
r estrictiv e assum pti ons (such as those of a deep probabili ty-well);
genc>rous
arc
utll i.ty·
assignmen ts
or
upon
With
different
(and · a rguably
superior)
va rying the guestimat ion methods, very differen t results
emerge, oppo sing deterrenc e and favouring unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt. 49
basic
reas on for this is straightfo rward (and like that ending §4).
LSN war has a n extremely large negative utility.
deterrenc e
out to
whi.c h increases th
other
recipes
of
feasible
a
how
for such things as preservat l on of national
sovereign ty , nationa l security, etc.
assumptio ns ,
and on
Any
policy
such
The
It is that
as
nuclear
probabili ty of this, or even risks it , must los e
alternati ves,
conseque ntialist
type
whatever
are
initially
applied
(e.g.
plausible
decision
Minimax, Dominance ,
Di.s as ter Avoidance , Expected Value) .
The anti-ut ilitarian theme can be def ended either by a full-scal e criticism
o[
ut j lltaria nlsm,
beginning for instance with its well-know n justifica tion of
l ocalised In justic e s , SO or else
11t i l i tarla ni sm
when
applied
One obvi.ous dcflc iency is this:
by
to
addressin g
s ome
of
the
inadequac ies
of
issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrenc e.
on standard util itarianism , what to do , whether
to proceed with deterrenc e, depends on the probabili ty of its success and on the
improbabi l ity of other options working.
deep,
uti ~itarlanis m
If the deterrenc e
probabili ty-well
is
morally requires deterrenc e, otherwise not. 51 But what is
morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are
pro babl e.
49.
Th e ins ab ility of utilitari anism is illustrate d by the
discussio n
inv olving KovkR, Lackey and Hardln, continued in Philosoph y and Public
Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilita r ianism, diametric ally
opposed conclusio ns are reached.
(Hardin 's approach tends however to
expedienc y reasoning of the strategic type.)
50.
Such wider critic isms of utilitaria nism, in all its forms, as an ethical
theory are too well-know n to repeat.
Some of the main defects are
considere d in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for
utilit arl.an ism'.
The point that util:Ltari anism gi ves no firm place to
stand comes from L, Mirlin.
36
wheLh<'r deterrence i..s moraJ.ly wrong or not, i. s
likPly
to
work
or not.
indepe nde nt
deterrence
are
decidedly
essentially
nowhere
i.s
Moral
princi p~s
not
are
through expected Vf.llues, whether utilities or o th e rwis e - though how
ba d :rnme outcome is ma y be .
depend
.Lt
If nuclear deterrence is wrong wher e it increases the
probablllty of war, the n ls it wrong, simpllclter .
det:crmlne<l
whcrhc r
of
upon
firm to stand.
Wor s e, si nce the expected utilities in the case
uncertain,
these
a nd
of
the results util i ta r ianism delivers
uncert ainty
measures>
util itari anism off ers
In con t rast wi t h the soli.d deo nti c ground of principle ,
utilitariani sm provide s only shifting s and.
The objections made apply esp eciall y aga ins t act uti l ita r ianism.
(orm
shows
at
special
int e rests,
such
as
conditions
security
(the
of
estimation rules are pulled in).
probability- well
state ,
have
hi gh
1s
deep ,
utilities,
nat io n- s tat e
and
spe cial
It does not yie ld a deterrence polici;
ind eed
hnrdly yields policies. tall (other than act utilitariani sm it s elf ).
11nd certain othe r diff i ulties may be avoided by considering instead a
o[
act
most that nuclear deter re nce is "wrong" a c c ordi ng to its l ig ht s
under very
il
The
acts. 52 But the method lacks sta bi lity;
These
seque nce
di f fe r en t prescription s will res ult
dependi11g upon how the sequence is se l ected, what is inc luded and what left
(as
also
associa ted p obabilit i es depend crit ically on the sequence selected).
No unequivocal rec ipe is delivered.
selected
out
to
To
see
this,
suppose
the
sequence
is
include worst cases , for instance cases where deterrence fails a nd
war breaks out.
In this event it can hardl y be argued that
deterrence
is
t he
pol lcy that maximizes u til it y ov er the sequence.
Along wit h the argument s, there are
dissatisfac tion with nuc lear deterrence.
other
concom.itant
conventiona l wa rs .
f or
Firstly, the peace it has provided
011l y nuclear pc~ce, or rather lack of nuclear war , as the re
smaller-s cale
reasons
is
no
deep
is
s hort age of
And the "peace " provided is a t best a tenuous
pe3ce, which Is not stable , ~ut liable to upset at
any
stage
by
a
r ange
of
51..
Though this is to oversimplif y, the po int s made ar e not affected by the
simplificat ion .
In any case the simpl ifi ed picture reflects well enoug h
the difference s between Kavka and Lacke y that matter in their debat e
(ref rred to in footnote 49 ).
52.
Whether thjs is rule util itarianism , or still act util i tariani sm
the sequence can be construed as one long ac t, may be left open.
becaus e
- - - -- - -- - - - - - ·
-
37
fn,t_0 rs, lncl 11d1ng er rot· , both human and
t ec lrn1 .:fl.1,
j)C:lc (_~ ,
p 0:i
It thofl not
offer
genu i ne
of the sort re riuir e d fo r a stabl e intec nat.lo
nal 1. 1. fe, but only o fragi l e
·e o f a sort" (PL , p.316 ).
Secon dly, there
enorm ous
is
cost,
mora l
-~!_p_po r_t_~.r~~ _: ___ cost of de.ter renc_ ':_, be cause expe
nditu re on it exclu des othe r urgen t
moral prio ritie s. The US Bisho ps put th is fami
liar poin t, in a surpr ising ly
Marx i st
way,
in
terms
of
destr uctiv e capac i ty and what
'the
ls
contr a dic tion
ne e ded
f or
betwe en
what
cons truct iv
the
is
spent
for
devel opme nt'
( PL,
p . 316) .
§6.
Prac tical , prude ntial and more mora l arg umen ts
from
natio nal
dange rs
nuclr•ar build -up of the supe rstat es , a nd the gene
sis of nucle ar dilem mas.
to
Whil e
there are argum ents to the immo ra lity of nucle
ar war prepa ra ti on, there are also
counr c ·-arg ument s,
that have prove d rema rkabl y persu asive (espe
ciall y to
Amer I c;wi, ), to the mora l
just:!.fiab ili ty
of
nucle ar
war
pr e para tion
in
the
_p_!.c s':~- circu mstan c es.
The unde rlyin g style of argum ent is simpl y an
elabo ratio n, or state -upl ift,
of Liw1- for the esca lnti on of weapo ns at the
local leve l, for acqu iring a gun or
f o r s to c king- tip the neig hbour hood armou ry - and
every bit
a r gu1r.e nt
from
local dang ers.
dom inati on ;
a nd
dubio us
fir st
of
all
seco nd of nucle ar destr uctio 11 .
atom ic
s urren der
and
so
avoid the destr uct io n' (Wal zer, p.273 ).
prepa ratio n is suppo sed to guard again st more
than these ;
third
eleme nt ,
name ly,
loss
of
basic
rig hts
there
with these .
black mail
of
forei gn
appea seme nt
In fact nucle ar
is
ways
a
cruc ial
of
life
This furth er set of elem ents is linke d to the
dange r of
forei gn domi natio n - which is reall y a separ at
e eleme nt from risk of
Thoug h
and
(free dom, equa lity, etc .) and
fund amen tal value s (upho lding of truth , human
dign ity, etc .) and
int eg rat ed
that
The two go toget her,
sinc e lf we dtcl not f ea r the black mail , we migh
t adop t a polic y
or
as
It is that nucle ar prepa ratJo n, 'so we have be
en
tol d , gua r ds again st the doub le dang er:
forei gn
as
black mail.
dom inntl on -need not imply the loss of most basic
value s it does
imply the loss of a t le a st of one , self- de te rmin
ation , freed om to choos e vario us
natio nal objec tives ; conv ersel y loss or erosi
on or infri ngeme n t of basic value s
can occur witho ut fo re ign demi. natio n, for insta
nce, as is comm onpla ce in the
"[ r
•e " world, by internal change of go,wnmtent or irnvij,fnroenta l approach, through
the iiicrc>nsed security and contro l a
nti clcnr
prepnratlon
incr easi ngly
nuclear
risks,
state
demands,
extensive
etc.
But
what
nuclear destruction, also
involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction
ti, _ material
of
53
of the cherJshed life-style.
So nuclear preparation is hardly n c l earcut
bnse
me ans of guaranteeJng basic values. 51•
fn other respe cts too t he argument from loss of
lncku
cogency
an d
rings
ho 1 low,
It
is
basic
values
and
ri ghts
hnrd to avoid th' f •cling r:hnt tl1c:
oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like
ci tati.o n
of
religious
values at politica l ceremonies;
clean cover for economic consideration of one sort
from
demand s
of
the
military-indus trial
of
private
wealth
and
vnl \les
appealed
to
category:
in
and
anot he r,
them
having
However
arising
to
do
with
th e
an argument isn't, or
associations.
And
the
rights
and
But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into
particular nationalistic ones do not.
And one of the main
a l leged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment
or
many
are, most:ly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental,
and worth much sacrifice .
this
of
power.
oughtn 't to be, defeated by lts unsavoury
that t he argument 1.s a
omplex , many concerned with foreign
domJnatiun of other lesser states, and many
conccut ·at:1.on
pious
of
"communism"
of "socialism ", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention
of cnpi talism.
communi.sm
has
What has
been
happened
here
confused
with
of
course
(the
t o tal i tarianism, which does remove certain more
freedoms
(of
opinion ,
association,
is
reality
basic
information,
that
( the
of)
state
values,
etc.,
ideal
socialist
namely
etc.),
of)
and
certain
so does
derivative~ threaten basic values.
One critical q uest i on, then, is whether extens ive nuclear
LSN
wa r,
and
indeed
for
rational way of preservtng
nuclear
those
holocaust,
fundamenmtal
preparation
for
is a good or effective or even
values,
which
we
have
left.
53.
The converse obviously does not hold.
Basic values and
cherished
life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation,
as when a more powerfuJ state imposes its values and way of life.
54 .
The argument from freedom , advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by
state representatives , is further conside red early in Appendix 1.
.... ,
'lQ
J,
Simi la r ci. ue s tions
dominntion
and
arJs e
as
regard s
blackmail.
argumeq;; H from
er, e
Justification
danger
which
is
itself
open
questioned (i n §8 ), both from the
to
ser i ous
point
foreign
of the methods of extensi ve nuclear
preparation depends essent i ally on an arrangement of hostil e
structure
of
of
question,
v iew
of
nation
and
basic
states,
a
i s subsequently
valu s,
such
as
freedom, and oth r wise.
But whether ul tima tely jusU(ied or
dangers
are
no t,
t hese
from
natlonal
those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear
prcpnration, and
jus tific, tlon.
have
They
been
have
par t of many people ' s
accepted
in
moral
by
policy
outlook.
particular , that ex tens i ve nucle ar
however ,
the
makers
as
affording
moral
fact be e n wide ly accepte d, and undoubt e dly form
Wi thi n
frnmework the moral justification holds good .
others,
ar gumen t s
arguments
not
a
c onv entio nal
Northern
It i s within such a fram ewo rk, in
preparatio n
do
such
engenders
establis h
a
moral
fix.
For
the morality of extensive
nuclear preparat ion, but only make a prudential case for such preparation.
people
not
also
face a nucl e ar dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it ls
specif ically moral one.
,1
impressed
by
And
for
ma ny
other s
again,
who
are
who
not
so
or as familiar wi th Soviet and American culture and ways of life,
and thci.r r espec tive r ights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma.
peop)c
Such
live
beyond
For such
the "beneficial" reach of t he supers t ates , prudenti al
counter-arguments from national dang ers carry little weight, and the moral
case
against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged .
Thls is the ge nesis of the argument fr om isolated
people
who
live
in
people.
Consi de r
some
a comparatively remote a rea, whose freedoms are not (yet)
under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by
nucl~ar
d ter r c nce
(a s under pr inciple Cl).
For such isolated people, who may
ha ve little interes t i n the preservation of nuc lear states , there is no
nucl ea r
diJ emma ,
and
nuclear
lo cations may have problems
problems
people.
as
deterrence
to
natio nal
is wro ng.
dangers,
genuine
People in less fo r tu na te
but
in
meeting
these
they are not entitled to impo se grave risks on the uninvolved isolated
In doing so
i mmorally;
and
f or
through
similar
nuclea r
reasons
deterrence , superstates
the
are
proceeding
conventi onal No rthern framework is
j_mpug rwd.
conclusion can be al ter n ' tlvely -c t>rl c hc<l
Tht'. same
argument::
put
a
reflective
i s olat e d pe rson, and check
S! 11 ci>
Amer ican
the
or-
resulting
by
a
substitution
Russi.an 1n the position of such an
asse ssment
of
nuclear
deterrence.
IL wor Jd be th e snm c as that of n reflecti ve isolated person, stripped o f
m1p, rs lntc bins, moral ly opposed to de terr ence and not rnot·all.y
transfixed,
t h <~
c onventional framework fails t o sati sfy requirement s of morality.
The outcome of the arguments fr om dang e rs is, the~ ver y different depending
whc her
on
the
arguments
are
appU.ed
as
rega rds a superstate or not.
The
superstate theme which emerges is, in brief,
SST.
Because o f multiple connected dang e rs from other states which have
nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states
- is obllged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons.
Henc e, by detachment, a super- nation-stat e, such as USA, ought to have something
Jn
orde r
t hP
meet
of
the nuclear armoury that it has.
Or, weakening the theme to
ol.Jjecli on s concerning excess, "overkU.l" capacity, it
retain
i1
t
l east
solid
a
ou~
core of the nu c 1ear devices it has.
(moretlly]
to
For su bs equent
argumc~nt it can be left open whether the oblig-'¾tion involved is a moral one, for
inst a nce
be cause
of
the
character
the
of
pro r·c·c tcd, or only (as nrg ued a bove) one of
g rou nds
to
those
di. sa rmame nL
supporting
ag ainst
a
the
dangerous
SS
reason 55•
prudent:ial
the me
nuclea r
Northern values supposedly being
On
similar
it can be argued that unilateral
opponent
would
be
prudentiall y
Jrralto nal.
It will be fr ely admitted that what is prudentiall y or morally requir ed is
a
s11 hopLimal
st rategy ,
li.ke the famili.a r strategies of the prisoners ' dilemma
si tu a tions and of certain related competitive games .
that
a
su peri or
would
be
cooperative
For
expen sive ,
re source s,
dr ai ning
of
such
t he details are wel l- enoug h kno~1.
55.
admitted
arrangement s.
Cooperation
and
be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a
ra nge of other r espects .
future
be
strategy for nuclear adversaries , if sufficient trust and the
lik . could be achif?Ved , would
agreeme nt
So it should
arrangement s
would
be
much
less
risky ,
destructive of the environment , a nd so on;
However for the present and the
foreseeable
the prospe cts of cooperation a ppear - so we are repeatedly told by state
It can stil l, a nd presumably does, amount to more than mere local
expedi e ncy, s ince the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue.
rcprcscnlat lve s , who are (not always ~ ltt t~gly ) helpin~
unfortunate ly
rather
remote:
only
the
ca make
their
polici es
sure insurance is ex t e nsiv e
nu c l ear preparntion and full preparednes s t o 3pply nuclear force.
At least this is so where one is a superstate :
proceed,
largely
unabated .
nuclear
preparation
Where one is not a superstate , but a lesser state
one must, the r e presentativ es continue, _t::_':l..l_ on a larger ally who has a
one's
a rsen a l,
umbrella.
nu c l ear
pre paration ,
th e lA ck of trust d l splaye d, ,md
for
huddl es
conf l.dencc
in
!ts
and
which
under
co ntrast s
ncouragcd elsewhe r e .
st·at (• , one whic h r.clics for i ts nuclear
grrH1nd
one
anoth e r's
But he r e a level of tr ust and coope ration is_ called for, by
dep0 nd ent states, which is far from foolproof,
with
nu clear
in s uranc e (which is pres umably not fre e ) is obtained indirectly
thr oug h some supcrstate 's
nuclear
COVt!r
super-· ally
Does a "d epe nd ent"
on a s 1pc r -a lly,
rather
tha n
strangely
have
that
exchange
on its territory?
mu ch
Jt s ally's opponen t ?
Confidence, for instanc e , that its ally will not r e nder i t a ta rget or
nuclear
must
stag e
a
Given the pr ocliv i ty of states , especia ll y
l arg0 states, to res ort to expediency, and give n the recen t histo ric al record of
superstates and t heir leaders , too much fait h would be mi spl ace d .
Thus, whatever th e l imited force of t he argume nt f or the superstat e
it
<loes
theme ,
not extend t o the analogous them e for a dependent state, which d if fers
f rom SST nnd end s as follows:
DST.
Because ... , a st a t e without adeq uate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged
to r e ly upo n a s u pe rstat e ally , and within that arrangement , to accommodate t he
facilities and nuclear in stallations of the protecting ally .
ln pa r t for reaso ns already given, principle DST is not very plausible (a nd
same
goes for mo re obvious variants upon it ).
Nor do the arguments of f ered for
SST t ranspose parti cularly well to direct arguments
striking l y
illu str ated
by
the
case
the
for
DST. 56
This
is
more
of more remot e nuclear dependent states.
Consider the a rgument from basic values, for instance , from the angle of nuclear
dependent Australia.
Basic values ln Australia are not threatened by, o r put in
j eopardy through, the ac io ns or plans
of
the
Sovi et
Union.
Nor
ar e
they
thr eatened by the other superstate, t he USA, the only country with ' the physical
56.
As ls widely known, inadmissi ble and usual l y much overrated considerat ions
o f expediency frequently enter into reaso ns why states allow foreign
nuc lea r facilit i e s upon th e ir territories , e. g.
eco nomic consideratio ns
such as trade or local revenue and short- term jobs.
ca1 1acity to launc h
mot j .ve Lo
<.111y
<l o
look convincing .
carries
full scale invasion of Aust r alia ', but
R
wc .i ght.
reasons
In
fact,
the
with
a rgumen t
from
of
For there
arg ument
t he
only
is
qucstLonable
non-n l lf~twd prnc.ticcs.
of
58
domina tion
In this way
too)
the
from dang er of nuclear destruction could be nullified .
such
supe r state
foreign
li t tl e care, the pr e s e nt level of
a
economic and political dom i nati on could be much reduc e d.
fore(•
lack(ing]
so , , so far . 5 7 CJ.ear ly the argumen t from basic values does nol
For similar
1 it t le
'clearly
danger
because
nuclear
of
umbrella,
superstate
dang er
facilities
and
th e
tha t would be removed wi th
With 1 ess remot e dependent Europc 1rn states these
sorts
a rguments from nationa l dangers are only marginally more convincing , and may
b e defeated along analogous lines .
The differe nces in the situations of st ate s, and
peoples,
break
theme
the
of
a
of
monolithic West.
differently
situated
This is a theme especially
favoured by US and the Wes t European rep resentati ves, who present the West,
its
freedom,
as t hr eatened by Soviet domin atio n.
und i.ffrrentiatcd unit.
dep1!nd0nL
i;tntes
with
But
this
l eadi ng
idea,
NATO
desig ne d
powers ,
and
In this the West is a single
in
and
part
to
align
lesser
to justify pu tting them at
nuclear rl sk is as muc h a my th as th e idea of the Golde n West.
The West is
not
so monolithic, it ls not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free , much of it
(i ncluding the Ant ipodes) is not thr eate ned by Soviet domination.
Principle DST - li kewise what it dep ends upon , SST - is
now
coming
unde r
attack by Eu ropean disarmament groups , who c hallenge the core assumptions of the.
und er lying retaliatory model that
0
Safety lies in weapons ,
More weapons i mply more. security59 ,
Cerlainly, for mo:ce :f.s ol ated states, such as New Zealand,
safety
from
nuclear.
a t ack l i es not in wea pons bu t in excluding nuclear facilities (including visit s
from nuclear submar ines ) .
Europe ans are ar guing in
present
of
syslem
is
more
a
similar
wa y,
that
the
a ris k, indeed l ia bility, than a protection (e.g.
57.
For t he quote d c laim, and some of th e
Au stralia ' s Se curi ty , p .94 .
58 .
The Jssuc is furt her pursued in Ap pendix 2.
59 .
Sec, for exam ple, t he las t article in Thom pson.
argument
for
it,
s ee
Threats
to
Thompson, p.251);
envi s -1ged
and thnt: w-ithou!:
Lhcut.r e
for
a
h\icJ. ,;,)ll''
instal1.st:!on1>i Europe cannot be
limited nucle r wnr , in the way .l
thf'
is now seen by US
( ut not Soviet) strategists.
Once the weapons assumptions
are
qu es tioned,
other
assumptions
of
the
retaliatory model a nd its variants come up for examination, namely
ci
Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular
o
Whe th er tle proper response is through nuclear armament,
as
opposed ,
say, to other military responses, such as convent.ional arms, or,
takin g off from the previ ous point,
~
Whcthrr military approaches and procedures (through
ar e
proper
methods,
armaments ,
etc.)
or should be such dominant methods, of conflict
resoLuti.on at the int er national level.
It ls plausibly arg ued, against military procedures, that at no
ordinary
level
do we sens5bly s et about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal
weapons and thr eatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and
r e ally
warranted,
frontier
ethics.
This leads into the issue of alternative
defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary 60
and
explana tion
it
deserves,
questioning of the framework
of
but
never
one
that
already
nation-states.
While
emphasis
anticipates subsequent
the
state
system
is
inrac · , force ls far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expe cted
and are l LkcJ y ine vitnhl c.
nation-state
system ':
For 'forc e has
[a]
permanent
plac,~
in
the
thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very
orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements.
§7.
Th
resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned st;:ites
Ass~mbli.ng
r eferred
th~
to
as
themes
the
so
far
nuclear
de v e lope d
fix:-
States
war-deterrence, because (as argued in §J-§5 )
to engage jn war.-·deterrence , at l east
60.
yields
the
both
and
their
supporters.
deontic dilemma. often
ought
not
to
engage
in
it is immoral, and also ought
for prudential reasons (as
Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in
Mohists.
For contemporary work on alter native systems , see
su rvey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature
and social defence arrangemen ts, and a growing literature on
i . e . convercd.on t o such arr angement s .
argu ed
using
China by the
especially the
on non-violent
transarmament,
·,,,,._
44
SST and DST).
tl w
Th i s dilemma i.s no idle construction
of
virtues
parac.onsisteot
logic),
but
( c onc octed
61
prod uced
by
war itself 62 , or
at
war
and
its
version
of
the
deon tic
least war which spr.·eads beyond purely
mjlitary la r gc ts, as larger wars in evi tably
e . g.
nuclear
, a, wel l as bei ng virtu a lly ublqultous i.n nuclear war discu ssions.
ThP nuclear fi.x 1s in part simply a mor e intense
di 1 emma
demonstrate
a serious real-life dilemma, t he
ouLJ.i n s of which are r e peatedly encountered i .n text s on
asper.ts
to
do
(since
ra il t ra nsport , typically rely on ci.vilian ones) .
military
arrangeme nt s,
The ma in dil emma arises
from a combination of t he retaliat ory model with t he feat ures of
war.
War
is
requlr 0cl for defence of th e state and valu es it upholds (or pretend s to uphold);
but war also invo lves imm oral ac ts and cv.tl co nseque nc es .
war
can
undPr
also
ce rtain
justified.
be
se e n
as a t temp ting a rec onciliation by tryi ng t o show that
ctrcumstanees
Thus
' some
these
reall y
ju tifications
0
evi l
consequences
Regis
of
war '
(Walls ,
p.260).
accept ab l e than falla c ious ,symptotic
are
morally
of war aim to show that a ctio ns deemed
normally forbi dd en by moral ma nd ates are now pe rmissible
the
The doctrine of " ju st
But
this
argume nts
when
perfo rmed
under
is no better or mor e morally
for
uti l itorianism
as
bein g
corre c L \~hen the s takes are larg e .
W;n· and preparedness for
61 .
wa r
als o
gene rate
s ubsidiary
di.lemmas
f or
Thus Green, along with many others, ' find[s ] nucle a r deterrence
the
best of pra c tical policies available to us now •.. give n the realities of
world politics ' bu t ' s till demur[ s ) because of mo ral qualms' (p . xii).
Green
also r e presents both Morgent hau a nd Halle as having 'rather
agonisingly presented a • • . case for a deterrenc e strategy, even whil e
asserting that the stra.tegy is morally indefensible according to the
traditional et hical codes' (p.2 52 ). Walze r ends in a similar dil emma (he
is committed to a str onge r a nd less qualif i ed form of it tha n he set s
down):
though it [deterrence ] is a bad way, there may well be no
othe r tha t is practi cal in a world of sove reign and suspicious state s'
(p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pur sue.
Similar ly th e US Catho lic Bishops
d :llemma;
they s peak of ' th e
dilemma of how to prev ent the use
Fa s kius nn<l Dockrill and i n Benn
terms of moral dilemmas.
present the situation i n terms of a mora l
political paradox of de terrence •.. the
of nuclear weapons • .. ' (PL, p.3 13).
In
too the nuclear situation is pre s ent ed in
Th e nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who
think they have seen the clear admis sib i lity of deterrence, or differently
for those who have seen through the argumen ts fr om nati onal dang e rs.
But
it i.s a dilemma for th ose locked into the conventional f r amework.
62.
Situatior.s in war are als o a major so urce of moral dilemmas:
see Routley
and Plumwo od where several exampl es are gi ven. A general logic a l account
of and theo r y of moral di.lemmas is elaborated therein.
. ...
inst;ince, a sevc t·e tensio n be tween freedom and
difficult
prohlcms
au t ho f· t c y:
'one
of
th e
~0s t
o[ war involv es defending a free society witho u t destroying
the values that g ive it meaning and vali dity' (PL,
p.324).
The
problems
are
greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arra ng emen ts.
The nuclear fix not onl y i nt ensifies a nd complicates other d-Lle rnm:-is induc ed
by
t he
co ntemporary s ov ere i gn s t at~ 63 , in particula r the dee p tension c betwee n
national security and the ope r at ion o f libera l-democrati c arrangement s (sucl1 a .,
"
lnd.lvidual
li.herty , popular control of institution s, etc) .
othe>r more persona l subsidiary d i l emmas ,
( poll U ca l)
obl lgations
to
s for
example
(the
question
the
extent
of
one' s
a nuclea r stat e, and ro le-induced d Uemmas such as
one's conf licting obligatio ns as a docto r or a nuclear
res c•archer
It also accentuates
of
politic a l
obligation s
armame nt s
and
processor
or
eva sion
is
their
considered f urther in Appendix 2).
At the more personal level, tha t of individual and group ac tion, the re
several
ques Ions
to
'Wh, t. should my sta t e
be disen tangled - questions di ffere nt from the key issu e
be
doing
and
influence, d epending on who one is.
I do?
1
one
Jives,
-
do?',
on
whi c h
one
may
exert
influences, i.e.
in
what
l it tle
There is not only the question 'What shou ld
a question whi c h will have a quite different force de pending
a nd
ar e
on
whe re
sort of stat e, where one wo rks, what one contr ols or
on who on e ls and one ' s role s - but also the
questions
' What
sort of person do I wan t to be ?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'. 64
Answe rs to thes e latter char a cter questions will feed back to influence those t o
act ion-or ien t ed
questions .
Each
of thos e questions c an , in gi ven situations,
induce subsidiary dilemmas .
The essential fea t ure of a deontic dil emma is that both A and the
of
A
are
wrong
(or
di ffe rently,
pursu ing a nuclear def ence policy.
obliga tory),
negation
for some suitable A, such as
The place and essential role of deontic
and
63.
The nuclear dilemma is not alo ne re sponsibl e fo r these other dilemmas.
T.arg -sca l e nuclear power generation, a nd other types of warfare and
security ar rangements, also contribute. But a conflict of freedom and
autho rity is already an outcome of the la rge central state.
64.
For gro up formula t i on of t he que stio ns rep l ace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The
l mpo rtnn ce of distilling ouL th e se qu•s t ions, and the moral und es ir a bility
of r!Pt0rrr,n~0 fn terms of whnt: Lt docs to p oplc morally, are brought out
Ln Benn , where however the issues a r e made t o l ook somewhat more separate
than they are .
moral d il emmas ure not
l i t.t>r;,Lure
f, !.,
•
widely
or
well
und er stood,
p...." t'ticular]y
__
e 1-1
~ 1i
in
ca .1
Thi s l s par t ly be c a us e c urre ntly domin a nt e thic a l positlons lik e
utilitarlnnism "annot at al l e asil y accommod a t e moral dilemmas or the data which
giv•s
to
rise
them
but
the n such positions do not r eally offer reporti ve
acco11nU; of wr on~ an d obli ga_~_:!:_on anyw.-1 y.
d i lemma doe
Cont r ary t o utilitarian per ce pt:Lons
a
not neces s arily have any mo ral s olution , though there may be better
a nd worse ways
By
01t .
wh c h
assessments,
contr a st
f orm
the
with
basis
s uc h
e thical
theories ,
preanalytical
oE se n s itive theories, do recognise mor a l
dil~mmaa and reflect t he i r f e a tur e s.
Reactions an
f rom
the
res ponse s t hat a re c ha r ac t e ristic of deonti.c dilemmas
fix.
nuclear
The r e 1<• an un s t end iness, an uncertainty a s to whnt to
<lo , whJ.ch wny tu pr.occed , whl c h pr ind pl •n i n wa ter e d- down for m to
temporary
Thus ,
crutch .
for
as
world' GG , that
b st"
j
ethical
RU;l1 ,)ps wt-o
way
a
of
neve r
exerci s ing
"mora lly
ou r
s J. n a morally-str a pped wor ld .
fu nctor
s peak
moral
A similar
th e
'strictly
mor;il
Dete r r ence ha s a strlc tly temporary role
but
de t e er e nc: e
th e
c i rc um s t a nce s.
de ter r .nc e,
is
be
in a fallen
to
" second
a
acceptability '
object
mus t
cert ainly
one
str ictly
and
wrong,
is
of
from th e
conditional
be to move beyond det er r ence, 'towards a
optlon
as
to
of
what
the
to
nucl ear
do
in
Thus Wal z er, for example, s t r ugg les t o the conclusion
though
a
"morally
try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e.
world free o f the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out
And
can
shift
'moral
c ond i tional '
while
a ccepta bi U.ty ,
good",
responsibility
d~t c rrcnce
fix.
·s
(as from good to a c ceptable) is made by the US Catholic
of
we
gra s p
examp l e , th e Bishop of London contends t hat the
possession of nuclear wea pons 'whil e
acceptable''
emerge
neverthel e ss
the
policy
to
fix.
awkward
that
war
in
the
pursu e
circumstances ( p .274) . 6 7 Howe ver as more than a n immediate stepping stone
to
a
65.
There are exce pt i ons of course, e .g . i n the Catholic educated such as
Sar t re;
a nd Na ge l's f i nal example i s very instructive. For a fuller
t h e or y of mo r a l dil emma s s ee howe ve r Routl e y and Plumwood.
66.
Repo r ted in The Ec onoml s t; re pr i nted i n
1983, We ekend Magazin e p.2.
6 7.
As a response to a moral dil e mma , Walz er ' s approach is perfectly in order
logtcal ly. Tho se who, l i k e Be n n , ' f lnd i t ne ither coherent nor cceptable'
hnvl! no t gras ped t he logic of mo r al di l emma s .
The
Australian,
February
12-13
!i
'.rnp erior
pol Ley ~
nsscrabled
(in
sufficien tly
it
is
§5-§6),
a
dt! cidetlly
reasons
of
·1
}-toor
the
opti_ n,
sort
reasons
i'o r
that
are
decisive
already
for those,
outside the conventio nal Northern f r amework, who find
no
genuine
of
nuc le ar
nuclear dilemma.
To make matters worse the nuclear fix ls, furthermo re,
stal1.:s'
own mald.n&_.
fix
a
It is not somethi ng they blundered into, by accident.
initial nuclear jnvolveme nt was deli berat e l y c hosen, primarily by the
Lhc
escaJAtio n
of
In these respects the
situation
is
like
peop.1 e who deliberat ely let themselve s be invo lved in two incompati ble
relations hips , and build up
though
and
U.:, A,
has by and large also be en deliberat ely chos e n, again mainly by
the USA and the USSR in in teractio n.
th:1 t
The
one
there by.
It
is
build-up.
The fact i
programme is t o be in addition to existing
( which
are
to
Sovi et
that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has
frequentl y l ed escalatio n, and apparentl y still does.
esources
myth,
a
some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, an d nuclear
in North Amerlca occurred on a defensive basj_s in response
bui ld·-up,
nucl~a ·
with
onflJctin g obligatio ns
generally
agr eed
The recent (1980)
United
to
States'
strategic
be already in excess of
Russia ' s , and which always have been so ) (Thompson , p.21) .
The present dilemma , that many people fe e l acute ly,
state
policy,
allies, and
Naturally
not
the
USSR policies.
indicates
especiall y
that
merely
route
by
a
taken
advanced
response
to
capita list
t he
nations,
Soviets
(or
of
USA and its NATO
state
socialism ).
would not have been feasible without compleme nting
And independe nt evidence,
t l1 ere
is then a direct outcome
suc h
as
Soviet-Si no
confronta tion,
is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist
n.:.iti.ons .
There is a t wo-way co nn ecti on between world political arrangeme nts
nation-st.' .ltes
and
the
nuclear
f ix .
arrangeme nts are an evident source of the
nuclear
situation
is
increa singly
present wo rld polJU.cal structure .
is
widely
promulgat ed
.'.lrrangcm ents :
it .is'
seen
On
the
dil emma
as
one
hand,
with
t he
these
result
through
political
that
the
i nd icat ing the inadequac y of the
Indeed it is no longer a radical
theme
but
that: the source of the nucl ear problem comes from state
n world of sovereign states . • .
which
brought
the
wo.ld
to
the prese n t dangerous situation' ( PL, p,JlJ).
nucJ.e11r fix tends to lo':.~ political arrangements into
On th e other hand, th e
the
statist
form,
into
arrangemen ts of an increas ing ly authoritarian and centralist cast.
stutlst
espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to kee p the
and
security,
to
defend
national
inter est s ,
reasons such as perpetuating the system
advantageous
of
confrontation,
st ate
to
(!),
provid e
but underneath there ore other
sovereign
st a tes
and
frame work
the
rlnd
peace
The
military-indus t rial in ter ests, dependent state explo itation, and
polit i cally
favoured
of
inequa l ity
it
supports .
The ~merg ing t heme is t he n that the ve ry nuc l ea r s i tuatio n arising from th e
statist
arrangements
a nd
interr e lations
( conomic
ideologies , etc.) tends to , and is used to, lock
a rr nngcme nl.s
of
s overeign
where
the
pa ttern
world
states And zones of inter e st .
t heme is a pi ecemea l pr a cti cal one .
side
the
rivalries,
into
conflict i ng
the
present
The argument to th1. s
Consider first, the matter from the
Soviet
of nati ona l control and progressive military-economic
reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer .
The threat from the West, whether it exi.sts or not (and in Soviet
perception it certainly does) , has become a necessary legitimatio n for
the power of the ruling elites , an excuse for their many ec onomic a nd
social fa i lures , and an argument to isolate and silence critics within
their own bo rders. In the West we have ••. care fully con trolled
and se l ec tive release of 'offi c ial information ' (Thompson, p.20 ) .
"We" in the West, e specially the Americans, also
integrated
with
state
appara tus,
have,
in
forms
increasingly
the military-industrial complex, which is a
major. benefi c iary a nd promoter of the nu c l eR r. arms race . 68
Secondly, there i s evidence of entrenchmen t of the arrangements,
by
th ing s
S llCh
as
the
SALT negotiation s ;
shown
there are f i xed s uperpower s an d a
(growing) nucle ar club of nations all governed by a
rule , partly held in place by deterrence .
as
flimsy
negotiated
set
Connected with this , there are cases
rev ea ling the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example.
Soviet
US i s
68 .
of
The
invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so th e
not
over.duly
worried
about
Afghanistan
and
its
people.
What
was
The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is
sketched i.n Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism , would
assign even more weight to this point.
As some of them would free ly
concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation.
diff~rent, what it was worried a bout a nd made ~uc]d a r threat~
adj~c ~nt
~estcrn
oil
supp li es :
concerning,
were
these lay within the US zone of interest (cf .
th e d Lscuss ion in Sche ll, p.212).
§8 .
Ways out of nuclear dilemmas:
results.
in itia l political fall-out from the ethical
Virtual ly all the ways are wa ys of limitat:i.on , and they all invol ve in
one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and
limJt~tions
on
the
thu s inevitable.
and
more
or
power s of states.
Limitations on national sovere~.EX _~re
The limitations may be reache d by agreement
and
negotiation ,
less voluntarily agre ed to 69 , or they may be imposed, or possibly
worst of all, they may eme rg e from an ini.t i. al war.
As with other fixes produced by
there
are
suggested
ways
the
structural
ar rangements
of
states,
ou t which do not interfere with these ac-rangemen ts,
inter.stR-te approache s, and there a r.e ways which do seriously alter the struct ure
nnd
power
·elations
extrastate approaches .
of
state s
(and,
in the limit, remove t hem altogether) ,
All the familiar , allegedly "practical" and "realistic" ,
attempt~ to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms
limitations , etc . , are interstate ;
sovereign
state .
The
s ame
goes
(graduated) unilate ral disarmament .
about the nation- state;
they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the
for
les s
"realistic"
But in fact there is
proposals,
nothing
or
empi rical
fact ,
is it part icula r ly a stable one.
nor,
and
its
replacement by alternat.ive arrangement s.
as
a
We are certainly
free - Jn more libera l states, it should be eve rywhere - to theorise a s
demise
sacred
it is not a particularl y well justified political form;
it js 1ot even a very long-standin g form of political arrangement ;
matter
very
such as
to
its
And nuclear dilemmas
s houl d have e nc ouraged such reflection.
69.
In principle it would be relatively easy for sta tes to agree to settlement
of their disputes by less damaging a nd expensive contests than military
ones, e.g. by contests of selected rep re sentatives, and not just through
fiB l1Llng ln some form, but by contests of footballers , singers, da ncers,
lawyers , or etc . In prac ti c e, however, such more civilized alternative s
are never much consldered in thes e days of superstates . Animals, by
conLrast, are smart enough to settle dis pute s by means much more like
these .
Even the a nci en t Greeks - though they had a clear appreciatio n of
limits, which has been lost by post-Enligh tenment leaders
regarded the
institution of war as fi nal ( al l egedly inevitable ) means of arbitration
between city-st a t es , not seeing
its
social,
structurally -emergent,
characte r.
50
approaches take one of
Extrnstr1te
ittlernat ional
of slate s.
r.ol
two
rou tes,
way
~Ile
to
l~,
ge nuine
power, or the way down, throt1gh fractio nation or deunionisat lon 7 0
The ways up and down are by no means one and the same;
,10ccss;1rily incompatibl e .
but they are
Some of the impo rt ant machinery, for a way up to
world governmen t, is alre ady there in the
international
law-courts.
Wer e
the
courts ns signed suf fi cien t authorit y and po we r, the remedy , namely through legal
acl ion, that· medie val
principle
theo ri. t s
saw
to
all
disputes,
could
in
be rxtended to in t ers ta te disput es , and th e just war between states S
and T supersed ed by the just ~ase of S versLs T.
given
intrastate
s n fflcienl
least jilitial]y)
But if
the
law
courts
were
power then their a uthority and efficacy would likely rely (a t
upon
war deterrence ,
though
not by military means.
perhaps
Law courts, as usually conceived, are not
effective without police and jails or
their
and
equiva l ent
supcr-statist
back-up
eq uivalent
for
of
economic
other
penalties;
and
the
either wi l l involve the capacity to inflict quite
substi'.tntial amounts of damage on "delinquents" -· which, bec ause delinquents will
typicnlJy
be
organisations,
will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps
dissent 'ng , participants in those organisations, as well as to other
In
pa rt i es.
repC'ilt
uninvolved
short t such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to
rt .
Tl1 • Way Up is one more stnt i s t, legali stic , authoritarian way of trying
ec:t
t. n
gri.ps
with
the
nuclear
though mostly 1n passing to be
to
problem, and accordi ngly is often men tioned,
dismi ss ed 71 ,
in
orthodox
strategic
texts
on
-·--------- - - - -- -70.
Am e ricans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the US SR) is
a union, of fairly recen t orig in, and that a differ e ntly-oriented State of
the Union message could well consi der dissolution of the
uni on.
Regional
movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular s upport at present. By
contras t, the re are signif i cant se para ti on movemen ts , some deserving aid
and e ncouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR ,
UK and France . The USSR already has tr oub le in holding its (supposedly
voluntarily integrated) satellite em pire together;
and the one recent
attempted add ition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant.
Nor s ho uld powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be
f no t c rcd c l ocwhc r e .
The some appli es to state empire expansion, ns
.illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Mos t important, the reunification
of
Germany
should be resi sted;
instead a more rational regional
deuni fication than the p resent East-·West division of post-war Germany
sho uld be oought , al ong wlth removal of nuclear weapons from the border
regio n, and so on.
71 .
Thus for example, Ka hn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as,
impractical , etc.
Hardly ne ces sary to s a y the Way Up has won most favour
wllh the 1 ga l f r a ternity , and from more Authoritaria n organi s ations.
5l
thermonuclear war .
By contrast, the Way Down, thoug h like
the
new, is sca rcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions;
means
an appcara nc Q (a comeback) in some more radi ca l discussions,
combined
with the Way Up (in "world ord e r" mode.ls:
unl i ke t he Way Down, i.s
considered
however
beginning
to
be
cf.
Way
and
is
more
sometimes
The Way Up,
sympatheti cally
by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint.
a r e newed emphasis on world order, in rea c hing
inte rna tiona l
system';
and
'the
'towards
a
no
but lt is making
Galtung).
much
by
Up
mora lly
There is
integrated
missing element of world order today is the
absence of a properly constitu ted political authority' (PL, p . 320).
A main argume nt for the Way Up is
just
a
repetition
of
that
which
is
commonly supposed to underpin sta.tist arrangements in the first place, namely an
argument fr om ( gene rous) variations upon the Prisoners'
Tragedy
of t he Commons.
traditionally,
ecological order.
not
herdsmen
as
best
solutions
regards
to
problems
as
the
of
organisation,
public order and, more rec ently, as to
So with the "tragedy of nation-states") where the players are
but
nation·-states ,
and one of the prospects is destruction of a
r,ood parl of th e commons by rwclear wa r, the solution is now
sort
such
It is that authorlty and coerc ion - in the form of the
state - a r e r equired to ensure
espe cially,
Dilemma,
of superstnt e.
said
to
be
some
Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application
of the "traged y" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some
of
thcjr
be
order-imposing
corr espo, dingly weakened.
ar gum ent s
are
role,
and
But all
political
this
is
obligation
to
There a re, then, many problems
through
these
A
further
theoretical
with
h:1.tch
the
is
Way
that
Up,
a
both
"tragedy"
theoretical
and
the Way Up merely repeats
arrangements.
It
is
contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations
nearby, that the probl ems of interstate relations are not repeated
72 .
will
72.
stalist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate
only
that
states
good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are
only sound under quite restrictive assumptions.
prac t ical.
assume
to
See further loutley and Routley
especially Griffin.
and
material
referred
to
a
level
therein,
up
and
The rea reas ons for th e state are of course very different from the
thf!oretic::il c:ov er such argume nts af ord. Among other things, the state
enables and guarant ees the accumulntlon of power, privilege and capital.
again .
The maj or pra ctical hi tch is that there h
no prospect at all of getting
su ·ha "solution " t o work in tim e t o Aerve 5.ts intended purpose.
Tn rc:,1.li l y , we ar e no ne arer a world gove rnment than we were a century
ago ,
In fact, it is even arguable t hat since World War II we
have moved furthe r a way from a world government than we were before
Wo rld
War
TI.
The disint e gration of empires has mul tiplied
soverei g ntles . I t ia true that we hav e s omething called t he United
Nations, but eve n the United Nations has decline d in power as it has
grown in memb e rship. By the beg i nni ng of the 1970' s the United
Nations ha d bec ome, in some ways, a l e ss powerful and e ven less
influen tial organisati o n than it wa s a t the end of the 1950's (Hazrui,
pp.2-3 ).
The reaso n s for thj s Mazr ui goes on to o u t line .
future
For
t he
foreseeable
nuclea r
ideologica l d i ff e r e n ces be t we e n s tates , including especia l ly differenc e s
as to how politica l arr angeme nts shoul d be e ff e cted, exclude any prospect of
opcrnt l vc
world governmen t or a worl d legal s ystem capable of resolving nuclear
hostlllt i es .
extre~ely
I n some ways, this is just as well.
monol ithic,
woul d
World
gov ernme n t
would
cer t ainly ,
whatever
it s
( g ray?)
politic al
colour,
{~xplo l tatJ v e eco nomic sys tem whi ch would do i mmens e
impose
damage
on
to
It
undesira b le
l eve l
Ideological,
r equ1 site
the world an
many
remaining
of
inde e d
u nity
political
and
parad 'gmatic ,
cannot
be
and,
e c o nomi c
sepa r atio n
expect e d
in
some
crucial
respects,
unity.
of
Moreover ,
give n
Northern
main
within nuclea r dea dlines.
swee ping
more
sovereig nty , c o ul d
blockages
and
agr ~ements,
be
negotiated?
dea dl ocks
i1
the
involving
genuine
There
an
way
is
When not even
endless
of
of
that
state
series
of s uch state reconciliation.
a pp lies to int e rst a te arrang eme nts, whi .h ma y make limited us e
the
of
The s ame
Way
Up
nego tia tions or other conc i liation pr ocedu r es within a fram ewo rk arranged
•
-
through the Unit ed Nations);
73.
it
limitations
almost
the
cultures,
nuc l ear weapon s li mitations can be worked out, how much less l ikely is
(e .g .
would
systems. 7 3
The Way Up thu s presupposes an unlike ly
much
be
f ost e r e conomism, would ent r ench bureaucracy with
all l t s damaging f ea tur e s, a nd could e asil y tend to totalitarianism.
·1
n .:ltur.:iL
an
7 11
Fo r a mor e de tailed (bu t decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a
world
gov e rnment,
see Galtung.
Naturall y the objections to world
gov •rnmcnt , 11nd dlffl c ult lca in the woy of oht in i ng 1t, do not extend to
mo r e f l ex ible world arrangements, such a world federation ofcultu res (cf .
Ma zrui ).
Such a plura l lstic ana rchlstic Way Up can
be
genuinely
s yn thesized with the Way Down.
jJ
There is
arrnrgemant s
regrettably
and
als o
conventions
much
are
e~ tdert ce
frequ ently
concerning war and human rights 75), a nd are
scntJments
signed
does
slide
smoothly
that
not
not
1nce rnational
observed (especially those
worth
into despicable dee d s .
bode
well
ever be rcc1chcd.
ln
<'nnv,•11t f< n
any
great
deal:
openly
violated.
I ndeed there:.> already appears to he at least one
fon·C!,
of
lofty
It
for nuclear arms limitations , s hould suffl c i en t ag reemen t
wl 1I C'h
tn
nl1
the
following
intEirna t i ona l
i1P mtljor 11u clc•nr sL 1t:es ore slgnnt:o r l.en,
w!1fc:h w11uld rule ·11t LSN war and nuclc11r cl ic• rcnc
includes
a
Even agreements states have
are oft e n enough disre ga rd ed, sklrted ar ound, or
not
tr ea tie s ,
1
,
t h ton genocide.
Genoc i de
ac.ts commit ted, in time of peace or war, with
inl ~nt to destroy in whole or part a natural, e thical, racinl or rel igio us group
as such:
ki.11:lng members of the group, causi.ng serious bodily or me ntal harm to
the members of the group , d e llbcrately inflicting condittons of life
to
bring about physical
destruction
i.n who l e or i n pa rt.
f ollowing associated a ct s are also punishabl e :
dJrcct
and
public
shall
Beside genoc ide th e
c onspira cy to
commit
be
Persons committing genocide o r any of
punl.shed ,
whether
they
are
the
othe r
act s
responsible rul er s, priva te
individuals or public officials. 76 It is not diffi cult to argue
nucl~ar
genocide,
inc itement to commit ge no ci de , attempts to comm.it ge nocid e ,
complf.ci.ty i.n genoci de.
mentioned
ca lculat ed
that
a
larg er
st rike (such as det e r rence policy requires as a ba ck-up respon se ) would
almost cer t ainl y consti tute an act of genocide, through what
minority
groups.
conspir acy
repr:esentati .v
'S
does
to
some
But then, by virtue of connecting principles like CS, nuclear
deterrence stands indicted
pa r ticular
it
of the
and
as
involving
i.ncitement .
nuclea r
s t a tes
acts
ass oci a ted
with
genocide,
in
Some wel.i - known political and military
would
thus
ap pear
to
be
li.able
to
indictment . and punishment und er internation al law .
7L1.
Even Dahl itz, who gi.ves a detailed and s ympathetic accoun t of nuclear arms
control at t empts and lost opportuniti es, is by no means confident th a t
suitable arrangement s onn now be achieved (se e pp.
210- 13).
Reasons
include technologic al advance s now taki.ng place, and the renewed America n
drlvc f or strategic super ior ity .
75.
See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty Int e rnat ional reports.
in t his paragraph were sugg est ed by c. Pigden.
76.
The accow1t of genocide given is taken directly f rom the
Genocide Convention, whic h is reproduced i n Kuper, p . 210ff .
Most of the points
text
of
the
The nuclear fi.x cmergi.ng fr om nat.io ,,-stnte arran!_1, 111 ~nz:s - c ombin ed wi th the
appare11t
I mpot ence
interstate relations to alleviate the situati on , indeed
of
with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation
ne:.rer
to
nuclear
the
" brink"
is
now
taken
to
ind ica te
contemporary angle) the inad equacy of natio n-state po litica l
tias
gi v en
new
impetus
sovereignty
the best-seller
and
to co nsiderat ion of other extrastate r es olut ions .
The
According
to
can
reorganise
the
radical
namely
n iclear
in
Sc.hell ' s
1
unsatis factoriness
situat .l on
The
should
the foundations of politic c l thought'
pollllcal
t.iicy opvrate •. ,
the
indicates
inst itutions
Fate
lead
political
of
to
req u i red
a
t he
Earth .
' ful l-sca le
to
make
't he
co n sonant with t he g lobal reality in which
and in ' work [ lng] out the practicnl s teps by which mankind ...
its
political
li fe' (p.219).
However Schell himself tri e s to
avoid the se ' awesome urgen t tasks, which , imposed on us by
the
of
the present system of nati on stat e s has even reach ed
stands,
Schell
reexaminatio n o f
world ' c
and
book
a new
a rrangements,
thesis that the nuc l ear problem
national
( f r om
and
work of our age'
else overimpressed
by
political t he oris ts.
the
7
Z
history,
c onstitute
So, no t feeling th e pressures of history or
real ities
of
(unstable)
nation-states ,
do
most
But there i s no good r eason to av oid the task of politic al
rea ssessmen t, made so much more urgent by the nuclea r situation.
There i.s li.tt l e doub t bu t t ha t we live ( too
11nthinklngly)
with
an
an tiquated
s ystem
many
present
state
arrangements,
representative
century
communications
•ery
different
condition;
in
a
77.
when
and
the mai n outlines of the mod ern totalitari a n state
and its mauifold defic i en cies recogni sed, even ea rl ier.
of
( a llegedly
17th
we re
willing ly ,
The feat ures
go vernme nt: , were largel y fashi oned in t he
especially ,
us
even
of poli t ical a rrangements which t he
nuclear impasse , among others, calls in to q 1est ion .
best
of
even
dem ocratic)
techno log y,
more
were
t he
and
primit i v e
d iscerned,
In the br iefs prese nt ed
A similar theme , similarly qu estioning 'such sacred tradi tions as a bs olut e
national so ve reignty', was p r essed by Bradley, a significant US g enera l
( sec Co x , p. 225).
Sch 11. (like Bradley) does not mak e it entirely clear whether he is
thi nking of the Way Up or t h e Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the
Way Up. So does the mai n t hrus t of what he says, e.g. ' Thus the pe ril of
extinction is the price that the world pays not f or "safet y" or "survival "
bu t for ito [sic !] insistence on co ntinui ng to divide itse l f up into
sovereign nations'
(p.210), as if the natural or original st ate were an
undivided one ? On Schell's position , see further Append ix 1.
for political a r rangements such as repr~nontat ive government, the excessive siz
an,! compl ex ity of modern states was not envisaged .
But such systems con tinue to
opcrn Lc , i ns ufflciently questloned, though tl1el r justificato ry bas es
und c r mi ne<l.
prese nt
Nuclear
problems
rep r esentative
have
political
emphasized
have
been
several other defici encies in
arrangement s.
In
particular,
they
have
rcv cn l ed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident
will of t he people on an issue , for instance in installing US missiles
Euro pe a n
countri es.
cen tury
ca s e for r e pr e sentative proced ires is dissolved.
issues,
~
i s sues.
The
least, be reduced.
reduced
excessive
power
back
at
dev e lopme nts ,
pro cedures,
But the route down through
issue-regul ated
large
i mposes
and
complex
other
modern
requirement s.
states
What
lnl t .t1-1.l
s maller
a s iL ls
to
inf or med
citizens
gro uping
than
approx i mate
of
a
g lant
satisfa ctory
good will.
As
the re .1 r c se riou s dcfic encies .f.n
the
l.nf ormation
by
are
stn tes,
government
recent
tec hnologic al
called for a re smaller
Firstly,
in
present
information
and
democratic
progressive
procedure,
of
control,
nation-stat es,
channels, and so f o r.th.
ncc e ptable
the
from
These
upon
nuclear problems have again made patent,
even
·release
the
and
distributio n
distortion
r estrictive
of
most liberal of them (and
Aga in, especi a lly with new and less
systems , there is little excuse for thls.
information ,
upward
depends
But there ar e
e vi dently vest ed i.nterests whi c h stand to benefit from the limited
pub} l t:1 y
and
Secondly , democracy, insofar
political
rela t ed clcfi c i ncies as regards educati.on).
flow
major
li ke many other social arrangement s, appear to function better with
lnt egraLJon of groups by principles of federation.
a nd
on
of governments would, to that ex tent at
grou p.i.ng s , information flo w, communicati on and education.
cx pe n,, ive
lea st
governmenta l power to more participato ry democratic forms, a rout e mad e
poss ibl e ev en in
mu ch
elected
wny that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues ) are not given an almost
f r ee hand on eve ry issue, but are required to answer
polic:y
th e
It is past time
for mor e is sue-control led d mocratic procedures , where governments once
(i n
some
Now that modern communicati ons a nd info r mati on-processin g
make i t fe a si bl e to dete rmine the mi.x of public positions on major
19tl1
in
of
data
featu res
in
have
a vailab ility
major communicati on
helped
in
making
present delib e rat e ly fostered pattern of nation-stat e
56
co11frontatl on, and in establishin g the prisoner's
nuclear
superstates
are
often
seen
to
be
gJlemma
type
situation
th e
locked into (on which see, e.g.,
llardin1.
A central a rgument, arising from the nuclear fix, for
political
questi oning
current
arrangement s and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at
le~sl), takes the following shape:•
Political arrangement s shoul d answer ba c k to certain
j,rnt iff.-.d
111
te1·ms
of
dolng
ut
.eas t
where
and
are
so. 78 The s<.i r e quir ements lnclude ,mch things ns
en;,blJ ng good and meaningful and moral l lve s for those
arrangement s,
requirement s
(as
certainly
in
who
operate
under
the
muc h of the West) the basic
mat e rial condit i ons for such lives are met .
•
l\ccaus c of the nuclear [ix, nation-stat ~ arrangement s have
these
requirement s.
For
guarnntce the prospect of
arrangement s.
nation-stat es,
good
meaningful
lives
those
to
under
their
yet ther e ls a non-negligi ble probability that
person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged
a
meet
at least in the North, can no longer
such 1.lv •s may terminate, leas tl11rn fulfilled, 1.n this way.
support
to
A life's meaningfuln ess ls certainly diminished if it ends before
its 1,rimc inn nuclear d i~aster ;
m.-iny
and
ceased
s tate
to
Furthermore a
acquiesc e
in
or
engaged in nucl ear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf.
Benn) .
Th_erefore, nation-stat e arrangement s have
should
be
amended .
have
their
justificatio n,
and
Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though
not all) natlon-stat es:
natio n- s t ate
f orfeited
it ls not only because of the
forfeited
their
mandate.
nuclear
Political
fix
that
some
obligations to such
states a r e corr espo ndingly dissolv ed .
There is enough evidence that power- brokers who control
stght
of,
or
worse
have
lost
don't care about, t11e point of political arrangement s, of
wha t justifies or is supposed to justify their sta tes.
78.
states
This
applies
both
to
How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the
irn lerlyi.ng politica l
theory.
Rawls, for example, puts it in familiar
contract ual form: that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for
mutual adva ntage' (p.4). Mao puts i.t in a standard democratic way: 'since
Lhe purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people
and the i r interests, it is the people who should control in a meaningful
way, the gove rnment' (see Soo, p. 68).
r;7
rnnre powerful s tates nnd to lesser states, both
c lai m
popular
Ln
and
mandate
ag;iinsL the wllL of the pcopl(! ,
power~.
put
a
value
hi3 lier
where,
nlrea y
illustrated
milita ry situa ti ons:
viol.1ted
the
'IH' t:.1k er s
on
some
have
more often , they act without it or
as
The sit1.1at-ton has been reached
sove reignty
nation al
survival. ' (Scliel1's conclu sion, p . 210;
is
-✓ hl.'lfe
where
than
'nuc l ear:
they do on human
for copio us evidence see
Kupe r).
Thi s
by I srael, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear
the
principles
of
just
warfare
repeated ly, as hav e ma ny other pr i nciples.
much of whn t c l .:i im they lv1d to externa l
have
been
blatantJ.y
Such states have forfeited
respect or internal political obedienc e;
so, on other grounds, have many other state s .
It could just be, of course, as is oft en
a lt er nat ives,
that have
been
re s arc hlng
glimpsed,
though
of world go vernment).
dismissed,
for
s tirc withou
very
no possibly better alterna tives .
but
little
As
to
whether
all
has
such
are
no
been
expended
on
opportunity
do
to
work,
a nd
not
Appea r
to
give
we
alternative s
w~y
Down.
There
working tow ar d s the wea kening
es pec .i.ally
can
be
the
may
and
ha ve
been
given
know very little a bou t how humans
suff icicnt
org anisi ng and trying out alternative
accessi ble
alter natives
instance as lacking feasibil ty , it is diff i cult to be enti r ely
operate under su bstantially different arrangement s.
But,
t ime
arrangemen t s,
to
even
once
again,
proc eed
thos e
nuclear
very far on
of
the
mor e
be time to pr oceed a l i ttle way ho wever , in
breakdown
of
t he
large r
s uperunion s , which are the immedia te problem.
ln valid to simp ly conclud e that alternative poli t ica l a nd
while
t here
But alternat i ves the r e are,
effor t
toking the risk of being dogmati c;
little
d e ad ii ne[,
tha t
t1e r a nge of alte r na t ives or their features (except pe r haps for th e
0
op Li. on
or
insinuated ,
nuclear
st a tes,
Thus i t woul d be
s oc i a l
arrangemen t s,
theoretic a lly feasible and certainly a l onge r- te rm goa l , do not present ly
off er a part of t he practical response to the nuclear fi x.
But there is no need to insist upon a s1 nglc-trac~ Way Out of
dll emrna
to
th t:
exclusion of all olh .rs:
quite the contra r y .
t he
nuclear
We can no t only
afford to be fa:!.rly catholic about " second best " ap proache s and embra ce wha teve r
seems to be working or looks like helpinJi • wUhin re c ogn i sed e thi c al ( and o t her )
con st rain ts ;
Indeed, given the urge ncy,
the
direness
of
t he
si tuat i on ,
we
58
:,hou1d
~s
be
fairly catholic and not lnflexibly co~mitt ed to narrow methods, such
boRged
rlown
( a nd
v ery
on
a rms
limitations
ner,ot inti o n s
m"thod::i
should
si~nifica nt
be
undemocratic
perservered
concessions
unrepr•sentativ e)
between main nuclear states.
wi.th,
from
cert ai nly
tJ nd
and
the
attemp t s
superstates,
made
to
e.g .
No-first···use declarat.lon, a ban on weapons in space, etc.
But even s uch
a
wring
further
jointly
signed
The direction of most
hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially
new .
The politica l means of the Way Out are what they have
la rg e r
eve r y
liberal
or
huma nitarian
been
on
issue that has matte r ed:
from ou tside
state governmental apparatus by organised pressure fr om within or
nnd
it '
by
furnishing
self ·- organising
characte r is tically Bottom-Up
famiL l ar
cons i de rations
are
methods
an
alternatives
practically
wi t hout
which
never
virtually
upon
bypass
it ,
Top-Down.
Such
but part of the more general , and very effective,
case agai nst relia nce upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to
supply,
but
whic h
effectively and [or
can
almost
t hat
invariably
mnttcr
le ss
be
obta i ned, where required, more
e x pensive ly
without
them
(and
their
monopo1 i.es) •
In the case of security it i s states , with very few exceptions,
impo sed ,
or
acqulc s ced
and nuclear weapons .
frequently
from
time
being ,
movement
have
in, milit a ry solutions involving nuclear installations
The opposition to th e
local
a nd
neighbourhood
esca lating
grou ps,
nuclear
fix
has
come
some of them now feder a ted
:1cr,;11s nntions ( " o the dir c cLion :!.a not rcnlly interstate).
!we n rrnc:ccr-rn fu1
that
These
groups
have
in blo cki ng some nuclear ln s tal lat.tons and establishing, for the
some
a ga inst
nuclear-free
nu c le a r
neighbourhoods .
equipment
The
patchwo r k
grass-roo ts
is strongest in Europe, which is - as the
mov emen t realised , and what gave it impetus - a leading thea tr e, on US strategic
thinking,
for
a
limited
nuclear
war
not
touching
ext r eme ly doubtful th a t i~1crea i ng NATO and American
Europe
will
E11 ropc wil l
these
mnke
it
a
saf er
place :
American shores.
nuclear
r emoved
installations
in
on the contrary it seems probable that
bec nme much eafcr lf t he anti-nuclear movements
installations
It is
succeed
a nd Europe r e ndered nuclear-free.
g ro ss ly lmmoral condu c t will ther e by also be conside1.·ably reduced.
Ln
having
The chances of
mrnt of the spectre of Soviet dc)tnl.11t\don, mil..ib:Jt:t, ideological and
Exc:c•p l
in
the
case
of
Eu ope,
where th e inexcusable suppression of Eastern
Eu ru pe a ll too ev iden tly persis ts, this is a n obvious fabrication .
8Cr i ou s ly
And even ir Western Europe the spec tre is
failing
partly
g iant
fashioned
military-in dustrial allianc e.
inc r easJ. ngly
dominated
and
largely
domi na t ed
financially
ideo l ogically.
much
propped
exaggerat ed.
no t
nnd
c1d c quatcJJ
and
ec onomically
some
of
and,
in
some mea sure,
Indeed much of the "free"
world
countered
as
mil.itary
by
The
means .
i .,"
in
basic
any
mode of
mUitary .
But
mil itary, and associated poli tl c al, domtnatlon of We ste rn Europe by
the Sovi e ts is a
problem,
t here
are
several
ways
other
predomi na ntly American nuclear weapons to mi tigate it.
on] y local def e nc e arrangement s - whethe r top·-down
alternative
is
it domina ted economicall y , by the US A.
doml na ti on to whic h nuclea r weapons are con s ide r e d relevant
in sofa r
a
up by the NATO powers '
i s not ge ncraJ. ly considered so much of a problem (as it ts 79 ), and
ls
anyon'
Since the l ast World War, Western Europ e ha s be e n
polHlcally and ideologica lly , by the USA ,
c a1;e
Does
expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canad a
or Brasil say?
Th Rt
other?
social
methods
but
also
some
and
much
r eliance
on
These should include not
state-suppl ied
social
decentralis ation , regionalisa tion and devolution of
orga nlsat{ons,
than
me thods,
or
r estructurin g, such as
power
to
dispersed
local
mo r e cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and
East e rn Europe.
Part of the point of
whether
external
or
r es tructuring
internal,
so
is
especiall y
situa tions, is to
st a t e-contrived
79.
break
make
any
military
takeover,
much more difficult and pointless, and the
rest o r ation of loca l control easier . 80 Part of
int e rch1nge,
to
the
point
of
cooperation
and
at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary
down
conditions
of
hostility
and
distrust
and
to
s abotage
the
West-East confrontati ons, and thereby to remove
For many pe opl es of the world , and in it s impact on the natural world,
advanced corporate capitalism is an oppress ive and damaging doctrine. But,
in contrast wit h a ustere Marxism-·Len i.nism whic h would i mprove the lot of
some of Lhe oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural
world, corpora t e capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many
mo r e individual ri gh t s and libertie s. Ce rtainly Marxism-Len inism which
appears to degene rat e in practice to an authoritari an and totalitarian
position is a less welcome alternative . It is fortunate, then. that we need
be saddled wi t h neither: there are s u per ior options.
60
ot.hC'r
motl ves
fo r,
and
Western
popul ar
suppor t
Eu r ope ,
for
f or,
long
j.
much
Uitary
too
adventures
partial
to
and
military
advt'nturcs, sho uld now be hel ping i t se lf rath e r: than relying on a leaky Amer.lean
nucl e ar
umbrella
for its defe nce .
Moreover it ough t to be, at the ve ry least,
1ncomfortable about the risls of c a tastrophi ca lly damaging
t he
world
in
the
i nterests
of
its own security .
extensive
parts
of
Nor should other "nuclear
depende nt" states be prepared to ac qui esce in this not uncharacteristic European
impositlon.
There
wo rl<l, wha t
LS N war
is
no
risks,
enormous
for
virtue
Western
in sacrificing othe r parts of t he
Europe,
rn i. li t r1ry-base d dom ina tio n to other parts of the worl d.
which
has
long
exporte d
There ar e better. options
than clublou s and ris ky nuclea r shields for Europe.
-·-·- -----
--·- . ·--
80.
Thus , for exampl e, t o the exte nt that lo cal defence groups a re integrated
under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle th at
s urre nder of the central directing sect i on absolved the federated groups
fr om following suit or following further dir ec tions. That is, through
devolution of power, surrender becomes structurally impossible (though
individuals or baste groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section
wnuld ho ld only limited informa t ion about the federated
uni ts
it
in tegra t e d.
The locally organised groups themselves, which would mer ge
wilh local po pulati ons, would be train e d in tact ics of passiv e resist ance,
sabotage, (nonviolent) guerilla warfare, et c.
The net effect (as c.
Pigden, who made most of these points , argues) would be to make the cost of
militar y conq uest, occupations and exploit a tion prohibitively high.
One reason why t he Japanese Army High Conunand decided aga inst invasion of
Au s LraHa i n March 1942 was th e cha r acte r of Australi.ans and the fact th a t
th ey 'wo uld resist to the end' ( Threa t s to Australia's Secu rity, p . 62).
Ycl
th
1 9 112 (wa r
r edu ced ) Aust ralian populatton was substantI.nlly
untrained a nd unorganised for loc ally-based defenc e . With such a defence
r estruc t uring, Aus tralia wou· d not only much reduce its vulnerab ility to
military adventures, but remove standard reaso ns for succumbing to threat s
of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like.
81 .
In par ti cular , with sufficient cooperation
and
trust,
competitive
prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept
separa te, are removed. So too a main mode l
supporting deterrenc e policy
would be undercut.
And the arguments from national dangers would b e
further co rroded.
In the same direc t io n, i t is import a nt to extend cooperation between USA
and USSR down below t he l e vel of state trade deals, e.g. in grai n and gas,
to communicati on and coope r ation between people. For such commercial deal s
there is suff ici e n t tr us t, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why
should it not be so also a t more significa nt people-to-people levels? Many
f ur ther Ror ts of lnt c r rclo tionshfp ore fe slble, nnd jnexpenaive by
m:llltary st a ndards, e . g . sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges,
gi.( t
pro Jee ts .
If, for ins tnnce , 100 1 000 o r mo r e ord lnnry Americans wer e
l i ving, working or holiday i ng in USSR ( and vice versa), Americans would
feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclea r missiles into Russ ia (or vic e
versa ) . Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual
respect and trust; or the con tr ary , a l ot of resources have been expended
to enco urage pr ecisely th e opposite a tt itudes, e.g.
as part of the
strnteg y of the "cold war".
~
6J
What th e anti-nucle a r movement s must press
b,oa rl out1 i.nc;
fof
::tccordingly
i.ic>
perceptive
t r ansarmamen t,
to
i.e.
conversion
outer
edges
of
graduat e d
the
movements,
alternative social defence arrangements).
Bu t t h e ar gume n t a lso makes it clearer how f a r this should go,
t hrough
in
i n pa rt it i s what they hav e_ been pushing for, nuclear reduction
an d rlisarmamen t ( a nd, on the more
wa y
clear
namely
all
the
disarmament 82 to total nuclear disarmament,
unilateral
c e rt a inl y to lo cal disarmame nt across progr e ssively larger parts of the planet's
s ur t~cc ,
inc luding
especially
Europe.
For
once
the
state is demoted , its
i mpo r t ance a nd t he necessity of its maintena nce properly downgraded and reliance
on
dec i s i on- making
its
diminished
de ci s ion-making - once all that is
happe n ) ,
one
in
duly
favour
of
allowed
more localised cont r ol and
for
(it
does
not
need
to
major component in the nucle a r fix is removed, namely the problem
o f red 11ction or even loss of state sove reignty .
Ma'ntenance of that sovereign ty
has been ass i gned a mistake n importance, which in turn acco un ts for the mistaken
we ig ht ass i gned to the arguments from national dangers.
What is
important
and
wo rt h pres e r vi ng is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the
stn r- c .
The na ti o n- state and dangers to it, and accompanying
features
s uch
as
mis p.l aced natl.onal J.sm, are the weakest links i.n the nuclear fix situation .
On ce th e demise of the soverei.gn nation-state is allowed f or, the arguments
fr om
nat iona l
conce rni ng
part i cul a r.
dangers
.lndividual
also
and
grou p
rights
and
In
their
freedoms,
by
t he
that
nation- s tate .
matter
The
are
to
arguments
liberties
in
for
t hem,
as
sma ller
or
exclusivel y
nation-state is neith r sufficient for
are
disappearing,
nor
community arrangements can ensure them.
But
a r guments f r om lnd i vidual and group dangers remain , do they not?
ri sks
are
civil
necessarily
th em , since i n inc r eas ingly many states the s e liberties
nec e ss ary
pl ace
None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life.
None o f ti e rights and freedoms
g ua r a n te ed
disintegrate.
in div id11a ls 11nd groups r e maln:
To
be
sure,
th a t has always been so, 83 and ls not
---~------ ----82.
The In i ti a l but impor ta nt st e ps are at zero cost as regards deterrence.
Wer e det e r re nce re a lJ.y the pol icy there would be little case for more than
a f r a c t io n of pr ese11t nuclear arsennJ.s.
The ste ps to disarmament ;ire
well-known , e.g.
the scrapping of obs olete weapons, and an end t o
modernisati on, the removal of nuclea . weapons in crucial theatres such as
Euro pe, et c .
62
hci n1~ clwnged but only woH,f!ncd in thi. s age of
moslly
to
wont
be
sure
t hat
nucle
or
arc
othe r
outsiders.
People
t hclr li v es will contlnue to run their course,
i.denlly i n a flourishing fash ion , a nd wi ll not be
Russ nns
natlon- states.
t
controlle d
by
Amiirican s
or
Nucl e ar arrangeme nts which threaten t he ir lives
not a rational rout e to these ends .
In t he weigh-u p t hat should occur in char t.tri g a way
dilemmas
the
as
nuclear
out
of
such
deo ntic
fix and its subsid i ary dilemmas, there ar e then much
more i mport a n t elements than featut·es of the nat :ion-st:ate, namely E~-~ of
things
those
the st at e is s uppos ed to safeguard, such as individual and local we lfare
and a ut onomy;
wc,1pons.
but those th i ngs are bett e r ensured by
The
main reasons are fam il iar :
threaten Lhe lo ss of basic values,
such
the
removal
nuclear
of
in particular, nuclear circumstanc es
as
welfare
and
autonomy,
for
many
cr•ntures and reg ions, and the potential los s is in general much great er than in
a nuclear-frcP si tuation ( even should another
with
nuclear
weapons ).
ideological
party
the
o pportunity
armed
There are also well -kn own supplementa ry reasons;
example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local
of
remain
welfare
for
(because
costs of wea pons manu fa cture) and autonomy (bec ause of th e
accompanyin g sec urity measures).
Thus
the
appropriate ly
de vi ces
and
nuclea r
fix
limiting
weapo ns
is
resolv ed ,
theoretical ly
it
can
deploy,
and
how ),
and
rate,
by
by
allowing
for
the
But, although that is a reasonable
Way Out , at little c ost in the circums tances , it will be
s ince
any
sovereignty of the st ate (especially as to what nuclear
con sidera bl e reduc tion of st a t e sovereignty .
pra ctice ,
at
strongly
resisted
in
those who hold power hold it , in one way or another, unde r th e
au s pices of the state.
This is a main reason why people must organise
and
act
aga i nsl the state .
Again the resolution also lo ok s practicnl enough, since
sovereignt y
reduction
in
ne ed apply es s e nt ially only to the the production and deployment of
nuclear weapons .
83.
the
Ind eed
it
could
in
principle
be
obtained
by
negotiated
It will rema in so und er any satisfactor y political arrangement s.
Until
human s ocial arrangement s change substantial ly , there is no substitute for
on-golng vigi lance to ensure or maintain political liberty.
agreement ( at the top l e ve l s of s tat e) .
to
far
with
the
superstates , the li mitations of s tate- powe r will likely ha ve to proceed further:
for nuclear weapo nr y doc s no t stand in sp l endid isolation.
i.nto
both
milita ry
s yst ems - and
( c ivil)
Rather
it
is
industrial production of the states
So, uns u r pr i s ingly, practica l- look ing resolu t ions are being
concerned.
ti ed
solidly
resisted by super states.
Accordingly more popul a r (bottom up) act ion aga ins t nuclear-involved state s
and
espec i ally
against
the supe rstate s , af t e r all the stat e s causing the mo s t
serious dilemmas, wil l have to be t aken much furth e r.
variety
of
organ is ed
forms.
These in clud e a refusal to contribute to nuclear
war preparatio n , e ithe r d i rectly or
wld •l y,
from
such
s t e ps
ns
Once again it will take a
The
indir ect l y.
the
forms
of
action
range
block adin g o f shipme nts of ur a nium, and the
rc f1 1!:lal of suppJ 1, Qa a nd se rv i c es to sa i1or n o n nuc le ar ships and subma r i ne s,
t he
to
withho lding or r ed i rect i on of t axes des t i ned for nuclear security purposes.
They inc l ud e as we ll the whole
r a ng e
nuclea r
facilities
i nstal l a tions
and
of
nonviolent
(methods
protest
which
method s
against
do
exclude
not
i ncapaci t a t i on a nd decommissioning of equipment l and which do include new
model
.
8'~
resistance and de f e nce organisations).
It is important to realise that petitioning of
powe r
state
representat i ves
and
ho l d e rs, f or instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct
ap pea l, t s far f rom a complete strategy , a nd may be ine ffecti ve or ignored,
th e r esul t s disco u r aging.
and
This is one reason why popular action should be based
on a mor e com prehensive politi c al
strategy,
which
also
involves
withdrawing
s up po rt f r om prevailing state arrangements, and working out and partic ipati ng in
alter nati v e a r r a ng emen ts, especially
alternative
defence
forms.
85
Sufficient
d etn' l s as t o what to do ar e already known, enough to make an immediate start.
84.
For some imp r e ssion of the rang e of me thods, see aga i n Sharp.
85.
For muc h mor e on all these points, s e e e .g.
fu rt her Appe ndix 2.
Martin .
As to what to do, see
64
APPENDI X l. ON THE FATE
or
MANKIND AND THE EARTH,
according to Sch e ll, and to Anders.
A
ncrtes
of
nucl cn r
prophet s
lw a
pr odu c ed
a
EJ e r:les
of
ph ilosophj cal ly-·o riented works on nucl e ar war and the all e ged impl i.c c tions of
l1 uman ex t inct io n . 1 The series is important for its dee pe r penetration into the
nuclear d ilemma , down to metaphysical leve ls; i n this the series contrasts ith
the transie nt s u pe rficialities of much o f the political commentary.
The most
wi de l y c i rc ul ated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the
s l ightest of t he ''prophets", Schell' s The Fate of the Ear th.
This skillful
piec e o f medi a -philo so phy uncannily redeploys some of the appar e ntly deep
phenomcno]ogi cal themes of Anders . So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell
and And ers ca n often be considered together. To critic i se their a ssumptions is
not of co u r s e t o belittle their wo rk. In pa rticular , Schell's little book, for
a ll i.ts politic al shortcomings, is having a significant a nd much needed ef f ect
j n sh i ft i.ng att: lt udes towards nuclear arrangements.
It is especially valuable
f or
i ts vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack.
Unfor t 1111,i t ely it: a lso exhibits, both phi losopld.cally and fac tually, sever e
defects .
Somr of it 1s simp ly ga rbage:
to selec t one example ,
consider
the
claim
that
' witho u t . . . a world-wide program of action for preserving th e
[ human] spec i.es
nothing else t hat we undertake together can make
any pr a c t tea l or. moral sense
(p.1 73, rearranged ).
Th is s1ou l d cer t a inly be rejected phi losophica lly ; for ther e is no separate
moral issue of s uch overwhelming importance that a ll other lssues become mor ally
ne 11 t r al. Mo r a l issue s remain moral issues: they don 't cease to be so when
compar ed wi t h more important moral issues ( as Schell effective ly acknowledge s
el s ewhe r e, p . 130 ) . And the claim should a l so be junked on more f actual grounds.
Humans fo rm a highl y resilient sped.es, like r abbit s i n Australia a survivor
spec i es, unl i kely t o be exterminated unde r
presently
a rrang ed
nuclear
ho l oca usts .
l.
The di.st i ng ui shing term i s from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, wher e many of th e
l eadi ng prophets are assessed. One well-known pro ph et not so consider e d
there i s Jas pers , presumably because hJs ma in work (which might equally
we ll ha ve been translated as The Fa te of Mankind) comes out in entirely th e
wrong direction.
For it gives heavy philosophi c al attire
to
the
be tt e r -d e ad -than-red abomination,
A ma ln argument agai nst Jaspers so presented i s simple. Howeve r bad being
r d mig h t be come ( at present it is debatably worse than living under some
of Lh e tot a l i tarian regimes th e free We st props u p), it still gives human s
a fu rth e r chance for good lives , since r e gimes fall or can be topp led: bu t
t o t al a nnihil a tion removes that all-important oppor t unity .
But J as pe r s does not pr e sent his po s ition so simply . Rather his con t e nti on
i s t hat there a re circum st a nc e s whe re a nd princ ip les for which a person or
group of per sons ought .to s acri f ic e even their lives . Freedom is such:
a
l i f e worth living i s a fr e e life. But the latter pint can be granted
w!. 1:liout conceding tha t s a c rlf1cc is a possible means to it ,
While the
sai:rifice of one or a f e w l i ve s may be a possible ( if dub i ously effec tiv e)
w~y t o fr • . l ivc D for oth e r s , c er t a inl y the sacrifi c e of all l ives is not a
poss i ble rout e to fr e e llve s for a l l, s ince no human l i.ves r ·emain. To thi s
rx Le nt Sche ll l s ri g h t (on p . 131) i n a ccusing Jasper s of an ea ch to all
f al l Rcy.
J aspe r 1 s i dea that "the f r ee life that they try to save by all
po s s ibl e mea ns is mor e th a n me r e lif e or lives'' breaks down when applied to
al l participating pe ople. None c a n ga in free live s by extinction of all:
t hat is not a possibl e route to l ife e ve1.
was selected howev e .· b1?ca,.1se it 1eads i0to, lndeed presupposes,
two of the major defec tive assumptiono in the work ot Mchell and And ers:
Sl.
Nuclear w,n· will ellroinate life, humnn li.fe r1t least, on
arth (the
2x~_~nc:Uon assumption); and
S2.
111 the absence of humans, very many notions, not only
those of morality
a nd value, but t hose of time and space for example, make no sense ; or, to put
it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their
s nse on a n act ua l human context ( the ext ravagant a nthropocentric assumptlon).
It is appli cations of S2 which giv Anders' and Schell 's work 2 some of its
apparent phllosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement
through the paradoxica l propositions generated. B11t the frequ ent applications
of S2 depend esse ntially on Sl. For without total extinction there will he
humans abo ut, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense!
Th ·-- exDmp l e
Granled the factual assumpti on Sl is by no means ruled out as a real
po ssibilit y; granted the technological means are now available to make it true,
to render Homo sapiens extinct; 3 granted the prospect of nuclear war does
t hreaten leacfing centres of Western c .i vilizat ion witb obliteration. Even so Sl
appea r s unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information.
Even in Ca nada, which lies on the pol ar route of Soviet missiles, human li fe
should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian
medi cal studies) . Sche l l's argument to Sl is extremely flimsy. It depends, for
example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern
Hem i s ph ere , but for the most part it does that very North American thing , of
con tracting the world to North Arner.lea .
(All that matters, all worthwhile
civili zati on, i.s in USA, or at least, to be more char.itable, in North Ameri cA
and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be
eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon , for
example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significant l y
out of <late. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less
we ll f rom Nortl1 to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than
Schel l's,
by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern
Hemisp here , New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa a nd Latin America could
escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. 4
Roth Anders a nd Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" th e
mean s of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they
both foresee as at least a live possibilit y, would furnish a good medium for
unl e 3rning nuclear technolog y (something very like this emerges from van
Daniken's theor y of an earlier "high" technology). In v i rtue of S2, they would
however 0xc lud e such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly
2.
For a deta iled comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions
o( S2 , se Foley JS.
3.
Thus the Las t Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer
merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new
ur gt'ncy. It is this sort of argumen t: that connects environmental et hic s
and nucl ear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulld oz er
are out of the s ame technological Pandora's box .
Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only
Pando ra's box.
Biological and chemical mea ns are perhaps even more
effective, and ce rtain l y can be more selective in what gets extinguished.
4.
Howev er, new modellifig~ and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep
appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario,
generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange, th e
immuni.ty of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern
LSN war has been questioned . In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching
the evidence , has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous
diff e rences in temperature between south and north, shifting normal wind
pa tt e rns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7
1983, p .56). Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a
vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust
for life on earth, much as many stotesmen have an interest in minimizing
t'r""l .
66
th n t lhc notion no long er rnnde sense.
But what tlh•y s(H'm t.o want to s uggest
wi. Lh th e impo ssi bility-of-unle a rning mes sage is th "' inevitability of the
de velopment and event ual use of the technology - as if having learnt th e means
ull else was dete rmi ned , and manufac tur e and use ceased to be a matter of
c hoi ce. Certainly such vie ws have been flo ated 5• But: they are no t t e na bl e .
Ther e are man y examples of
technological advances that have not been t ak en
adva nt r1gc of, and there are even cases of tec hnological developme nts that have
be en mRnufact u rcd but not marke ted or used. The re is not something ve ry special
a bo ut n11 c l ear appa ratus that puts it beyond the scope of such· generalis;<1 tio ns .
Both Schell a nd Anders do claim tha t the re are very special things about
nu clear wea pon s , in particular that they do not allow "expe riments ". Even if
thi s were tru e - i. t is certainly not of smal ler weapons
i t would not tell
aga .inr,t the pr e v.lous argument: against the ine vitability of nuclear weapons. And
in fac t Anders and (e ven) Schell hedge thejr claims a bout testing , and
the
limits to nuclear sc..ient if i c work ,
to large-scale weapons and independent
experiments which do not interfere w.ith tl1 e observers and those outside the
" J.abnrn t.ories".
Again they have latched ont o major po i nts: in parti c ular, we
hnv e at present no way of testing the c umul a tive effe cts of large nuclea r
weapons in concer t, e . g .
for more holistic effe cts such as fireballs or
firestorms , e le ct romagnet ic puls e or ozone destruct ion. Sho r t of an LSN war,
and l ike ly eno ugh with it, these crucial effects must rema in largely untested
and lypothelical in chara ct er.
The penetrat.ion of human chauvini sm , a s in S2 , is not something peculiar to
Sch e ll, but is a product of Western ph ilosop hy, European philoso phy especially.
This cl,auvinism is unfortuna tely alive and sti ll well, Anders' ve rsi on of S2
being ju s t on e striking illustration ( c:f . AA p . 252ff . ) . It ha s a lso deeply
penetra ted Anglo- Amer i can phi.losophy, and has recently been extended
by
Wittgenslein ' s wo rk , where even the necessary t ruths of mathematics are taken to
be a pro duct of I um:rn co nv enti ons , and would va nish w.lth bumnnsl
Such ar e
all eged imp lications of ex tinction ;
but the fact is that the truths of
arithm PLlc a r e in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humano ids or of
gods or g iraffes .
In Sche ll, human c hauvinis m is dished up in a particularly
powerfu l and obnoxious Kant ian form.
Th oug ht s and proposit ion s, time and
tens e s, history and memories , values and morality, al l depend on the life- giving
pres e nce nf human being s - past or fu ture or me rely potential humans are not
e nough , persons t hat are not humans are cer t ai nly not enough. Thus, a ccording
to Sc hell (p.1 40 , e .g. ), ' ... t he thought "Humanity is now extinct" i s an
impo ssi ble one for a rati onal person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In
imagining a ny ot her event , we l ook ahead to a moment that is still within the
strea m of huma n t.ime,
The thought is howeve r perfectly possible for
huma ns; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later
ratl onal creature may well be able to hav e it tr uly. Schell erroneously denies
that: t here is no "later" ' . . . outside th e human tens es of past, pres en t, and
futur e
(p . 14 0) 6 •
Human ext inc t ion eliminates ' the creature that divide s
time into past, presen t and f uture ' : so anni h ilati on canno t 'come t o pass'
(p. lli3) .
But it: is simply false that the tenses are human;
the tens e s depend
on a local time ordering (per ce ptible to many creature s ot her than humans, but
no t depending at all on that perceptibilit y f or its via bil ity) relating other
time s to the present , to now (a l so a huma n-independent location, evident t o
other cr eatures, an d borne witness to by suc h sequences as the passing seasons).
And nnn ih llntion may als o too easily come to pa ss , for ma ny humans in the Nort h
at l e ast, as it came to pa ss in recent ge ologic al times that human s began to
exist upon earth. Bef ore t hat ther e was a time befor
there were any human
beings.
- •••-- - - H•--- -
--- - - - - -
S.
Not merely by technologica l determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth,
a form e r US general , a r gues by straight induction, that if the US mili ta ry
ha s a wea pon it will u se it.
6.
Th e ap palling theme that humans c reat e past, present and future
repeated e l s ewhere , e . g . p .1 73.
(etc.)
is
Anders ' arg um ent for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no .Longer
even what has been', is also explicitl y and narrowly verificat ioni.st: 'for
wrwl wo u ld t he d iffer e nce be betwe en what. ha s only been and what has never been,
if the r e J s no one t o r emember the things that have been' (AA p.245). Ther e
would st l ll remai n ma ny sorts of differenc e; for one, the history record ed i n
mm1y
other org anisms would be differe n t.
Temporal themes do not la c k
' legl lma y be ca use not regist e red [or
verified]
by
anyone';
truth,
signl Eica nc e , sti l l less meaning, are not matters of human verificat ion.
be
Here , a s e ls e where, the human cha uv i nism is mixed with other distortin g
metapl1ysi ca l assumptio ns of our Western he ritage , in particula r, verificati onism
and on t ol og ical assumptio ns (to the effect that there are severe difficult ies in
talki ng ab out what does not exist).
Thus, for example, Schell takes over
dub I.o ns metaphys ic s from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossibl e to
i magi ne our own death; and whenever we a ttempt to do so, we can perceive that
we are i n f a ct s till present as spectator s" (p.138). The second clause goes a
good dJ e l a ncc t owards refutjng the first. In fact there is no g r eet dlfficult y
in descri bing coun terfactua l s ituations which undermJne both Freud's claims.
The same go e s for Schell ' s extension s of human chauvinism into one of i t s main
tr a<l 1 ti o nal str ong holds, value theory:
the simple and basic fact [si c!]
th at befor e t here can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoici.ng
there must be li f e' , human life ( p. 171) .
These are no facts, but deeply
entrenche d
philo sophical
dogmas whi c h have been exposed and criticise d
elsewhere 7.
Natura l ly s ome t hi ng s will disappear with the extinctio n of humans:
trivial l y t here wi l l be no mor e humans (unless humans re-evolve or are
rec eated ) , and t hus no mor e human ins ti tutions, human activitie s, huma n
emo ti on s , and so forth. But it is a lready going too far to suggest, as Anders
does, that t he r e will a c cord i ngly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain,
no hope , no comf ort, no sa crifice, no imag e, no song ... '. For there are, and
may eontlnue to exist, othe r creatures th a n humans with emotion, struggles ,
songs ,
Nor will the endJng of all such human Vf?ntures, if it comes to
p3ss, show that nl l past huma n ve ntu res have be en 'all in vain', meaningle ss ,
and already so Lo say dead. The decay of t he s olar system, or the heat-deat h of
the uni.ve r s,~ cv~n, wi l l no t s how t hat worthwhil e human activitie s were not
worthwhi. le. 8
Sev er.a l of tbe other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive
from t he i r shared assumptio ns Sl and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical
no t io n (in Re vela tions ) of a Second Death , redeploye d by both.
'The death of
mankind ', und e r Sl, is reckon d a ' second death', because by S2 end Sl remaining
lJ fe i.s r e nder ed mean.lngle ss and already ' seems to be dead' (AA p .244, S p.166)
a nd Ls already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially , a
per son f a ··es ' a s econd death ', not merely one's own but in addition that greater
de ath of the spe c ies and all future generatio ns (S p.166, p . 115). However even
if nu c l e ar ext inction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicate d,
becau s e it de pe nds on the fallaciou s inference to the meaningle ssness of
prec edi ng lif e and on the
very
questiona ble
represent ation
of
this
mea ni ng l ess nes s as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die
just once , pe rh a ps all at about the same ti me . The idea of a Second Death lacks
even a s o li d met aphys i cal bas e .
From Sl , t og ether with the minor pr inciple that extinctio n being an
absolu t e does n ' t d i ff er in deg ree, come s the universa lity of peril them e that
' we are al l exposed to pe r il in t he same degree', which is according ly
'd isguised' a nd 'diff ic ul t to rec ogni s e', be cause there is no contrast (AE p.61+;
S p.15 0 ) . Thi s th eme fall s with Sl. In a ny event, not all peoples are equally
i mperilled by t he nuclea r situation , th e Indians of southern Patagonia being
7.
See , e .g ., ' ll uma n chauvi ni s m a nd env .l r onmental ethics', in Environm ental
Ph i l oso n~
(ed i ted D.
Mann.ison and other s )) Research School of Social
Sciences , Aue trallnn Na tio na l Univ er0 l t y 1 1980.
8.
Anders is here ( AA pp .244-5) r e l yi ng upon a ve rs i on of
the
argument
from
68
rnLher betlcr pJac d than the Germans of northern gu , e .
1 011
Nor are all pe opl e
C<JuaJJy locked
in to the situation or inca pacitated by it; as exp l.aine d,
th e
po s ition is different in different countries a nd placeR.
Nor,
---
1
i ke wise , are all people equally res ponsible, an obnoxious theme,
(in co ntrast to Anders) r-c pc a tedly infiltrates . This is the Po go
theme, ,iccord ing to which
-S3.- · Responsibi lit y for t he pre sent nuclear si.tuation (fiasco, really)
distributes onto e verybody, it be longs to very human in the world . 9
B11t there is 3lso , mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the
stronger one , namely that we have some responsi bil i ty (the Nazi situation is
compared). An es peci ally blatant example of the Pogo theme 10 runs as follows:
'
t he world's political leaders ... though they now menace the earth with
nucl cnr wcapo nG, do so only with our permis si on, and even at our bidding.
At
least, this is true for democracies ' (pp .229- 30) . The theme is elaborated
e l sewhere :
we are the authors of that extinc tion. (For the populati ons
of the super powe rs this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction
and support the governments that pose th e t hrea t of it, while for the peoples of
t he non-nuc lear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail
to try to do anythi ng about the danger)' (p . 152) .
But this is more of an
argt1ment indicting r epresentati ve government, by revealing its insensitiv ity and
unr es pon s iveness to many of the populace they alleged ly govern, not to mention
those affec t ed by its activJties who are not represented at all (namely
ioreigne t-s ). But Schell convenient ly neglects all such points:
we are
pote n tial mass ki llers. The moral cost of nuclear a r maments is that it makes of
all of us underwri. ters of t he slaughter of hundreds of m.lllions ' ( p .152).
And
again '[ as] perpe trators
we co nvey t he steady message
that life not
only is not sacred but is worthless; that
it had bee n judg ed acceptable
fo r ever yone to be killed' (p.153) . Little of this is true . Those who campaign
against nucl ear a rrangements , vote against nu c lear- committed parties so far as
is possible , a nd the like, are certainly not the authors of potential
des t r uction, and responsibi lity .for the nuclear situation does not simply
dist r ibute onto them. Nor does responsibil ity - or the unlikely opinions as to
worth Schell tl l eg itima ely attributes to everyone - fall on those who have don e
less .
Responslbil ity for de cisi ons taken in "liberal democracies " even by
representat i ves (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything
as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented , since among
wi ll c :1
Schell
--- ·------·---- - - -
9.
An inter•stJng converse of thls t heme is sometimes advanced , that no one is
responsi bl e , the whole thing is out of control. The technologit al vers i on
of this no-responsi bi l ity the me is dis cus sed s hort ly. More satisfactory is
the theme that nuclear arrangement s are ou t of political cont ro l , but fo r
re aso ns, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclea r things goi ng,
whic h enable respons ibility to be distributed . The vested interests , wh i ch
bear considerabl e responsibil ity, include the mi li tary weapons i ndustry,
a nd r e sea r ch and a cademic commurd.t.ies , Under pressure s for re-election
especiall y, politicians give in to these powerf ul groups, so losing contro l
o f pol itic a l. processes. The argument fai l s at it s final stag e. For many
politicians either belong to or represent vested interests . Thus polit ic al
processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run ou t of
political control .
10.
Another example of spreading the responsibil ity runs as follows:
'The
self-extinc tion of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sa ne
or sens ible; neverthel ess, it is an ac t that, without qu ite admitting it
to ourselves, we pla.n in certain circumstanc e s to commit' (p . 186). Ev en
for most of the plnnners, ex tinction is presumably not part of "the plan",
but an 1ninte nd ed consequenc ; and most of us have little or no role in
the pl a nning, enough of us even campaig n agai nst the planning .
Fur ther
't he world
chose the course of attemp ting to refashion the system of
sovereignty to acconm1oda te nuclear weapons ' ( p . 194):
the world'?
This
connec ts
of
course with the ideological argument from defence of
fuodamental s, e .g.
for libe rty, for the (USA ) nation, and against
soc inli.sm.
In the'
.nurse of
th:fA
argument yet Rn o thm: fallR 1011s
assumption is rolled out: ' The means to the end are not limited , for the
end itself ~ets the limits in each case' (p,189 ) .
mnny otller th1.ngs, a representative .LH only
represf.ltiJ:ai:ive of a p· rty which
offers a complex and often ill-characteris ed package of policies, and a voter
may vote for ze ro or more policies of this package.
Only in the (uncommon)
event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can respo n s i bility,
st .Ill of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to
e ve ry one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important refated
th eme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nucl ear situation
generates responsibilitie s for every social ly involved person (thi s theme is
discussed in Appendix 2).
When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying theme s,
part of what r es ults is decidedly along the right lines; namely
S4.
The controllers (not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us]
have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out
f step with the nuclear age , the one-earth system, etc.
(the whole ea r th
theme ). Thoug h Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the
state and the frequently immoral purpo es for which the state is us ed,
unfortunat el y he often loses sight of this i mportant theme (indicated pp.187-8).
Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large,
scatter ed and fragmentary.
As observed (in §8) , Schell arrives at the
conclusion t hat the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new
pol iLlcal institutions more 'consonant with t he global reality' are required as
a matter of urgency.
But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out
viable alternative s.
At mos t he makes some passing gestures, some pointing
towards the Wa y Up.
So l utions to the nuclear dilemma come, if not easily, in a similar
simpllstlc way, from the Top Down; tho se who can must appeal to the Top (cf.
p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and pmitat io ns
( such as SALT) and in worl d government ( as with the United Nations) . 1 Given the
r ec ord of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations a nd regulators, it
is by now a pathetic fai th. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of
the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to
explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to
military-indus trial organisation and ways of life .
But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation a nd ,
more generally, of t he roots of war can be found elsewhere. 12 The roots of the
nuclear fix are not confi ned to the ideologically-a ligned arrangements of
nation-slates , but penetrate also into key components of those states, their
mjlit.ary, their controlli.ng classes, and their supporting bureaucracies .
And
both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for th e
a rrangements, and in key components of the states , a con spicuous and crucial
feature
Ls
the drive for power and domination . 13 Thus the push for [nuclear]
supe r iority by the super-states, to be achie ved through military-orient ed
science and technology, which involves a nd enables domination, in seve r al
inter.related forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough
surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from
nature) to proceed wlth military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found t he
h.lgh-te)~nology research and devel opment means to ever more expendable power and
energy.
In changin g t he structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of
nucl e ar war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mai n power·-base,
the natlon-stat0.; it ls also Important to alter key component s of the state,
and, mor e swe epingly, to ·remove trouble-maki.ng patterns embedded in all these
social and political arrangements , namely pat tern s of domina tion, patterns
anife sted not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured
relations,
ma le- female
re l ations,
human-animal
relations,
human-nature
relations; to remove, in short , chauvinistic relations . However not everything
11.
Sec p.225ff.
12.
In Anders and el-borated in Foley, and more straightforward ly, in Martin.
The inco1iplete list of items given ab ove, to be investigated in a deep er
analysis of the ruclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p,164.
and especially p.227, bottom paragraph .
j
nee ds to be accompl ished at once;
and
the clus~~ - of damaging power and
do1nlnaL l on relatlons tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the
probl e ms can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key
components of sta tes.
[n ~1at analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats
th<• familiar false contrast of state cxpedie.ncy with morality, as a c ontra st
between "raison d'etat" and the Socratic-Ch ristian ethics.
The teaching that
'tl1e end justifies the means j_s the basi s on which governments , in all times,
ha ve li. ccnsed themselves to commit cr::imes of every sort' (p.134).
So 'stat es
may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival ' . Schel l
then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justificatio n by
destroying e very end; but again the argument is far from sound, a nd depends on
human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions .
Even if
all humans were extinguishe d (as under Sl) ends could remain, for instance for
nonhumans such as animal s and extraterres trials , actual or not. The e nds-mea ns
argument can however be repaired to remove such objections : instead i t is
13.
These motivating drives form pa rt of a larger int egrated
packag e,
compris ing maximisatio n drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth,
('TI C" rgy, sp ecr,
sat:f.sfnctto n, . • . • for the
newer
Enlightenme nt (but
Faustian ) vlr tues.
Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for
excessiv e neatness nod implic1ty manifested ) to reduce th package to one
main component, prefer e nce-satisfa c tion for 1nstance, or ut .i lity. And the
type of drive ls justified (especially for those who have it, but worry
abo11t i t) not 01ly as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational,
which agai.n it is not. Rationality , the deeply entrenched myth has it,
consists in maximisatio n, of the virtues .
Maxjmisatio n of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation
theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisatio n of power, as with the
Christian-I slamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence , the parallel
maximls ation
of knowledge
paradoxes of omniscience .
There are no
consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient.
The drive for
ma x i mum consistency , often taken to be the epit ome of rationality , also
l e nd s to inconsisten cy in the case of more important theor i es, s uch as
arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative
t heo rems).
IL, .
R & D, though directed by military requirement s and the arms race, also
drives the a rms race. Its role .is partly disguJsed by the myth of neu tral
science.
There have been a tt empts, not only by those committed to technologic al
dcterminlsm , to involve technology more dee ply as the main, or single,
source of t he nucle a r fix . It is technology, th e mega- machine, running out
of control , that has brought us to this pred cament, the nuclear abyss.
Sometimes t his serves to exonerate states and thei.r key components and
those
who
control
them, for they are simply caught up by this
out-of-cont rol machine; but sometimes the s tate itself is se en as a
machine also running out of control. But technologic al determinism , like
other varieties of stronger (nonana lytic) determinism , is false .
Nuclear
technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known po l itical
dispu te involv:i.ng distingu1.sh ed scientists ; it was deliberated , fund ed and
promoted , while other alternative s were not.
Damag ing technologie s of th e nuclear age were not inevitable,
but
dellbcra el y chosen by certain components of the large nation-sta tes. And
murh as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted
with.
The fashionable inevitability /determi.nis m themes admit not only of
refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often
recalcitran t
technologie s.
They also admit of being made t o look
r idic ulous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolut ion, then if
it fu nctions (as it p ·obably will , a matter also determined ), it will serve
as a human population control device, a matter also determined.
That is,
the Bomb has its fixed evolutionar y place in human population regulation.
7l
claimed tha t ext inction null i fies ends-me ans justlft&A~ion by frustrating the
r a J iqntion of ev ery re levant end - me a ning by ' r e levant', in this context,
t hose end,, the rea li sa tion of which th e stat e appeals t o in justification of its
n uc l ear pol i cies . 15
An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe
c no1 1gh 1 sses , would undoubt e dly frustrat e the realisation of relevant state
ends.
So eve n f rom an ex pediency perspective, superstate policies are open to
severe c r i t icism , for exampl e a s motivationa lly irrational.
As to th~~ pa r. t of the st a te and (state) sovereignty tn war,
Schell leave s
us i n no do ub t . A s ov e r e ign state is virtually defin ed as one that enjoys the
right and powe r to go to wa r ln defenc e or pursuit of its intet"ests (p,187).
Wa r ari s es fro m how thi ngs are; from the a rrangement of politic a l affairs via
jealous na t i o n stat es (p.188). Ind e ed th e r e is a two-way linkage betwe e n having
s~:".'_E:_r~}:_f;;22.._~ a n d _ca pad 1:.7 t o wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell
c o11Lends , nec e ss a r y f o r people to org a ni se fo r war. On the other side, withou t
war it is impossibl e t o preserve s overeignty. Neither of these c ontentions i s
t r Rnsparen t l y c lea r a s the y stand. The f l rst is damaged by civil war and the
like, t h e s eco nd by t he per sistence of sma ll nonmilitary states. Now that the
mac r o-state s ystem is e ntrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in
pci r ticu l ar ) t o a rgue from t he "'real:1.ti e s"' of international life, which include
sel f··i n terest , agg r ,~ss i on, f em.· , ha tred.
It is on this basis th a t peace
ar r angeme nts are r e adi ly d ismissed as un rea listic, utopian, even (amu s ingly) as
•xtrcmlsl (c f . p . 185).
Schell's f ur ther th eme that nuclear "wa r"' is not war threatens, however, to
undermine hi s ca s e a ga inst the s overeign state; for example, his ends-means
arg11m nt and t he a rgument based on its nucl e ar war-maki ng capacity. Fortunately
th e nol-wa r t heme needs much qualifi c ation, and starts out from an erroneous
c ha rac t e r i s ati on of wa r as 'a violent mea ns employed by a nation to achieve an
end'
( p .189 ):
but--this is neither ne c e s s a ry nor sufficient for war. What is
ri ght ( s o it i s a rgued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different. from
ea r lie r c onvent i onal wars.
Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end
whic h nuc l ear "' va r" does not have. But nuc l ear attacks can certainly have ends
( ev en if LSN war s cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games
a r e wo n).
It is a lso cla imed that war depends on weakness; on one side being
defeated on a de cision by arms. But in nuclear "war" thi.s doesn't happen, ' no
o ne's st r e ng t h fa ils until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what
t hese sorts o f considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear
wa r s a r e not wa r s, but that they are not wars of certain s o rts, e.g., not just
wa r s (be cause they fall on such criteria a s reasonable prospect of successand
improveme n t ), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conve n tional
war s have pe rs isted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that
nu r:10,1r we a po ns h av also ru i ned " c onventio nal"' wars, and his connected theme
t hat t he demise of war has left no me a ns to finally settle di.sputes between
na t lo ns, f or th e final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192- 193 ) . The theme
d epend s on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war
a nd t he mi s t ak e n proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of
a ppea l'' betwe e n nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests
tha t coul d s e rv e , and
there is also th e possibility of more cooperative
behaviour, e . g. joint refer e nda) . The theme also imports the social-Darwinia n
assum ption of Clausewicz (the "logic of wa r" theme criticised in §2) that war
has to pr oc eed to the t e c hnological li mit
as if war and violence were
thoroughly nat 1 r a l actlvitLes independ e nt of recognised social settings (for
winni ng, su r rende r, etc.) a nd rul e -less activities. On the contrary, wars are
pa r asitic on s oc i a l organisations such as sta t es and are governed by a range of
understandl ngs , conventions and rules .
The y are a social phenomenon, with a
rule structure, if no t a logic .
Huch ca pital has bee n ma de not me rely from "the logic of war" but from what
i s now cal l ed "'the logic of deterrenc e " a nd the "'logic of nuclear [strategic]
plann lng'". The me ssage that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive
n uc l cnr 11rr.1 ngemc nt a t he wo d<l l s now en ll ng 1. ed in a rc perfectly loglcnl, sotmd,
15.
Thi s re for mu lation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main
qual ificat ion can be inferred from Sche ll's context.
- j
72
rcnGonab.le, rational.
However thJs represents li l i:. le more than a cheap
semn nti.cal trJ.ck .
Logic in no way justifies the present arrangement s, or
nnythiu g 1·ke them , or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of deci.sion
(as presented , e .g., in Jeffrey) which ca n be appUed in strat eg ic. planning;
but it does not yield s pecific results without desirabilit y measures being
assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in,
extraloglca lly.
There are various ways these va lue assignments may
be
determined, to meet moral requirement s or not;
but in nuclear s tr ~tegic
planning they have invariably been set tled on the bas iG of expediency. l& In
fact,
'logic of' tends to be used very gener ously, as a word of general
commendatio n, to cover something like 'rational consideratio ns ente r ing into t he
policy or strategy of '. In these terms, S hell, who like o thers enjoys pl.e ying
with the term 'logic of', should write o f ' the il logi c of deterrence' , f or he
emµlic1size~~ (p.21.J) tlP disparity bct:wc11n the supposed rati.onali ty o f t:hret1t~nl.ng
11se of nuclear weapons and the irrational i ty ( even from a national i n te r e s i
viewpoint) of act ually using th m should the threat fail: 17 ~ the success of
deterrence doctrine depends on the c redibili ty of the threat
of
thi s
unjustifiab le and irrati onal use. I nd eed Schell wants to go sti l l further a nd
locate a contradict ion in deterrence (e. g . pp.201-2): but the argume nt depends
on an interesting conf uaion of cont:radictl on with cancell at ion , 18 along with the
Rss •mption that deterrence invo lves cancellatio n . Nucl ear deterrence ma y wel l
be irrational, i.t is immoral, but it is not inconsisten t .
16.
Selecting the 11sual came theory scttlng sees to th is almost automaticnl ly;
for it is then assumed that each player plays to ma ximiz e his or her own
ndvantagc. Thus too th e presumption Jn Walze r, p .277, that 'the logi c of
deterrence' is based on eye-for-eye and toot h- for-tooth as sumptions .
17.
Even the irrationali ty of the use hac been contested, e . g .
it
wishful]y
thought that America will rise l ike a phoe nix
radioactiv ~ ashes .
has be en
f rom th e
The r e is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of th e mis sing
mo..!_ivc for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a r etributiv e
one, but a n ideological one:
eliminate t he prospe ct of the f uture
dominance of the riva i deo l ogy .
18.
An anal ogous confusion of negation with cancel lation or obliteratio n
appears in recent US " st a r war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to
"'negate" incoming USSR missiles .
Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a diffe re nt dire ction;
although
involving negation t hey dep end upon perhaps questionabl e i nterconnexi ons of
intensional func t ors. One type of paradox (consider ed in §5) derives from
a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to
proc eed to LSN war, though credible th reats ( ap pear to) imply an intention
to proceed.
Another s tyle derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the
number of nuclear missiles when t he persis tent pract ice, which impl ies an
intention, is to increase th e number. This paradox is technically r emov ed
how satisfactor ily in another matter
by a dis ti nction between
longer- term ai.ms and :1.mmediate practic e , a time-ho noured method of removing
.PPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collt>,.•Uyr,, and Indiyi,hli1 1 Responsi bility
and on Regional ~~rategie ~
What one do e s depend s , naturally , on where one lives and what mea ns one
hns , AS we ll as on wha t one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be .
So too what s tr a t egy a stat e should adopt depends on where it is located and
what sort of power it is , on national as we ll as on moral co nsi de r ations . In
presen t circumsta nces states have an evident responsib il tty to work ouc th~lt•
pol te l. cs .
The r e nre however some pcrs uua iv • argum ents that this is where uLl
r espo ns i bi l i ty ends : t he se major re sponsibi lities accrue entirely to states,
a nd ther e is no individua l, or (smal le r scale) c oll ec tive, responsib ilit y to
work out a pol i cy or stance on such matters as nuclear ar rangement s and still
l ess to ac t, perh a ps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such
a no-respon sibi l ity or ~-out posit ion no doubt suits many people
many for
th emsel ve s, s ome (especial ly mor e a u thoritari an power-hol ders) on behalf of
othe s - it do e s involve i nadmissib ly opting out of moral responsib il itie s,
r e spon si bil it i e s ac quired by vir t ue of being a person wHhin the fr amework of
ce r tain soci al a r r angements .
Now the r e is no doubt that individua ls a nd groups can do t his, c an opt ou t.
They ca n neglect t he:tr moral re sponsibi liti e s; b ut they are not ju stified tn
doing so. Against th i s clai.m, whi ch is bas ed ultimatel y upo n each person's
being set i n a we b of respons i bj_lity-- induci.ng social r elat ions, whether they
like it or no t so long a s they choose to liv e with others, there are some neat
arguments which a ppear to pe r mi t , or even wa rrant, opting out. One influenti a l
argument take s t he following lin es:
1.
The (o r dina ry) ind i vidual, or group, ha s no poss ibil ity of making a
d i fference t o wha t happens. Theref ore
2.
Such ind ivid ua ls, or grou ps, have no obligatio n to try to make a
differenc e . Hence
3.
Suc h i ndivid uals, or groups, are not mor a lly responsib le , f or instance when
thint s go wr ong.
There are two mai n a ssumption s in this a rgument , both of which should be
resiste d: fir stly, in gett i ng from l to 2, a varia n t of the "ought implies can "
t heme 1 , and se condly, the ass1mptio n tha t individua ls can't make a differenc e .
While it is true tha t individua ls cannot accomplis h much on their own, together
th ey can. Wha t a n individua l can achieve depe nd s on what suff ic ien tly many
other i. nd lvidua ls do.
In highly competiti ve communi ties, full of hopeful
f r ee- riders, a pe rson may encounter a familiar impasse: that he or she acts in
ma nner
M (e.g.
morally, against nuclear arrangeme nt s , r a tio nally), at
con si de r a ble pe r s onal cost , with no gua ra ntee that othe rs wil l also ac t M-ly.
Suc h nn impasse no long e r faces so many in the West, at least as regards initi al
s t eps agai nst nuclear a rrangemen ts. The individua l can cooperate with others in
ways t hat do make a differenc e.
An i ndividual is not exonerate d from
r e s ponslb1.l ity by the argument .
While ind iv iduals can re s pond by joining organisat ions whose activitie s are
di rected a t mak i ng some differenc e , many individua ls a l so have the option of
more indi vldu All st i c action in such forms as boycotts , go slows, po l itical
di s obedi enc e.
An important form of individua l resistanc e, a lready adopted in
Canada and nor t h··we stern USA, is refusa l to pay income taxes directed towards
defenc e
or v·r ious pa r t s thereof ( e.g.
nuc lear weapons productio n and
de plo yment ), or a l ternat ively redirec t ion of such taxes , for instance to peace
fun ds,
Evi de n tl y, however) all these more indivi dualistic forms of political
act ivi ty wo r k mo re ef fe ct iv~ly if individua ls integrate their activitie s, since
th e i mpac t s aggregate ( a nd appear aft e r a certain stage to exponenti ate). As
we l l co l lective action he lps in distribut ing the impact of retributio n or
puni ti ve ac t io n by st a te aut horities.
1.
Any sat i s f a c t ory d _ontic th e ory which t akes mora l dilemmas with du e
se r io usn e ss is bound to r eject th i s theme. There are als o independe nt
g rounds for j e ttisoning this Kantian theme : see Routley a nd Plurowood.
- II
.,I<,'
Th 0 re are, furthermo re, arguments of some weight that individua ls are under
Ro1ne
sort of moral obligati on to t a ke political ac t ion to disaffili ate
tlwm,, l' lves f rom wlrnt contribut es to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of
ac t ion Lhjs is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance,
whether i l is a nuclea r power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilitie s,
etc., and o
such complicat ing issues as what kind of preventiv e action the
state iN l ikely to take in return. (Any state seriously practis ing deterrenc e
Js bound to take some action against effective protest, or ri sk losing
cred ibi l ity ; but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one
individua l need bear.)
One a rgumen t - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear
wea pon s to, fo
example, providing fac ili ties for them - proceeds from th e
wron g ness of nu c lear war to the pos'ition that it is not right to be making the
we~pons for such war.
The argument here appli.es connectin g principle s (like
those of §5), while appealing to such backgroun d informati on as that the
manuf act ure and de ployment of such weapons j_ncreases the risk of s uch war. But
j f it is not morally righ t to be making s uch weapons t hen those who live in a
state that is doing so ought to d isaffilia te themselve s from such defence
productio n, an1 disaffili ation includes not paying for such prodtictio n through
d e fence taxes .
The argument is not without substanti ve as sumption, but the
a s sumptions appear morally reasonabl e and defensi ble.
Another
effective
argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be :
Does one want to le, or effective ly to be seen as, the kind of person who goes
along with the nuclear destructi on of human populatio ns?
Or with making
c red i bl e a threat to do so, or th e like?
What follows applies primarily to
people wh o do not want to be, or be seen as, such people .
Arguments like hese not only put opt-outer s and do-nothin gers on the spot
insofar as they contribut e to national objective s; they also raise questions ,
perhaps eve n dil emmas, as to pol:L ti cal obligatio n fo r those who would take
act ion, ev en limited action such as redirectio n of taxes 3. For are there not
political obligatio ns to the state, such as paying due taxes and supportin g the
national defenc e effort?
It i.s usually assumed that there are. However, no
dile mma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligatio ns to be
re gulated in some fashion by moral obligatio ns ;
for in this case moral
obli ga t i ons ov_rride political obligatio ns. In fact political obligatio ns are
alread y significa ntly limited by moral constrain ts. The nuclear situation does
not so muc h bring out new limits on political obligatio n, as em phasize the
respects in which those obligatio ns are already limited, and introduce further
moral considera tions against sponsorsh ip of national defence arrangeme nts.
\n obligatio n to try 4 to dissociat e oneself from preparati on for nuclear
war or from nuclear-d eterrence , for instance by not spending part of one' s
working life contribut ing indirectl y to it, does not commit one to more t ha n
this:
to an obligatio n, for example, to work for an alternativ e nat ional
defenc e policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this wou ld be a good
thing to try to contribut e towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on
wher e one lives, the level of one ' s commitme nts, e.g . to nonviolen ce, and so
forth. For not only are different types of policy reorienta tion appropria te for
different nations and regions, but there are more superfici al and deeper
rcori ntations that can be worked out and promoted, e . g. schemes that leave
2.
An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthauss en of
s upport of his refusal to pay defense taxes.
3.
This dilemma and op ti on is now removed in practice for most wage earners by
Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes ap parently introduce d to give
t he state interest on gross earnings, bu t obviously very effective in
remov .i ng taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferr ing
ower from ind ividuals to the state.
4.
Given the power of institutio ns and the state one may be able to do little
more than .!:El_, without giving up one's work and thereby one's abili.ty to
contribut e to other deserving causes. For example, it may be v ir tua lly
mpossiblc for one to avoid contribut ing to a superannu ation fund which is
Seattle
in
"co nven ti on,'.11" warf a re a pparatus more
that ch:ing,.. tha t .
H
T
~~ s
intact,
and
deeper
(ecological )
sch emes
Th<:! US Bisho p , f or examplet pr esent R rather shallow set of goals for a
su pe rp owe r s uc h as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the
d e velo pmP n t a nd deployment of destabilizin g nuclear weapons systems and 1o1orking
for better co nt r 1 of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear
s i t ua t i on a ffords an import ant opportunity to press however for a much deeper
se t of cha nge s in the superstates .
For those whose very limited political
i nfluence is exe rted in cons i derably less powerful states, even the shallow
goa ]
ma y look quite different: there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps
t ho se of a nother power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to bett er
c ontr ol .
The vi ew from the very minor powers in the Antipodes i s furthermor e
diffe r e nt from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect ln
much of the Antipodes of avoid.i.ng the more immediate effects of an LSN war,
whi le t her e is Little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and o thers).
There
i s ac cordingly some obligation - an obligation little considered and not grasped
by the powe r holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve
th e r e in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilizatio n. Local
a nd re g ional self-intere st would also suggest substantial steps
towards
s e l f-p r e s e r va tion that (foolishly) have not been initiated.
Wha t i s broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once
th e gonls are gli.mpsed. Steps include wlthdrawal from the American alliance,
wh jch i s in an y case of questionabl e merit since its main advantages lie with
the US a nd J.t affords no guarantee of local defence; 5 c losur e of American bases
and wi t hd r awa l of Ame r ican a cess ri.ghts for. nuclear-car ryi ng equipment to
por ts , a ir bas e s and other facilities, espe cially so as to remove local nuclear
ta rget s; pursu i t of a mor e evenhanded policy of nonalignmen t (something quite
s mal l powe rs elsewher e have managed to achieve ).
That much is easy, in
pri nci pl e ; and justified. It is justified because local commitment to th e
Am e r ica n mi lit a ry operations in the r egion lacks a solid f oundation; it is
preml s s ed prim a rily on t e acceptance of deterrence, which, so it has been
a r r, ue <l ( in §5ff.), lacks justificatj_ · n. That Australian commitment to joint
Aus t r al ian-US f acilities and to US military operations in the region is
e x pl i citly bas e d on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent
s t a t eme nt s of gov e rnm e nt policy. The jolnt fAcilities are 'part of a system of
d e t erre nc e ' • 6
More dif f icult to e nsure, at least without much preparation , is that
economi c and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North.
Se condly, then, the building of increased socio-ec onomic independenc e in th e
Antipod e s is r e quired. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear- free zone
not wo rth targeting militarily: the regio n must also have a sustainabl e life of
1.ts own. For a small region, thcit lo oks a very costly exercise unless combined
with other desirable objectives; for example, in Preddey and others it is
estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build
up New Zealand' s economic independenc e. 7 For a larger region whi ch included
Aus t ra l ia, the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many
Northe rn military budgets, and l1ave the advantage that much of the expenditure
is genuinely productive. If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structu r al
readjustmen t were combined with t he .independen tly desirable aims of moving th e
5.
Se e the dJ s cussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.14O-1.
How slight
t he commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been
e mpha si ze d again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the
USA .
Of cour s e, the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparative ly minor
one , of he many mi.litary treaties that should be terminated:
from a
Eu rop ean nnd world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
ar r a ngeme n t s , and the r moval of American and Russian forces from Europe
( a nd el s ewhere ), are very much more important.
A ful l e r d i scussion of Austr.alia's defence phil osophy
will appe nr in a subsequent publication in this series .
and
alternative s,
76
whole reg i on towa rd s a multi- c u ltural conserver societ y and perha ps even
dh,r ,, r t i ng
"d e fence " spend i ng to conne cted self-managem ent and soci al dt'!f ence
gon l s, the costs would be very considerabl y lessened . They only appear so g r eat
in th e s e tting of a consumer-s atellite soci ety. In any case, wher e lif e and
c ul tu r e themselv e s are conce rned , the cos t s do not appear excessive.
I n sum, Southern countries s ho uld be s e vering their milita ry linkages with
Northern
nuclear
powers 8 ,
a nd
s hould be preparing now, socia lly and
e conom i cally, for the time af t er the LSN war, the g reat No rth ern war.
Howev er
ther e are serious blockages in the way of such th ngs in the Ant ipodes) and
inde e d impeding an y substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war.
Some
of the blockages derive agai n from the f act that present nuc l ear arrangement s
favour man y of the power holders and s u it strong cor porate interests which wield
poli t i c al powe r .
But the main blockages to mo r e popular action a r e sl og a nis ed
r.n the false dlchotomy: "either it won't hnppc.n or we ' re all dead a n}•wayj
so
why bot he r".
One reason for blocka ge is then the extinction assumption ( S l of
Appendi x 1), the unwarr · nted a doption of which is excessively nihil is tic .
A
mor e i mportan t reaso n is that most people, and most of the ir political
re pres entatives, do not bel ieve that majo r repercussio ns of LSN war are going t o
bcf;1l l
th e m.
These are e vents which , .l i. ke starvntion and tortur e , happen to
o th ~r ( r mot) pe o ple , not them.
It is no t tha t LSN war i s unthinkabl e :
rather i t is that i t seems
unb,~llev a hl e t ha t it should make any d ifference . Most people in t he Antipodes
~eal l y do not believe that thei r lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear.
war.
Wa king up and mo bi lis ing t hese peo ple is a major part of the problem in
6.
Se e th e letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Min1.ster , replying to a symposium on
conseque nces of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, l.9 83. The
point is also made by the Fore ig n Minister in his Evat t Memor ial Lecture ,
as
Hawke~ notes.
The point is softe ne d by r e pr ese nting the fac i li ties as
also having a role i n verificatio n, as well a s dete rr ence, 'that mak es arms
c o nt rol and reduction feasi ble': the known role of the facilities in war
fighting i s not alluded t o , and nor i s t he fact that any verificatio n role
can be alte rnat iv ely a ccomplished us i ng satellites. However the matter is
not in any do u bt:
'successive Australian governments . • . have taken the
vi e w that our primary conce rn should be to suppo rt the effectivene ss of th e
Uni ted States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for De fe nc e;
quoted in Threats to Aust ralia ' s Sc ur.lty, p.17).
Government representat ives (e. g . Hawke ) conc ed e that the joint facilities
put Austr a lia at nucl ea r risk.
' Howev e r it is t he judgement of t hi s
Government that the benef.its to Australia in terms of its immediate
int e rest and globa l st r a tegic consideratio n outweigh potential risks'. A
prope r de cision-t heoretic analysis would not sup port Hawke's claim:
since
Australia is known to be a nuclenr t arget because of American bas es (c f .
Ball, pp.130-8 ), the pot e n t ial risks given that an LSN war has
a
non-ne gligible probability far outweigh a ny i mme diate benefit s . Since
Australia has only a r egiona°i strategic role, the global st r ategic
consideratio ns are , as could be othe rwi s e i nferred, primarily those of the
ma in user of t he facilities , the USA. The Governme nt is prepare d to put
Australia , its peoples and e cosystems , a t what is decide dly serious risk
.for i.mmediate and Ame r ica n i.nt ere st s .
A
worthwhile
re presenta tive
government docs not hold its people s hostage for such re asons . Not only i s
tha t short-sighte d expediency decision maki ng: it seems virtually cer tain
t ha t the <letai l s of the decision mak ing, were they ever. revealed, would not
justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, bu t
wou l d turn on s uch things as present trade advanta ges and short-term
co mme r c ial considerati ons.
7.
As to the e c onomic and so cial problems Aus tralia would face in t he event of
a n LSN wa r, see Coombs fo r a preliminary as s es sment.
8.
Id e ally the removal of s igni f icant nuclear targets should t a ke pl c e nc ro as
the whole Sou thern Hemisphere , because this is the zone that is r e latively
insulated, a t mosph e rically, from the Northern Hemisphe r e.
77
achie ving requ isi te social and politi e Rl ~djustmen t.
-yen those who believe
tha t LSN war ls no t improbabl e (but may well not be totally destructi v e of life)
do little to reo r ganise their lives in a way that would reflect their
assessmen t: . 9
Richard Routle y*
9.
Aga in , for some of what to do, for some ways to reorg a nise, see e.g.
Mart in .
There is als o much in teJ.J.ec tual work to be undert ake n, for
example , searching out details of alternati ve arrangeme nts, and al so
dJ.scredit ing establis hment experts, especiall y economist s and poli.tical
scienti s ts , who intellect ually underwrit e present nucl e ar arrangeme nts .
*
The tex t has bee n much improved as a result of detailed commen t s by C.
Pigden , R.
Good in, N.
Gri ff in t B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through
cor r espondenc e with G.
Fo ley.
J.
Norma n has helped in its final
organisat ion.
The initia l outlines of the pa pe r were worked out in
Victoria , Canada; and an early version was read a t Simon Fraser Universit y
in 1982 .
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c;. Anders, Die __Ant_~q •i erthe!.t des Menschen, C.H. Beck, Munchen,
1956;
to a$ A/i,.
G. And0rs, Endzeitan d Zeitenend e : Gedanken zur atomaren
Munc hen;--Pfi2 ; referred to as AE.
Situation ,
referred
c.u.
Beck,
T. Brownlie , e d., Basic Documents on Human Ri.ghts, Oxford, 19 71.
D. Bnl.1, A su i.table. piece of real estate. American installttt ions
Hale & Iremonger , Sydney, 1980.
in
Australia ,
J. Barnes, 'The just war' in N. Kretzmann , A. Kenny and J . Pinborg (eds).
The
Cambridge Histo r y of La ter Medieval Philosoph y, Carnbri.dge Universit y Press,
1982, pp . 771-784.
R.J. Barnett, Real Security, Simon
s.
&
Schuster , New York, 1981 .
Benn, 'Deterren ce or appeaseme nt? Or, on trying to be rational about
war', Appl led Philosoph y, to appear.
nuclear
P. Berg, Re!:._1::habitlng a Sepa_rate Countr.y, Pl anet Drum, San Francisco , 1979.
M, Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlan
Pr inceton, Princeton UP, 19 74.
(eds.),
War
and
H.C. Coombs, 'The ec onomi c and social consequen ces of
(Septembe r 1983) 8-9.
Moral
nuclear
Responsi bility,
Natuni
war ',
5
A.i'!. Cox, Russian Roulette: the Superpowe r Game , Times Books, London, 1982 .
J. Dahlltz, Nuclear
Arms Control: with
McPhec Gribble, Melbourne , 1983.
effective
internati onal
G. Foley, ' Jonathan Schell : Genius - Phi losop her - Rewrite
Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS.
Man ',
agreemen ts.
t ypescript ,
G. Foley, Nucl ea r Prophets. The True and the False_, typescrip t, Bri sbane, 1983.
J. Galtung, The True Worlds, Free Press, New Yo r k, 1981.
D, Gautier, 'Deterren ce, maximisa tion , and rationali ty ' , in The Security Gamble:
Deterrenc e Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age, (ed. D. MacLean), Rowman and
Littlefie ld , To t owa, N.J ., to appear ; also f ort hcoming in Et hics, April
198/¼.
R.E . Goodin, 'Disarmin g nuclear apo l ogists', typescr i pt , 1982 .
R.E. Goodin, 'Disarmam ent as a moral certainty ', Et_l2ics 95 ( 1984 ) , to appear.
P(hilip) Green, Deadly Logic : The Theory
Universit y Press, Columbus, 1966.
of
Nuclear
Deterrenc e,
Ohio
State
N. Griffi n, ' Lifeboat USA', Discussio n Papers in Environme ntal Philosoph y fi8,
Research School of SociRl Sciences, Australia n National Universit y , 1983.
Grou nd Ze ro Orgnnisat ion, Nuclear War: What's lo It For
York, 1982.
You?
Pocke t Books , New
R. Bardin, 'Unilater al vers us mutual disarmame nt', Philosoph y and Public Affairs
12 (1983) 236-54.
J.E. Hare nnd C.B. Joynt, Ethi c s and Internati onal Affairs,
1982.
Macmillan ,
London ,
79
R.M. ll;,r.e, Applicati ons
o[
Moral Philosop ~, M&Q1t1illan, l,~rn,hin , 1972.
R. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decis~on, McGraw-H ill,
York, 1965.
New
H. Kahn, On Thermonu clear War, Princeton Universit y Press , 1960.
G.S . Kavka, 'Some paradoxeG of deterrenc e', Journal
285-302; referred to as PD.
of
Philosol?.!"1y
G.S. K.-ivka, 'Deterren ce, utility and rational choice', Theory
(1980) 41-60; referred to as RC .
and
75
(1978)
Decision
12
G,S. Kavkn, 'Doubts about unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt ' , Philosoph y and Public
Affairs 12 ( 1983) 255-60; referred to as DU.
L. Kuper, Genoclde: its Eoli~ical use Jn the Twentieth Century, Yale UP, 1982 .
D,P. Lackey, 'Ethics and nuclear deterrenc e',
Rachels), Harper and Row, New York, 1979.
in
Moral
Problems
(ed.
James
D.P. Lackey, 'Missiles and morals: a utilitaria n look at nuclea r det e rren ce' ,
Philosoph y and Public Affai.rs 11 (1982) 189-231; referred to as MM.
D.P. Lackey, 'Disarmam ent revisited : A reply to Kavka
and Public Affairs 12 (1 983) 261-64.
a nd
Har de n',
Phil osopl'l_
B. MarU.n , Grass Roots Strategy Against War, Freedom Pr ess , Nottingha m, 1984 , to
appear.
A.A. Mazrui ,
A World Federatio n of Cultures: An African Pe rspective , Free Press,
New York , 1976.
J.C. Murray, Morality and Modern War,
Affairs , New York, 1959.
Cou ncil
on
Reli.gi on
and
Inte r nati onal
T. Nagel, 'War and Massacre ', in Cohen et al, pp.3-24.
J. Narveson, 'Vlolence and War ', i n Regan, pp.109 -146.
National Conferenc e of Catholic Bishops, Committee on Wa r and Peace, ' The
challenge of peace: God's promise and our re s ponse' , Origins 12 (20) (1982)
306-328; refer red to as PL, for 'New Draft of Pastoral Letter '.
Oxford E_i~~lish Dictionar y, Oxford, 1971; referred to as QED.
B. Paski.ns and M. Dockrill, The Ethics of War, Duckworth , London, 1979.
G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingen cies 4. Nuclear Disasters , A Rep o rt to
the Comn1issio n for the Future, Governmen t Printer, Wel lington, New Zealand,
1982.
P. Ramsay, The Just War : force and political responsib il itt, Scribner, New York,
1968.
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard Universit y Press, Cambridge Ma ss., 1971 .
T. Regan (ed.), Matters of Life and Deat h, Random Hous e , New York , 1980.
R. Routley and N, Griffin, 'Unrave l ling the meanings of life' , Discussio n Papers
in Env i ronmental Philosoph y 113, Aust ralian Natio na l Universit y, Canberra,
1982.
R.
Routley and V. Routley , 'The
Alternati ves 2 (1982), 23-8.
irrefutab ility
of
ana rchism' ,
Social
80
R. Rou tl ey ~nd V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions'
in
Paracons i stent Logic (ed. G. Priest, and others~ Philosop hia Verlag, 1984.
R. Scheer , Wi t h Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, Random House,
York, 1982.
New
J . Sche l l, 'Refle ctions (Nuclea r Arms - Parts I-III) ', The New Yorker,
February
48- 109, and 45-10 7, respecti vely. This
P.<>rinr; , trnh tl t lcd Th£> Fat e of th Enrth, hfls now appcnred as a hook wlth
t hat tit l e (Knopf, New York, 1982). Referenc es in the t ex t are to the book.
1,
8,
and
15,
1982,
pp.47-11 3,
T.C. Sche lling, The St rategy of Conflic t , Ha rvard Univers ity Press, 1980 .
G. Sharp, Explo ri ng Nonvio l ent Alterna tives, Boston, 1971.
D. and R. Smith , The Economi cs of Militari sm, Pluto, London, 1983.
F . Soo, ' Mao's vision for China', in ContemP?_rary Chinese Philosop hy
Adelm ann ) Nijhof f , The Hague , 1982, pp.62-80 .
T . Taylo r, Nurembu r g and V:letnam: An
19 72.
American
Tr agedy,
Times
(ed.
Books,
F.T.
London,
E . P. Thompson and D. Smith , Prot est and Survive , Monthly Review Press, New York,
198 1.
Threats to Aus tr alia's Security . The ir na ture and
Gove r nmen t Publishi ng Service , Ca nb erra , 1981.
probabi lity,
Austral ian
R. W. Tuc ker , The J ust W r, John Hopkins Pr ess, Baltimo re, 1960.
M.M. Wakin (ed.), War, Morality and the Mil i tary Professi .on, Westview ,
Colorado . 1979.
Boulder ,
t
M. Wa l ze r, Ju st and Unjust Wars , Basic Books, New York, 1977.
R. A. Wasse rstr om ( ed.) War and Morality , Wadswor th, Belmont , Cal i forni a , 1970.
B. Will.lams , ' How to t hink sceptic ally about t he bomb', New
1982).
Society
S. Zuck.e rma nn, Nuc lea r Illus :l.on and Reality, Collins , Lo ndon, 1982.
( Nov .
18,
1 NTRO!)UCT f 0N.
Vlrt· uc1l ly .11 1 t h e ph i1os ophi.c ;l1 lit cri'!ture on nur.le a r war ls wr i t te n from
;-1
SllfK·rpower (predomin an tly Amer i can) or e lse European (mainl.y German,
British or Fre nch) viewpoint.
This art:icle, a f ter connecting in initial
section s with Northern Catholic literatur e , adopts a very different Antipodean
s La nce . Such re gional per spective s , whil e t he should not affect
the morality
o [ t he mat t e r, ,ff , highly po1i ticaJly relevrmt.
eitlH_•t
t he phJ.lo so ph i ca l li tera tun~, c>spec ially t:ha t emanating from th e
als o
a i l s th e test of morality. lt is c oncerned only or primAr i ly with
what i s good o r "rati onal" or prudential f o r A.raer.i.cans,
or for the American
sl.ltc, t o do ~ whereas mora l ity is ind e pende n t o f place, race , natio na lity and
t ile li ke . This article tries t.o take the morality of the matter, and the
r es ult ing r ed is tribution of mora l and political obligations, seriously. It
c onc l ud es, amon g other things, that th e Ame r i can and Russian states have no
moral bu s ine ss putting nonaligned peoples at suc h grave risk as pre sent nuclear
ar r angemen ts involve.
Mtwh o f
U~A,
CUNTENTS AND OUTLINE: Itali ci sed heading s §3 - §8 indicate the ma i n
structure of the argument
Pag e No
§O.
Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wa rs, and new moral
l.
i ss llPS . L,1 rg e-sc nle (LSN) vs limited nuel ea r wars , the focus on the
f ormer , but the l mplic tions for the latter.
§1 . J_l5)w nuclea r wa rs differ from o t her wars; wars and Htates, and the
2::.9s ulti ng l imi ted appr~riateness of older models and theories of war.
War chc1rac t e ri sed. The e ss e ntial role of th e state. New and diff~r nt
featur es o f nucle ar wars.
2
0
§2 . The mora l si tuation: the recent: tendE:'n_c::L of moral consid e rations
-~-~~s_ome e_n t.i.re ly submerge d_ in_ the context o f war.
The nncl e nt d ist i nction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning
base on expe di enc y. Argume nts tha t war must be expediency-base d refuted.
Mor a l i ty dues nol have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency.
Uti lit ari a ni sm nnd expediency distinguish ed . Limits to consensus:
s upermen and s u pe rhawks. National Interest and expediency assimilated.
Li mits of st ate e n titlement.
§3 . The initial a rgum':nt to the immorality of LSN wars.
One ke y argume nt, from the wrongness of ki.lling noncombatants in mass, is
pr esen t ed, ass es sed, and criticisms met. Ar guments for the premisses of
the ke y argumen t elabo r ated.
§L1. Argum e nt s f r om historica] r equirement s on ,just wars: the important
a rgume nt from convergence, and env:l.ronment a_l ar~Ements_ .
Argume nts from just war requJrements: di sc rimination; proportionality ,
p r ospe ct of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral
positions. Arguments from enviro1nental principles.
§ 5. The shift t:o nuclear deterrence: nrgume nts to its immora~-~~·
De t e rre nc e seen a s the only prac tical way to satisfy major desiderata:
p re ve ntion of wa r: and maintenance of pruden t ial values. Pure deterrence
not t. he po H e y. De terr c nce ais prac t.! c (• d has i.ncreased the probability of
nuclea r war. Th e first argume nt to imruorHlity of deterrence, from the
pla u s ibi l i t y of probab-Ui.ty of Immorality. F11rther arguments through
<l ~u n t i c conn e ct.l.ng principl(~S : the probahl ll Ly l.inkage. Refuti.ng the
c ou n t e rargume nt from the succe ss of deterr ence . The way the onus of
1.
5
11
1 !•
17
Page No
!,ills on deterrence policy , 1.Jhi ·h cannot mt>et. evidcnlla J. requireThe second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious
prc'p.tralio n for nuclear war. The general form of connecting pri nc ipl es;
separating out t hose hat arc correct . Th e third connecting principle:
the wrongness of se rious threats of nuclear devastati.on . Criticism of
this principle lead s to further connecting principles, th rough i n te ntion
and through commitment. Meet i ng counterargumen ts from utilitarianism .
AppJying the connec ting prlncip1es to argue to the jmmoral:tty of
deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti -ut ilitarian
versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with de terrence .
piu,.,f
Till·lll H.
56. ~£0Ctical ,___pru<lcnU.al and more moral arguments from national
daugers Lo nuclear build-up of the ~upe r statc.s, and the genes i s . - of
nu c 1 t',ff di lemmas .
The tirgume nts from nucle,:-ir black.ma:!.l and foreign domination, and from
risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial arg ume11t from basic ri g ht s and
f11ncl;iml.'nl.al values. The argument from i solated people to superstate
iwnoral ity. The supers tat e theme, and rea&ons for its appeal . The much
less p0rsuasive de endcnt state theme. Ch:1llcnging the assumptions of
tllr> undt'rlying rc latiatory mode].
§7. The rcsulring nuclear di~emmas ·- fo r nligned states and their
_supporl e rs.
Ch,nc1ct. er ot the nuclear fix. Subsid iary di lemmas: natio na l securit y vs
37
43
fre edo m nnd democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features
of deontlc dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-bes t escape from the
nud.car fix . The nuclear fix a fix of s t ates' own making . Interconnection s
between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangeme nts.
§8. Wavs out of nuc lear dilemmas: initial political fall-out f rom th e
ethical res 1lts.
Tl1e inevit.c1bil i ty of limitation s on nat1onal sovereignt y. In terstate
and ex trastate approache s . The Way Up and th e Way Down of extrastate
approaches . Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case aga i.ns t it.
FaiJurc of internati onal agreement s) espe ci ally on human rights and
geno ci de. Excl11s ion of nuclear dete rrence und er the Genocid e Convention.
Need fur the reexam i na t i on of current political arrangements i mpo sed b y
the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated politi cal a r ra ngen.ents revealed by nuclear problems . Further arguments from the nucle a r
1 ix for polll lc:il reassessme nt. The we . k J i.nk: the sovereig n nationstatc. Forfeit11re of political obligation by many st~tes . Alternative
po 1 I. Lical arr;__ingcmen t s vs nuc lcar time hor 1.zons.
49
The rnultt-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main polit ica l
mea ns lle outside state governmenta l apparatus. Laying the s pectre of
ideo1ogicnl domination. Social restr uct u ring a nd devolution of powe r.
Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty
go. Dissolving the arguments f r om natiorrnl dangers. S .. a e r e si.stance to
loss of po wer . Further lines of o r ganised act ion agains t nuclear states.
Appendix 1: On
Scl1;!1l
t he fate of mankind and the ea r th, according to
and Anders.
Nuclear prophets a nd prophet .i c ru bb ish . The ext in ct ion assumption .
Common emerging themes of Sc-hell and Anders. The extravagant anthropocentric assumption , and some of wha t is wrong wi.th i t. Second death
dlsmlssed . The universal i ty of peril. The alleged universality of
responsibili t y : the Pogo theme . The correct, but undeveloped, whole
earth theme . Ultimately Schell offers little hope and s upe rf icialiqy.
Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of de t er renc e.
H
64
.1,t . . ..
Page No
~~~_cl_:!~~; On mat t ers of co lJective and individual rt'sp oirn:ibilit.y
a nd on regional strat egies.
Individual and state responsibi.J.ity. Opt-·ouL positions , and o.rguments
t.o Lhem. Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group co peration .
Arguments to direct obligations of individ1rnls to the nuclear
dissociation. Limitations of rival political ob l igati ons.
Dif f eren L pol ic y r e organi sati on for d:i ff 're n l regions. Shallm,•er and
deeper g a]s. Th e important opportunity for deepe r r eo rg.nnisution
afforde d by nuclear dilemmas. Ob.ligations of those in the Antipodes:
what i. s required, and justifi d . Soci a l and ec onomic reorganisation
in the An tipodes, and reducing costs i.nvolv1~d. Bloc kages to social
and po litical adjus tment.
iii
73
ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEA! WAR AN!)
NtlCLEAR
DETERRENCE
AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
Large -seal ~ nuclear wars raise cthlcal questions not generated,
~ Ll
o r n~ arly
HO
th11 n e of even t he larges
d if f0 r· c n c:' !n kln<l of war.
invo l ve,
and
threatened
sa id
to
so
differ
co nv entiona l wars ( t he World Wars ) as to yield a
CertFdnly ma s sive
PX
hAnges
Gt1ch
as
nuc.le:ir
wars
exchanges such a s nuc lear deterrence presupposes , ar e
neither envisaced nor fully accommodate d by tr·d ltional theories of
Muc h
at
forcefully, by previo us human mili tar y cncounters. 1 This is at
bottom because of their projected effect . , which are often
f r om
eit her
just
wars.
new philosophic al reflection and inveRtigatio n is required, even if r a ther
wel l -t est d and old-fashion ed moral princip l es will
se rv e
as
initial
ethical
ba se.
Al though nuclear wars are, thus
non ex i s tent
(extrapolat e
va r ie tiea,
objects,
1
nuclear
wa rs
from n very limited
Ia
fnr, only a decidedly
menac1.ng
class
of
proper have several distinctive properties
nu .lear
experlence 2 )
and
come
in
several
particular, confined or limited nuclear war s, of which tactical
or st rat eg ic ar c subvarietie s, contrast witl1 lirge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars)
- - - ------- ---- -1,
The US Catholic Bi shops i n t heir Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point
forc e fully:
'Nuclear weapons •.. and nuclear warfare ••• are new moral
issu s . •. The re exists a capacity to do something no other age could
ima g ine:
we can threaten the created ord 1· • • • We could des roy [God ' s]
work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows
has a great deal .i n common with the Bishop ' s position, it differs
significant ly in removing the religious backdrop and associated fe a tures
and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument
more clearly and sharply. To illust ra t e the differences tha t emerge with
removal of the religious backdrop ~nd its the associated unity-of-ev il
theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL, p.323:- First l y,
peace is possible without religious enligh t enment if it is possible wit h
it: religious enlightenme nt is not an essential c ondition as there
implied . Secondly, violence does no take all the forms the Bishops tr y to
give it , e .g.
sexual discriminat ion is hardly a form of violence,
pornography an aper tc without it , etc. It ia a serious m stok e to try to
heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading
(forms or violence) along wi.th war aa if t hey stood and fell together, e.g.
abortion and nuclear war.
Note tha t referencing , ·where not through an au thor's name, :ls by way of
acronym explained in the references at the end.
2.
an
The isolal ed, and unnece sary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very
end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear
wars proper will he very different and v ry nmeh mo re horrifying.
Nuclear
wars proper, though elements of uncomfortab ly adjacent possible wor l ds,
ought therefore to be onfined t o merely possible worlds. Enough of their
features we can appreciate without their being brought to act~ality.
111hicl. r1c'ed not howe ver. be unlimited 3 •
explosio n
A large-sca le nuclear
involv es
war
of l arge quantitie s of nucl ear devices ove r a sizeable region;
a [unction of two main parameter s:
distr i bution.
Such
strnt.egic ) nuclear
quant l t leo
of
a
war
war
quantity
diffe rs
which
explosivc n,
ts
markedly
limited,
nnd
(megatonn age
wh ere
from
by
the
a
of
t:,Hget.s
it i s
ex plosive)
limited
assumptio n,
the
to
and
(tactical
much
or
smaller
chnr.uctcr i Rtic ,111.y
arc
cl rcumscr ibed, f or instance confined in pr i ncip l e to military inst al l ations in
a
given
reg ion.
Though
t he
focus
in
what follows is upon I.SN wars and th eir
prev e nti.on, limLted nuclear wars are by no
nucl.car
arsenal
means
a
separate
st r ike 1
s ince
a
is a prereq utsite, an d th e probabil ities of escalatio n of suc l1
waxs to LS N wars arc high (given usual reasonabl e aosumptio ns
second
iss ue ,
et c. ).
4
Because
of
these
of
follow -up
or
connecti ons, much of the ca se made
acainst LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as wi l l become evid ent .
How nuclear wars
reHultlng
d-Lffer
from
oth er
war s:
wars and states and th e
-- ---------- - -- - --
llmltcd appropria teness of old er modelY and theories of war.
of war that has dominated mucl1 thinking, including strategi c
two
party
(or
thinking,
A model
is
th e
severa l person) game or, as a complicat ion of that, th e clan or
trib e bat tle ~.
A picture of
war
thu s
refle c tion
r e quirement s
for
legitimat e and just wa rs, which technolog ical
on
advances have
trad iti ona l
now
theo ry
ender ed
of
war,
emerg ed,
inapprop riate
ha rdly
and
especiall y
sometimes
surprisin gly,
as
a
result
inapplica ble.
of
The
made no allowance for such
J.
Another dimension of varia tion concerns the sequence of the war, es pe cially
the type of strike :lnvolved.
Though the sequence is j_mportant for the
mo r al ass es smen t , for example of th e ma in actors , it in no way alters the
immorali ty of LS N wars, as will emerge.
4.
'T he overwhelm in pro babi li.ty [.is1 that a nucl e ar exchange would have no
limits ' (PL, p.31 !+). He nce am, Jor org ument. against limited nuclear wars:
t hat any such war risks , inde ed renders highly probable, an unlimited war,
and the ris k is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by
s Lrai g htforwanl a ppli a_tio n of decislon theory, multi.plyi ng the mass lv e
undesira bi lit y (mora l and ot h ~rw ise ) of n LSN war by 'ts probabill ty gi ven
a limited nuclear war.-Giv en th e character of weapons developme nt and
present communica tion ar.rangem ents, the id e a of a highly circumscr ibed
purel y nuclea r exchange between the s upe rpower s , perhaps in the European
"theatre'' , is really a myth.
5.
There was a substanti al element of sport (and connec ted features of
prowess) in t radi tional wars tha t bas been eroded in modern t echnologi cal
wars. Nuc lear wars may be not just un s po r ting , in that no notice is given,
etc. , t hey a re also remote and impersona l, and different ly unjust, in a
mu h deeper wa y,
j
phenomena ns mass bomb.lng o f lar.ge citJes, such a s
Tokyo.
rn1clear bomb.fng , wi.th
And
j t.'
many
occurred
wi.th
Dre s d e n
and
further crucial effects be yond mass
bombJng, adds furthe r new d imens ions .
Ycl lt is impor t a nt for tic argument
1Jnchors,
Lo
historica l
were
accounted
unjust
war l s essential ly a ma tter of states and their control:
the Oxford Eng l is h Dictionar y acc ount, w~..!::_ is 'hos t .ile contentio n
ar1ncd
'war'
of
content io n
or
comba t;
cxct1i1nge is the actual e xp<irience .
but
other
are not literal, but transferr ed, metaphor ic, etc. 8
proLagon ists, antag onists or players;
means
and
or
wrong.
to elabo rate
by
means
of
forces, car ried on betwe en nations, states , or rulers, or between part i es
in t he same nation or state' for control of the state7 ;
noun
linkages
G
to be awa re of what counted as war (the :emantice of the matter),
and
of wh Pn , 2nd why, w;-1rs an<l military ac tions
Firstly ,
r e tain
always
a
f nction
of
sens es
of
the
States are the
forces c omprising armed soldiers are
the
a nd comba t or forceful and typically viol_ent
Thus wars ar _ external or internal
states or their rule.
(c.ivi.l),
Thus too wars have grown in
quantity and fr eque ncy as states hav e expanded , wars have changed as states have
transform ~d,
and
nuclear
war
has
emerged
with
nuclear states.
lhf,on°tic al way then to eliminate wars is t o remove states :
6.
An obvious
:i.n short, wars
ar e
There arc interes ting si delights concernin g eve n the etymology of the term
1
war' , wh ich wa s deri ved from a term meaning 'confusio n ' . In particula r,
'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times ha d
in living use any word pro pe r ly meani ng 'war'': Oxford English Dictiona rt
( OED) o n wa r,
7.
But of co urse there can be something quite a nalogous to war waged between
clans , gangs, multinati onal firms, even against Nature , and still more
me taphorica lly against poverty, etc. To this extent , a strict definitio n
of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structure s
the argumen t will direct us to, has to ex t end beyond just the brea k-down of
nation--s tates.
8.
Tn to thls category (si.n ce Natu re i s no naU.on) falls the ubiquitou s and
unwa rranted war against Nature of modern times , wh ic h features just as
large in Marxism as in capitalism . As could have be en guessed , someone
.t was James - suggest ed channelli ng all war into "war'' in the me taphorica l
sens e agai.nst that unarmed and nonaggres sive "opponen t'', Natur e.
James
proposed a s a substitut e for war proper, conscripU .on of the youth for a
wa r again st Nature (see Wasserstr om, p.12).
What it boiled down to,
howev er , was that youth -was to be c hannelled into all the dirty work, in
that way to acqui r e manly virtu.s mil i tary ac.tivit.ie s "rightly" i.nstil,
especia lly discipline ;---but also service, devotion, physical fitness,
con struc tive exertion, responsi bility, and order. Another less diabolica l
sub st it ute for wars p r oper (in America n ecoropian literatur e) is through
wnr gam es and other game s of competit i ve cast.
Again specious arguments
enter for t hose bringing- out the "best" in human males, etc .
.:1n uut
,~01•1p
of ro llt:ica l :.ind asso ci ated t cclmoJ .ogJ--n l st ru cture,
and are
nltcr i ng
by
the
s tructu r e.
Wars
j _Lu a t
from
c an thu s be seen as a struct ural problem of
(other wi se
defect ive)
politi ca l organ isatio n of states ;
they are a
ional fix , n struct ural malfor mation .
helps
wa r
arise
War
Thls seman t.ically based pictur e
of
exp.la in why th e rad ical a rgumen t agains t nuclea r wars and
deterr ence
d t: vo lves into an
war-m akers ,
argume nt
agains t
aga.in st
states .
In
the
fact
( s<'1 f-legit i.mise d)
on
the
war-d eclare rs
and
tradit ional theory , wars wer e
r estric ted to extern al wars, which were coni:;tr u ed as
t heir
r emoved
t1 e
right
of
r ulers (p ri nces) to conduc t for certai n politi cal purpos es;
states
or
the argume nt
was that priva t e person s with grieva nces had access to the
c our ts 9, while states
did
not ( wa r s w_re, so to speak, the intern a ti.onal analog ue of
th e law courts ).
But this is itself a very sta tist conce pti on of th• legitim
at e
place
of
wars;
ll1c• scmiJn tica i s not so rest.r .i ctive and permtt s intern a
l wars with i.n i; t ate s, for
examp le t.o end wars, injust ice, etc.
Let. us
a
h OW\ ) V1_. r
to brlng out what is differ ent now - confin e att e nt1on
-
basic and moat famili ar cas e, extern al wa rs hetwe n two s
tates or sets (axes)
of st a t. es , two-pl a yer ex t cr n;il wars.
·ompr litive
game s,
could
be
won.
attent uated form for some "victo rs")
Lhc World vfars.
strate gy.
surrou nding
trad i tional ly
firstl y
for
mass ive
armed
wa rs,
Like
exchan ges
such
as
th •re may well be no winnin g
in
ar e as
the
of
No r thern
very
hemisp here
countr yside.
Thus,
and
the
second ly,
for
laying
the
was te
_£Dint
of
of
substa ntially
substa ntiall y
oblite rated 10 ,
(cxe rcl sed
and
most
as
nothin g
all
worse off than at the outset of the "play" .
are
huge
war
seen, to settle seriou s inters tate disput es , is remove d:
a nothe r point of diff e rcn ~e , the phenom enon of wars that
prepar ed
that:
That assum ption still held good ~hough in
Wj th LSN wars it no longer holds;
is settle d with main protag onists
player s
It war; assume d
An LS N war could involv e destru c t ion of all main Wester n
metro polita n
agglom e ra tio ns
9.
to
main
Hence
elabor ately
f0r , etc,), but which can never be pointf ully fought ;
Thus Aquina s a nd Grotiu s for examp le (see Ba rnes , p
. 776, top).
The
argume nt
presup poses rather a lo t , includ ing a neat public /priva
te
dis t inctio n . Put Aquin as's way,
it looks as if it could be readil y
t r .-:m sf erred into an argume nt for intern atio·n al govern
ment, or at least
effect ive law-co urt s , Yet all Christe ndom was suppos ed a
t that time to be
one state!
5
hence t he ineviL Bl>Je emphasis on .l:..l!.E.~- deterrenc e.
.:uid
ot her
Lhf'
e lements o f gamesmen ship ha d a role in earlier wars, but it was
not pu re de t e rr e nc e .
to
mil i tary
Certainly , deterrenc e, bluff,
Lastly, tradition al wars could be confined in
tar gets
r egn rd s ju s t wa r s ;
and
military
e xchanges.
principle 11
This feature iG fundnnent al as
for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross
uni nvolved par t ie s sac rifice any pretensio n to morality.
ways
to
The special effects of
nu -lea r exp lo s i •cs , e s pecially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear
canno t
w3rs
be
legitimat e ly
confined.
l1orrify lng det a i l i n popu l a r so 1rce s
uz0ne
<lestr uc ti on,
s hockwav es,
suc h
effe cts
gign nt l c fum i gat i on s
§2.
a nd
th e
e nti re l y
rapid
••.
speed
special effects (presente d in
Schell)
include
radioacti vity,
pu lses, fireball or firestorm
e tc., etc.
As a result
of
these
of exchange, LSN wars will resembl e
mor e than they re semble old e r - style war:s.
The mora l s ituation:
be c ome
as
el ec troma gnet1 c
<lcv .,su1t .i o11, rog ue bac t e r in ;.rnd viru se s,
com pounded
Th e se
the
r ecent
tend e ncy
submerged in the context of war.
of
moral
considera tions
to
It is particula rly important
i n t he ca se of war to mainta in a firm grasp on the ancient
distinctio n
mo r a lity
or local or nat :l. onal
and ~ ..e5:..diency.
What is done in war, especiall y
between
advant a ge, may be very diff e r ent from what ought morally to be done, whether the
l ') .
There is however the degen e rate idea of war as i.nvolving annihilat ion or
extinctio n, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilat ion of the enemy whil e
no t be i ng e ntirely annl.hilat ed oneself: the side that somehow "survlves "
suff ic iently to r ebuild is said to "win".
But this is, at best, an
extremely t e nuous sense of winning , wl1ich in any case neglects the medical
ev idence conce rning nuclear destructi on.
Recen t t alk a bout winning or even s urviving a nuclear war must
reflect a failure to appre ciate a medical reality: Any nuclear
war would inevitabl y cause death, disease and suffering of
pa nde~onic proportio ns and without the possibili ty of effective
me d ical int e rvention
(PL, p.313).
Mo reov e r an y such phoenix war is r adically unjust, because of violat ion cf
the tr adit i onal requireme nt of pro portional ity, and for other reasons
de veloped in the tex~.
Unf o rtunat e ly as doc umented ir Sch ee r, significa nt off i cials who are
resp o nsibl e for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of t he world t hink that the devast a tion o nuc l ear war an be survived by Americans and
t hat a gl oba l nucl e2 r war can actua lly be "won"! They re ly , among other
things, on a n incredibl y low , and unaccepta ble, redefinit ion of "winning" .
11.
In prac t i ce they often were not, they drained limited economies , they layed
wa s te countr yside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or
c hemic al wa rf Rre or mod er n min i ng), im poverishi ng inhabit·n ts, etc.
l all('.l" f u determ in e d usi ng the cod es :ind conv en l:lotH'
Much
t.h at
oug h t
war ,
of
or
othenlis e 12,
not t o be do 1c i n wa r is do ne, for one (alleged) advantage or
anothr·r, desplte modern m:i l tt ar y cod es a n d co nv ent i ons ani the like .
we
liv e
not
go
in
a rat her bar barous age :
unremarke d,
if
the
th e horrors of the twentieth century will
history
Furt.l1c1inore rn Ll tta ry t h i nki n g a nd
ge t s
writt e n
as
wi pi ng
moves :
based
on
"stra t e gy"
disad van t ages ,
of
mor a lly
excluded
actions,
·a J.culaU o ns.
charncterist i ca---1J:x
its
is.
that
rur al populations, be come real 1o ss ib i liti e s, included in
o t
con,w<ptr·n ti nli.sr
d0.Lcrmi nes
(accurately)
str ate gtc pl an n ing tend (.1s Nagel ex plains) t o
induce a ce r ta i n mo ral numbing, so th a t a r ang e
such
Hllitarily
its
e xp<'di e n cy .
by
gains
own
i.t _o u~ !:_, morally,
cons i d e r i n g
and
Eac h
side
only
lo s 8e s a s
a
in a military encounter
own
its
advantages
and
r e sult. of alterna tJve possible
to consider those of the other side( s) as
well.
In
t h is way stra t eg ic planning di s places morality .
I nd eed l t ha s been contended that wa r should be planned and conducted
wa y,
a
no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without
l i mit s , moral or other (except insofar a s technology limits the means of
eLc.) .
Such
t he
class lcal
through
"bald
an
inc r emental
a
distinct
nrgumen t
tc.tt1s .
g
a r gument
from
an
t ha t
th e
It
would
And
(bu t
The
externally
wil l be broken by each pl a yer in turn for advantag e .
ext r aordi na r i l y na rrow motivat1ona l bas e i s assumed.
the
of
li mit)
escalation
man" f a llac yi 3), t hat there can be no limit.
assum p tion is t hat a ny merely s e lected limit (as
enforced
force,
Js the so-called "classic " view of Clausewicz, oft: repeated.
Cl ause wicz Lr ics to argue,
reall y
this
Thus t oo
follow
from
i d ea of a limited wa r is some so r t of contradiction i n
nut i t i. s not, though breaking off i n the he at of war, or the
s upposedl y l imited nucle a r exchange, may be s ingularly impr obable .
c onfusion
Nuclear
12.
For a s Nage l c ontend s (early on), there are moral restr ic tions on the
c onduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither
a r bit r a ry no merely conventional, nor a mat t e r of usefulness.
These
t li cn1<•s
run er Lindy co11n t •r Lo the. cll.llrn :l.c t heory of war of Clnuscwic z - n
th e ory outlin ed In Walz e r.
13.
As one l e s s hair does not, at any stage, dis t inguish a bald man from a
hirsute ma n, there a r , starting from the hirsute end, no ba ld men. Th e
prog~e ssiv e escalation ar.gument concerning war is an inc remental ar gument
Jike
the t e chnic a l Sorites syJlo gisms , formalising the type of fallaciou s
a r g ume n t which shows that one more straw never makes a heap.
Th e
fn l l;i.cio us e scalation argument 'i. s pa rt of the so-called "logi.c of war ", f or
more on whJch see the conclusion of Appendtx 1..
i'
war s thus appear dec i dedl y Cla usewiczj_ a n .
for
the
l
anc,
r or
players
Still the !irgument
is
inc onclu s ive;
can choose, at leafJ t J n sma ll er calmer wars, not t o e scnlate,
examplt!, agree to abide b y arranged practlccs , t y pes of we a pons, etc. l· 4
A s t 11tc engaged in war se ld om sees i t self a s e ntirely bound by
of
mo ·al i t y:
lt i s t ake n to be me r e prude nce on t he pa r t o f those attacked to
take account of the no-imr oral- holds-ban:-e d appr oa ch t h e y
c<;p,~, f,11 ly
t lw
1
constraint s
from the ot her s'ido.
11w~Liou not onl y
as
to
ma y
well
enc ount e r,
So 0a , h g1·oup po t e n t i a 1l y e ngn g cd in war f;1cps
it
wlw t
o u g ht
to
do
in
mor a lly
permi ss ibl e
si. lu<1tlons , but al s o both wha t i t ou g h~_ r ea l ly do, a nd wh a t it can morally do in
the morally flawed situati on s it finds i t s e lf.
But the last question do e s
not,
in tli,1L cnsc•, r e d uce t o o ne of ex pe di e nc y .
There i s no que st ion, then, of moral i t y giving or having
0:x.pe<.lienc y,
even
under
extreme
to
give
way
to
circumst a nc e s such as the prospect of LSN war
involves .
Fo r it i s not as if s haky con Ri de r a tions of
give
to the f i rm ground of exped iency when t he c hips are down, since often
way
morality
eno1gh such mora l ero s ion does not occ ur in c risis s ituations.
t hcorc~ical
fac t
is
that
both
deliver
f r om
us
But the
the
vnlue
the o q'.: .
to
Expedlency
fact,
but
urg('s ,
tba t
does
foreign
takes
local va l.ue s - o f sel f , family, clan, class, or nation - ar e
conside rat i on s .
proper charact risa t i on , a
remote
By cont r ast, mo rality requires, as a matter of its
much
univ• r sa lizable
mor e
univ e rsal
pr inciples .
rePultan t
i1,tersu bstlt uti vit y
fairness,
eq u ita billty and
of
value
and,
And morality thereby imposes, through
principl e s,
jus t ice.
distributio n
c ertain
requ i rements
of
general
Ex pe di e ncy yields an unfair , inequitable
value system, one tha t subscribe rs would not a dh e re to if differe n tly
Ttie
no t
It assumes, or
what really coun t, and ov e rride or are t o be max imized at the expe ns e of
or
to
cruci al
simply
narrowl.y-co nstr;.icd l oca l a dv anta ge or powe r a s wha t i s valuable .
even
bound
moral i ty a nd expe dien c y fall within the same,
eq 1:. 'J l y f~lrnky or equally sol ! d , doma tn_ of v al ue
miraculousl y
are
placed
1 :.,
.
Jeep thcorcL ical u1 s ati sfact orinc ss of ex pedi e ncy, and associa t ed strategic
Lhinldne , n l so Jer lv ci; from Lh i s faU. ur e
of
·va l untioi1~:;
pe r so ns X and Y are interchange d under
14.
11nd r es ults not ho ld -f ng whe1
i nt e rr e pla cement,
from
the
same
As Wa l zer a r gue s, p. 24. An histori cal ex ample i s the era of ge nu inely
I imi t cd w:1 rs l n Europe fo ll owi ng t he hilrba rl s m o f th e Thirty Years war.
B
.
expr d 1e1cy
assessm ents 16 •
ic
c~ n
For expedie ncy loes not elude
deontic
presen tation:
be pr er;ented as through such popul a r slogans as "local might i.s right",
or ft lvcn tight formal
rest•mb le
charac terisat ion .
The
charac terisat ion
will
normal ly
that o[ utilita rianism , except Lhat util i tic . are only assigne d to,
or
arc bi asse d in favo ur of, certnin indivld u~ds.
Howeve r, theorie s of ut.llity
~ol have to he posi tions of expedie ncy if utility is 11ot locally confi
ned.
util llariun ism prope r is not to be dismiss ed as
cnn
Thus
onside ring only expedie ncy;
intcrsu bstitut iv:i. y rc'quire ments of morali ty ;
meet
do
it
Lt does not, unlike the
me hods of war game theory, assign differe nt weights to the
individ ual
uti.lity
of ( ce rtnin) Americ ans, as opposed to Russi ans , say.
There
are
dc•ont.o .logis ts
r egardin g war
mora ll y
howeve r
signlfic a11t
e.speci ally,
17
•
which
differe nces,
between
utilita rians
serve to further compli cate the moral pie t u re
In particu lar , utilita rian approac hes have
permis sible,
or
to
seemed
to
effect
some
to
rend er
justify , ugly strateg i es and practic es as regards
~nemy civi. lians, that deonto logical princ iples wo uld not
permit.
already
and
partisa nship ,
since
utilita rians
But
this
is
would
reject the
descrip tion of pr.ctic es permitt ed under thei r princip les as 'ugly';
wherea s an
a im
in
what
follows
is
to
avoid
meta-e thical
me ta-ethi cal neutra lity, though of course not
there
is
a
neutra lity.
to
achieve
And
morally
large area of consen sus, or at least moral converg ence, from which
ar gumt'n l ,an bt'gtn.
S('Vcr al
moral
partisa nship,
VJ.rtua ily all positio n s
grc•
that
the
obltter ation
of
major ci ties ln a LSN war. would be wrong, indeed morally outrage ous.
If
tltere is diss e nsion, as there may be among nuclea r stra tegists
who seem to
feel
no qur.Jms when lt. comes to trading loss of some Americ an cities for
some Rus si a n
ones, s imply increas e the costs
involve d,
up
to
loss
of
whole
nations
if
l.5.
The severe limitat ions of t:hoBe l esse r ''virtue s ",
nationa lism
and
pAlriot isrn, also come from the failure of replace men t which
exces siv e
applica tions of nationa lism easily engend er. Try for example swappi
ng a
person from inside the homelan d with one from outs i de as regards
treatme nt.
The point of, and reaso·n s for , intersu bs t itutivi ty as a require
ment of
morali ty, is well explain ed in Har e , p.78ff. Hare applies the require
ment
to make a telling case agains t nEtion ali sm (a case which exte
nds to
strat eg ic decisio n-theo ry).
Nation alism, al ong with fanatic ism, is the
main cause of war, so Hare conten ds, p . 72.
16.
The case aga inst expedie ncy was develop ed in detail
especi ally the critici sm of Thrasym achus in The Republ ic .
17.
Thus the differe nces between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and
Hare
the other, i.n Collen et al.
by
Pl ato ;
see
on
:iccesi:iary , unti.l moral repugnanc e :fs
Tile
ncounlere d;
_!: hen try to work down
again.
fact remains howe ver that Jn the nuclear area things have got substanti ally
oul of perspecti ve, morally.
abandon
or
Strategic thinking, i n particula r, has
tended
to
suppress moral considera tions ( as indeed theories of the state also
do, somet imes flamboyan tly, in favour of partisan values).
Naturally Lhe fact of broad consensus as to the morality of th e matter does
not
m ·an that there are none who would welcome such outrageou s happening s, that
to t al nu clear destructio n of the North even, would be
Cons id er
t he
w11rld ,·inpl r1•.
be
so thern
risi.ng
(hemisphe re)
no
one's
advant3ge .
strongman , SS, who has v :lsions of
Wlillo l.lH' t,uperpowt• rn of lli<' no ·t. h rcm:i in, SS ' 1.1 dnwm ·a n
realised.
Thus
his
best
strategy,
having
rid
s ubmarines and ·outhern lands of US bases, is to try
nil lear
to
exchange
in
the
North,
There
would
southern
to
be
waters
encourage
a
hardly
an
of US
all - out
point then in securing
institutio nal arra ng emen ts so that potential SS's do not accum ulate much
espe . ially
given
the
apparent instabi lity of crucial world arrangeme nts.
tlrnt is to nnt1eipnt e:
lhc present point :1.
has
and
tts
power,
limitatio ns,
is
an
thnt ( t he fnct of) moral
inadequat e
But
conse nsus
const r aint without accompany ing
struct ural adjus tments.
For , typJrnlly ,
<lifferc11 tly
to
nationa l
impose
interest
ls
taken
hosta ges
or
override
morality,
e ven
holding
civilian
populatio ns
kill:lng m111.lons in the national :i.nterest 18 ).
unfortuna tely, these assumptio ns are not confined to more totalitar ian
such
as
of those
those of Eastern Europe.
things.
substitut ion
of
jus tificatio n;
fails
in
The
first,
expedienc y
,
.
C.!.BSSC,S
And,
regimes,
But morally national interest can do neither
the
overridin g
for
morality ,
of
morality,
which
the second, the alleged mor a l dominance of
:important
or
irresi stibl e ethic a l claims t ha t dominate mo r e ordinary
cthicnl considera tions (such as those conc er ni g
nuclear
to
is
entirely
national
simply
lacks
the
mo r al
interests ,
of cases, including , so the argument wi.11 go, the
case of LSN war.
18 .
As Sche ll blun l:ly puts it, 'What io being cl.aj_med is that one or two
countries have the right to jeopardis e all countries and their descenden ts
in the name of certain bel iefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it
leaves room for ambiguity , since the belie fs may be morally grounded rat her
than based on national interests .
Stales may i ns i st upon opera ting one self ish national interest basis ,
Ii:!.
It
nol
be
pretended
expcJ i<"ncy (na me l y ,
that
tha t
of
it
i.s
"group
but
n montl basi, as distJnct from one of
ego1 sm " ).
There
no
1s
special
moral
d.ispensa ll on
fo r governments.
j ndiv iduals :
ther e ia no loe;i.cal diffe ' nee .ln the patter1 of jus ti fi.cation, or
analys is of obligation.
Morality works :ln the same way for groups as for
For e xample , what ought to be as regards Xis (analy~ed
semant i cally) what would happen as reg a rd s X in all ideal worlds;
no
di ff e r e nce
organisation.
extenuating
killers:
whether
X
is
an · individual
States such as Israel (in i ts recent invasion
reaso ns
aside,
be having
just
as
beeu
conce ded , special moral dispensations;
more Lhan tha.t and do not sta nd up to crit.i.cism.
cannot
immorally
makes
system, grou p or
of
Lebano n)
are,
as brigands or mass
there is no moral difference.
Certainly t here are gro unds on which states
or
individual
or
and it
f11rnish
two
(incompatibl e)
their a gents
01:
have
claimed ,
but the excuses offered are no
A
moralities ,
a
s atis factory
state
moral
theory
or public one and a
private or individual ci tiz en one - state expediency Rnd individual
morality
becaur;e thi s would lead t o violations of sub st itutlvity , neutrality, etc. 1 '3
ins t ance , a state ope ra ti e X could us e s tate
mor~lJy impermi ssi ble ways, ways ruled
Y are permuted .
special
01 1t
cover
(e.g.
to
considerati.ons
citizen
Y
in
by state interests) when X and
A group or organisation or pe rson can be
der iv ati ve
damage
For
bound
of
course
by
in virtue of role, but these are der ivative
prin c iples - good for any such 1nstitution - which fit within and answer back to
general
moral principles.
So it is also with a state which is an institutional
arrangement justlfied ( i nsofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some
least)
of
its
citizens:
its
charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly
1orR l principles which convenien tl y coincide with those of state expediency .
particular,
a
sta te is not
1 morally)
survivrd .
In
entitled to risk the lives of many of its
own citizens and of other p~oplcs and creatures for its own ends, even
ow n
( at
for
its
Thus it is not entJ.t led to do what both nuclear war and nuclear
de terre n ce r equ l re, as will emerge.
19 .
There a n ~ also othc•r arguments agai nst two (or
see Routley a nd Plumwood.
multiple)
morality
Lines:
11
!-: ' )
'j.J.
The i_ni t i<d argument
p:1cifli;m
yield
arguments
to
the
tmmora1 lt.1_
of _ LSN
wars.
to
tb e
1mmora1it.y
of war.
But 1wch a rgum ents ;ire
controversi a l in an area where th ere is no
go od
r·ason
to
Argumen ts
be
for
controve rsial.
Pacifism can accordingly be se t aside as a spec i a l case, stnce the immorality of
LSN
wars follows .
All but pacif is t positions concede that war in itsel f is not a c rime.
nil
wars are immo ral, though eve n inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior
ways of settling po litlcal issues between states .
wa r s
who
Not
are
Among more or l es s admissible
th e inte rna tiona l " tourname n ts '' of arlstocrat ic young men or warriors
volu11l'cer
:w
Ho ldlers
nnd
whos<'
actfon
does
no t
6pi.ll
ov er
on to
noncombar.an ts , a nd some early a nd medievvL wars , wh ere few or evet no combatants
were kjl.led in war.
conscrip tlon,
Since the esta bl i shme nt
press-gangs
and
recruitment
of
such
of
the
lHrgely ceased to take these less offe nsive for ms;
induction
prac tices
as
near-d es titute, wars hav e
modern massive war s are
far
removed from the ideal war-tourn ament typ es (which fea ture now only in ecotopian
por traya l s, in ways that are in creasingly dub ious ).
imrnornl,
Most
s orts
of
wars
are
because of what is done to the essentially un5_nvolved, but few to such
a n exte nt as LS N war s .
The first argument to th e
immorality
of
LSN
wars
and
of
sufficientl y
larg e-sca l e wars ge neral ly, takes the following form:
Pl.
The (deliberate ) killing in mass of noncombatan ts is wrong.
P2.
LS N wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatan ts.
P3.
Wha t inv olv es wha t Is wrong is wrong .
( KA)
LSN wnrs ar• wrong.
The parttcular a rgument g lven i s ju st one r epresenta tive of a set
of
Lhis
type.
the
(KA )
t·cpL1ccs
But the
qu1. te
'kl.11:!.ng
su ff i c l en tly
11v :i.l.
crcH tu res' .
Thu s
t n ma ss o f noncombatan ts' by a
cl~rnse concerning 'huge des truct-lon of 11.f esty l e of uninvolved or
i. nvolvecl
f ocus
can
destructio n cf li.festyle of nonhumans and humans
fJJ i k(~ Ll w t :in L'., N war wJ 11 brf ng l a
on
arguments
Cha racte ri sti cally, in Western culture, it is thought that mass
kl l Ling of h11m<1ns ls a bout the worst th i ng that can happen.
vadu tlo n
of
not
ll
fir s t
uitable
directly
Other vuriatlons will emerge in the di.scussi.on (i.ncluding
th at: where the bracketed 'de.liberate' figures ) .
The argumenL Js valid,
,1L t a .kcd)
on
the
basi :3
but
of
may
each
be
attacked
( and
of its p1·emisses.
has
in
ef fe ct
been
Let us consider these in
reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves
11
what
is wrong" is -wrong, has been c hallenged on r:1ther Scholastic grounds. There are,
in partic ular. problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments,
purport
o shot.J tha t some proper obligations involve wrongdoing.
as~~lst.i.ng :rn in jured robbed per son is said
robbed;
but, s ince the ro bbin g is wrong,
to
"involve."
providing
For
which
instance,
that person ' s
assistance
belng
is also wrong.
But thes e pr oblems derive from too slack a not1on of i.nvolvement; w:i:th a tighter
accoun t of invo lvement th e problems disappear and P3 stands . 20
As aga inst P2, it may
legitimately
directed
be
argued
against
that
mi lit ary
nuclear
targets.
wars
can
be
encounters
But given the character of
nuc lear wea pon s, LSN war s could in no way be co nfined to such targets.
net
merely
the likelihood that many missiles ex plode off target, ther e are all
the ot:he r eff ects of large-scale nuclear. bombings.
fnlloul
There i s
down-wlnd
from
military
pcopJc, es pecial Ly in the cas e of
uninvo.lved co u11 t rl cs aucl
tnrgcts
US
and
For example, t he radioactive
will affect large conc entratio ns o(
European
t argets ,
and
may
affe ct
as Conn <l o.
There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties
by
appeal
cffcrl ) 2 1.
t o s uch dubious pri nciples as the doctri ne of double effect (or side
If missiles wer e c haracte ristically
r.eliAbly
on
target,
and
one
20.
The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of
obl igat ion over entailment " pd.nciple ,, can be removed by a ti.ghter
involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment.
For
de t a il s s ec Routley nnd Plumwood, where Good Snmar.i tan problems arc
diagn osed.
21.
According t o the doctrine , which is one concerni ng responsibility, we are
rcs ponsJblc
only
for the intended e ffects or consequenc ~s of our
freely-c hos e n actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences,
even U
these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended
conseq uences .
Unless carefully hedg ed, the doctrine is
pernicious ,
a llowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility
for evi l th e y knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme
comma nd which intended only to take out US military targets would, under
double effect , have no responsi bil ity for the resultant effect on American
and Canadian cities!
Taking the i ssues concerning do ub le effect to a more
satisfactory
conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly
dis tingui s hed acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions .
whicl1 was
intend ed
unfort unatel y
only
went
off
to
destro y
an
unma1H1<HI
und e r g round
Such claims shou ld be reject ed :
ci ty.
dou bl e
effect
Noneth e l ess
the
circum sta nc es
differ ence , for they m.ay mitiga te atti tu des to tho s e rcflpo
ns lbl f'
,1
for firing the nd ssi.le, .·i.nce
the
the
thr actjo n would be wrong, and th e
~.:_~:~ ~css nol ]c$sen cd by the g lv n lntent l.on.
innkc
silo
course and destro yed a large ci ty, it c ould be claime d
th.:it t.h ~~ (uni.nt cndcd) mass dest ructio n is legitim ised under
could
missil e
j
t was not as if t he y had
del iberat ely
aimed
at
The double effect princ ipl e confla te s [dimin u tion of]
respo nsibil ity
Assign ed for an act with the [dimin ution of ] wrong ness of
the act.
~s agains t Pl, and as regard s the middle term of
argued
tha t there is an impor tant equivo cation .
the br~cke ted term, ' delibe rate ' .
killin g
and
P2,
it
The equivo cation is induc ed by
be
conc eded
that
de libera te
milJta ry ,
e . g.
farmer s
or
goods
or
servic es
bootma ke r s or ente rtaine rs .
used
exclud ed
as
innoce nt .
The
s econd
d~ten sible - versio n of pr emis s P2.
other.
for
re a sons,
it
by
proper ly
point concer ns a much narrow er - and les s
Bec a use P2 s o amende d is
less
defen sible,
is bes t to l eave out the "modi fier" 'd el ibera te'.
What is import ant for the presen t purpos es i s the moral status
of what is
mixtur e
of
tha t wi th the motive s of the perpet ra to rs.
requir e
the
qualif icatio n
'delib e rate'
or
done,
So 'delib erate'
gets left out, equiv ocatio n is avo ided, P2 stands , and so
does Pl.
not
t he
Second ly, it will be
conten ded thAt LSN wars do no t i nvolve t he delibe rate killin
g of t hos e
a
It
no means al l inn ocent , many being direct ly involv ed in mi
litary ef f ort,
whethe r just as taxpay ers or as s upplie r s of
not
be
charge d firs tly that noncom batant s, insofa r as they are distin
guish able,
by
and
ma y
of genuin e innoc ents is imperm issible , two challe nges will
be made .
will b
are
While it will
Pl
For Pl
do es
'int e ntiona l' or the like. 22
Admit tedly nlso 'nonco mbat a nt' is a fuzzy term , but none
the worse for that, and
Lhere
is
no
seriou s
p·o blem
in
markin g out a class of clear noncom batant s,
people who a rc not <lir cctly involv ed i n the comman d and
J.s,
mnrco v'r,
no
need
to
adopt
action
chains .
There
the prncti c e , derivi ng from catho li c ism, of
statin g rn init i.al verslo n of Pl in terms of in noce nts at l e ast as proble matic
22.
Despit e Na3el ' s sugge stion that it does (p.158 ).
The sugge stion depend s
upon oimila r mistak en assim ilati ons , of ac t wi t h intent
ion, and wrong ness
with respo nsibil ity, to t ho se of the double effect doctri
ne.
,1
rlns:;
":'i
,c mnk.t~
t,-,nt of r~on ,~omb:1t ants to try
t:(,
endenvourlng
c..hnrac t er i z .. , -- Rnd then
i:h c dif f ic11.Lt transiti.on to noncombatants.
there
Nnt only can arguments aga i ns t the premlsses of the argument be met,
.tr,~
for
;ir311mcnts
the
prt:'ndsses, thongh for t he subc-tant iv e moral premiss Pl
and
Lhcy aru of the cha tacterlstlcally nonconclu sive moral sor t
tend
will
For examp le, one argument for
v3ry sowcwhat with th e underlyi ng ethical th e ory.
Pl, .rnd for objecting to the kil l ing of non~ombatan ts, ts the Kant i a n one,
(to
poi.nt)
,
re s pect: owe d to tnem a<· pc so ns
mi n f nn l
from
-~_gume nts
§4 .
the
understate
sc,rio usly
doing
so
23
histori_ca~ __ ..::_e~qu i rcm nts
on
wars,
just
ur
dreamed
by
conlemporary
"free·-enl<'. rp r fs c" cap:l. Lalist st.ale (and
opponents
communis t
im portant
the
The conclusion t hat LS,'
wars cacno t be justly waged - nnd accordingly are ?njustified -
1e
that
fail s to treat them with the
.0..1~Jl~l5:!..'..~- from con-:_er_ger~£:::J and cnv.t ronment al arguments .
r.;omet. lti
to
of
is
Americ a
inspired,
me r ely
not
or
et c),
th e
of
same
The
conclus ion fnlls out of vc1rlouR trc1dj t i0nc1l requirements, worked out i.n mediev al
t:irnt•s ,
(or jusL
wars.
first
One of t h e r equi r ements gives but a varia nt on the
;>1
:irgumen t (KA). · 1 For a necesso r y co nd i Lion for fighting a wat· justly was th a t it
to
no t be the case t hat large numb e rs of [innocent] noncombatants are bound
killc.:<l (cf.
be
Barnes , p .77.5) .
A just war req ui res just means , that t he war should be
fought
by
morally
which
impli es in partic ula r that there is no indis c riminate
killing of noncombatants .
The implied principle was escapsulated in a princi pl e
legitimate
of
means ,
discrimination
(betwee n combata nts and othe rs) whi c h 'prohibits all actions
directly intended to take the lives of
p.312)
/. ~:,
.
civilians
and
of
noncombatants'
(PL,
LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate
')
(
I.lits ·cqulremcnt '' .
7.3.
Of course there are co~nterarg uments too , and not merely from t c military
in the case of small numbers of obst r uc tive noncomb a tants. One
;.rngLP
favored argument is a va r i at ion on the Bald Man: the re is no clear line
between combatants and noncombata11ts. Howe v er a s Nag el a rgues (p . 20) there
in
are distinctions between t hem, firstly in terms of thei r roles , e.g.
c,irry-Lng or u!,in? ;irm · o r dircc . ing t. lnBe who do, a nd s econdly in terms of
See a l so PL , p.312, where a
their liarmf.uJ.ness , the threat they offe r.
uj rr.p1, and ef fec ive paradigm case nrg11mcnt is up pli ed .
2 1~.
Note th at throughout, tile• te:xt adopts Llie OED eq u.:itio ns, reflecting common
lust wit h mo~ally right or correct, and unjust with morally
usage. of
- - - -··---·--
Overlapping the requirement of Just means is thac 6f
being that of net evil to net good:
pro ro rLi on
cor; tr-:
up
proporclonality,
'the damage to be infljcted and
lnc urn.> d by the war must be pro porti.onate to the good ex pect ed
the damage and costs ,
req 1irement:
disproportio nate
to
goods
moral
pr0p0 rt lonnl ·l ty re qui.r ement i R
er i t1! rlon
of
the
which
doctrine
through war .
"improvement"
ln
achieved
of
confined,
nationally
no t
ar
that
way.
ov e r a ll
co n sequences
of
abstaining
i mprov ement "puts wrongs to righ ts":
c ondi. tion s
"nmel.ioratlve "
wn y
the
'a nation wages war
justly
than
Similarly
on l y
if
the
for that nation or the wronged n8tion it is supporting have a decent
s:1tisfy
for
bad,
from war ' (Barnes, p.72) .
LSN wars can
in
these conditio ns, as scen.-i:rios depicting the aftermath of s 1ch
Some oft.h e lesser r e quirements for a just war are also
wa rLl ,
nnd
war
According to the fl.rst, 'X wages wa r
c han ce of be ing better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20).
no
are
Entangl ed with the
justly upon Y if the overall consequences of wa r a re bette r, or less
th e
taking
by
p,312). 27 Tt Ls not difflcu lt to see that LSN wars violate this
(PL,
arms'
the
e :a mple
that
of
infringed
reasonable expectation of success.
by
LSN
It seems that
tl ie r· c ca n b e no rea onable expe c tation of suite success in nn LSN war ·- whatev e r
t!il'
v0 ry
d lf !<r<' n t'Jy,
cx rhanges .
1 lmilcd
prospccUJ
of:
succl'SS
for
whatever the p rospcct:s of succf•ss in
Wha t
some
sm11ll
strictly
state
limited
clltc ,
or
nucl ea r
is le ss clear cut is th e question of whether LSN wars conflict
with th e requir ements of just cause or due fnu lt, and of right
intention.
Fo r
One (by no means
be arg ued to in various ways.
c onclusive) way is Nage l's way, from the requirements of directness and
r e l e vance in combat, the underlying ( co ntroversial) principle being that,
1
wh<1tcvcr on<.> does t:o another person inte ntionally must be ai med at him as
a subject, wlth the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15).
25 .
Til e principle can
26 .
wars where t he targets ar e
c8 s cntially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed
"!nd:lrectly",would b~~ :i.ffe r cnt. Such wars are no t however excused by t he
For such wars remain unjust on
pe rnicious doctrine ~f double effect .
on lif e
several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g.
As Zuckcrmnun says, 1 Tt is st ill inevitable t hat were
s ys tnms, etc.
mil i tary i nstalla t ions rather than cities to become the objectives of
nt lack, millions, even Lens of mlll.lons of ci v.Lli a.ns w-ould be
nucl 'lH
kill e d .. • ' (quoted i.n Thomp s on and Sm i.th , p .14, where the italics are
The situation witli strlctly llmi ted nuclear
ndded ).
Zi.
Tli! r; i s riol Lo b e confus0d wi.tli wlwt lB very different, the vi.cious anclent
doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so
on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest offi cial policy of
fli>;,cib1e r e so0T1se. ,vii11~ted to the level " f att ack,
t hi i, ilc> p e nds on the s e nsitive jssue of the weight assigned to what
are
se e n
as
b:J1; i c human r1. gh ts and fundame ntal value s , a nd the extent to which just wars
can
b e i.dco J og i.c a lly justif i ed.
Whil<': the ma instr eam pos1.tion
of
medieva l
theory
oppo s ed to id e ologica ll y jus tifi ed war s a nd "humani tarian" wars, these wer e
was
no L ck f' nitlvely exclud ed by the trndiU.o nal theory ( cf.
lltt J e
is
wlw n 1.;o m,rn y arc
se nsitive
howe ver,
me rit,
( a nd
when
issue s will ari s e again subsequ ently).
a r g uments
are
not
do
There
.In puzzling ov e r dubi usly effcctlv e requirem ents,
dec isive ng a lnst LS N war s
h i st orica l r e quireme nts
Barnes, p .778).
not
simply
commit
argumen t s
matters
underlyi ng
the
Finally , these argumen ts from
any
presc r iptive
fallacy;
from
historic al
autho r ity
for
to
th e
mo r al
c oncl 11 s i ons, but use also premisse s to the effect that th e requirem ents imposed,
a nd
nome times applied , were justifie d.
As they are.
I n the Christia n traditio n t here were two main strands of r eflectio n on the
mo ral
rightnes s
or
justness of wars, the just war t heory and a rival pacifist
str a nd, promine nt in early Christia nity, but largely submerge d from Augustin
e on
co ntempor ary
u n ti l
times.
Both exc lude nuclear wars, one strand because they
arc ine v i tably unjust, the other because they are wa rs and
This
ls
the
involve
beginnin g of the converge nce argumen t agai ns t nuclear wars :
such wari, a re exclud e d from all ethical perspec tives, once
remov ed
( a nd
e ven,
howr• vcr you look
conse ns us
violence 28 •
Ht
very
f requentl y , when it is not) .
il morally .
a r gument;
it
The argume nt i.s not
proceeds
expedi.en cy
that
is
duly
They a re morally wrong
the
same
as
the
weaker
fr om similar results from the full sweep of
ge nui nely e thi c al position s, not from massive agreeme nt of opinion.
The deta :! le d conv ergence argumen t is an exhausti ve case by case
each
type
of
moral
theory.
Fortuna tely
deta ils
can
be
de ontolog ical a nd contrac tual theories l ead back to requirem ents
28.
one,
from
shortcu t.
For
for
just
war
These alte rnatives are not as far. removed .r..ractic ally as may appear.
For
the aim of just wa ~ theory is not 'to legitimi ze war but t o pr event it.
The pr1~sump tion is against the use of force ' (PL, p.312 ) . And ~..£. types
of wa r s a r c ruled out by Lite theory. However not all wars or violent
revoluti ons a re excluded , and that is enough to guarante e the distinct ion
be tween t he a ltern a tives. In particu lar, defensiv e ware are allowed - at
l e ast for th e defendin g side, though from a wider viewpoi nt these too may
be co nd emned
'the classic case [of the just war] ••• was the use of
l et ha l forc e to prevent aggressi on against innocen t victims' (PL, p.311).
Und e r rec e nt internat ional law, defence , narrowly construe d, is the only
legi Uma t e basis for wa r; Roma n law was only slightly more generou s, in
a llow i ng for th e restitut ion of eoods (see Barnes , p.780).
.l /
whi c l1, it ha s ,ilrcady been s hown, LSN wai·s violate.
w.1r
were
i_;ornctimes
a rriv ed
at
or
l n fact conditions for just
defended through pr inciples of such moral
th12ori · s , so tl,at a good deal of the r equls i. te argumentative
been
done .
work
already
The latter point hold s a lso as r egards ut ilitarianism, where it has
in c[fec t bee n c•hown that whatever br a nd of utilitarianism is
maxim j.sati on
utl lHy
has
is
final ly
ac complished,
LSN
adopted,
wars
are
howe ve r
excluded
ut1· 1 ·Ltar1an
·
g r oun d s . 2 9 Tl,e reason f or suc1
l converg nee .i snot f ar to see k ;
wars
Llw l
involv e
on
LSN
1:uch ma ssive infliction of pa in and colossal removal of pleasure,
tills dominates i n assessmentn howev •r Lhey 1:1 te accomplished in
utllitarlan
Tilu s any genuine alternative to LSN war ls bette r 30 •
L1i; ldon.
The arguments
ovcrwhc .lming
so
moral
far
case
outlined
against
such
mora J princi ples whi ch the waging of a n
principles
are
de riv able
from
agains t
some
LSN
wa rs.
LSN
would
su bstanti ally
wo rse
are
tha n
exhaust
th e
violate
thes e
of the theories just considered).
These
ac countable,
condition
not
( again
th e obligation to maint a in
earth jn proper shape a nd not de grade it s systems :
we
do
For there are oth e r significant
war
pri q•f pl es include e nvironmental ones, such ns :
p,cnera tions, to whom
wars
we
the r.-esponsibility to futur e
pas s
to
th e
" recei ved
the
world
it".
Such
on"
not
in
conservative
principl 0s - howeve r they are finally s atisfact or i ly formulated - are
bound
to
be vio lat ed in t he event of a n LSN war.
§5.
The shi ft to nuclear deterrence:
suppo rt
nuclear
arguments to its immorality .
Those
who
arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating,
certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars ,
by
pointing out that there is no actual engagemen t in any such wars.
What i s being
done ls, it is cla imed, quite different fr om
war:
deterrence
is
most
important
precisely
engagement
in
preventing
in
LSN
such
wars from ever
occur ri ng , as we ll as in mR int ai ning other fundamental Western values.
it
is
continued ,
deterrence
is
the
.9nly
practical
d e siderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values.
way
indeed
Indeed,
of obtaining both
Similar arguments
29.
For details see, e.g ., Lackey, especially MM.
30.
An argwnent of this sort is devel oped in more detail,
complete gc ner ality, j r Goodin, esp •c i £tlly 'Disarmame nt'.
are
But compare Hardin.
though
not
in
a<lvnncerl for all tl1e va ri ous guises that de terrence is presented
in:
mutually
;.~ssurcd des truction as fnrrnerly, fle xi ble r espo nse as latter ly, or otherw.ise. 31
Su,h c1aims as to the roles and
dubious,
for
seve ral
reasons.
objective s
of
deterrence
If i.t t.rere, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal.
s uperior ity.
than
th i s,
and
sometime s
even
a
mili ta ry
goal.
In fac t there ha s
renewed
driv e
for
Pure delerrence can account nei t her for act ual nuclear weapons nor
for orthodox Wester n military strategy 32
process
decidedl y
A first reason is th a t there i s much e vid e nce,
despite pronouncements, that dete rrence is not the - the only -
been a que st for more
are
Nor has deterrence set in motion
the
of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels ap propriate
for dctct"rence .
On the cont rn ry, un<ler " its"
impu.ls e
there
has
been
almost
unli mi te d acce l era tion in building arms (to pa ra phr a se PL p.318).
A other major re a son for serious doubt a bout what
sold
31.
is
being
11nder "d e terrence" labe ls conce r ns th e _proba bility f actor:
marketed
a nd
deterrence has
It ts important to observe that the di sc ussion is not restricted to one
form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but
applies t o al l for ms of response likely to engender LSN wa r. This includ es
"flex ible r es ponse", since the lik e ly further development i s massiv e
ret al iation to a n ini tia l Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for thi s
is the extreme vuln erabilit y of the US defence systems, especially the
communication systems, e.g.
to early strikes a nd to electromagnetic
pulses.
In the result i ng great confusion, escalation appears the likely
out come . I n a ny case, fle x ible response includes massive retaliations, as
part of its ra ng e and is ultimat e ly backed by it.
It is a l so im portant to observe that deterrence as practised is not
confined to responses to (nuclear) a ttack. The threat of nuclear action
has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a
nucle a r power. I t is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses
to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of
deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does.
32.
As to the firs t po int, there is not onl y overkill capacity and the driv e
for suped ori ty ( oft e n repr esent ed as '"negotiating'" strength) but the
matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the
second point, US policy has been de cidedly expansionist with regul a r
intervertion in o ther nations; there have been r epe ated US threats to use
nucl0ar weapons, espec ially to deal wi th revolutionary activities in t he
third wo rld , but also in Europe in "li.mited'" nuclear war; and i n official
military stra tegy no s ha rp line has be e n drawn between c.onventi.onal and
nuclear weapons: on these and other r elated points see furth e r Lackey MM,
p.19lff., and also Thompson and Smith.
The argument can be pressed
[1rLher, to the alarming conclus ion that deterrence is larg e ly a front,
which plays onl y a minor, but justificatory, role in actual US policy.
Among fu rther evidence is behavioural data: a government with a genuine
deterrenc e policy would repeatedl y emphasize its strength (even when it
la c ks strengt h), whereas the US govcrrnnent ofte n parades its vulnerability
and weakness in public . For other evidence see Smith, e.g. p.46ff.
i.ncrt.:ascd the probability
nrms-race
type
t hat
of
LSN
war.
More
precis ely,
deterrence
of
th e
is being practised, which invol·es full-scale prepar a tion
for Lota] nuclear war, has prepared the cond i tions for nuclear war to occur, and
hns
to
that
,,,·te nt
least en hanced its prospect s of occurring .
at
r easons also, connected with pure
original
setting),
the last 30 years.
the
deterrence
and
with
the
For other
"cold
war"'
(its
probability of a LSN war has increased consid erabl y in
The reasons include the threatening posture
called
for
by
deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated
to main tain credibility
overridden
or
with
''sacrificed"
a
population
whos e
real
for
military objectives;
state of military readiness;
etc.
The situation has
many
ther e
sober
analysts
century , i.e.
think
before 2000 .
is
a
high
There are s e veral
interests
are
being
the dangerous and risky
now
been
reached
where
pr obability of an LSN war this
routes
to
such
a
probability
assir,nrnc•n t.33 It wo uld only rccp ii re one in ' id e nt wi.th a 20% chance of leading to
an rscalating wnr every 8 years between 1960 and
Amer lean
2000.
alerts,
hav e
been
lucky
already .
In
of
nuclear
markedly.
the years ahead it appears likely that th e
For
the
danger
supplicant
nations
resources declines.
and
the
worsens
and
the
extent
The danger is enhanced by
connected
increasing
chance
of
the
lot.
33.
Cox).
easily
as
the
plight
extractable
continuation
of
of
crucia l
the
arms
of nuclear acci dent and human or
t ec l1nical error, none of them negligible factors as
(cf .
:l.ncrease
zones separating the superstates are increasing in
sjze and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and
r e veals
the
exchange .
number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war wil l
race,
on
sidE? ;i.lone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes , as with the
Cuban missile crisis , carry a considerably higher chance
We
Full
past
experience
copiously
Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a
Even so every substantial point involved can be contested,
and
many
are
Another route to a moie than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi
methods:
weigh up the experts' a sse ssments. In this regard it is worth
noting that it is not only ''nuclear doves" who consider the probability of
nuclear war has increased in r e cent years.
Amer ica n officials have themselves admitted that the policies of
r ealis ing th e st rategic potential of counterforce attacks and of
selective and flexible responses have increased the probability
of nuclear wnr (Hall, p.128).
20
conlcntlous (thoug h not always for good reasons) .
s e em s
no
way
Fof better
or
worse,
ther e
to rna~e such an overall probability argument particularly tight;
a nd ti1t: r E:! arc p] a usi. b le arguments , from the complexity of th e data concerned and
t he conti ng ency of the future, that it cannot be made tight .
IL is bad enough however that l.t 2-._~_ de c idedly pla usible that it
proha bJ~
that
LSN
an
war
will
d i st r ibu tion pri c iples) that it
proba bl e
that
c entury.
And that is enough
a
grossly
occur this ce ntury.
is
immoral
to
decidedly
morally
on moral grounds, to change deterrence as
policy
is
i.mmoral.
For then it follows ( by
plausi ble
that
it
highly
is
sequence of events will be perpetrated this
warrant
morally to take acti on to avert the outc ome.
de terrence
highly
is
evasiv e
act.Lon.
We
ought
That in turn implies taking steps ,
presently
practised.
Thus
present
That i.s but the first of several ways we shall
nrrivc at that damaging conclusion for pres ent super-state deterrence policies.
The plnusibil ity of claims as to the hi gh or increasing probability of
war h a s of cour s e been disputed.
LSN
The mai n counte rargument runs as fol lows :
Nuclear war is unlikely , be ca use the consequ ences are too horri fying.
The underlying assumption i.s that wars and the like, with
ar c
improbable.
assumption.
Unfortunately
however
horrifying
outcomes,
much ava i lable evidence counters this
More th an enough humans have not shrunk from brutal
exchanges
horr if y i ng wars , or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf.
Kuper ).
What ts le!;s assailable than the high probabili ty claim, what the
ce r tnin ly
Ther e by, through det errence, we
si t uation,
since
have
already
got
into
t.h e probA.bility.
immoral
of
r aising
The mor e detai led underlyi.n g arg ument s , then, to the immora lity
of nucle ar deterrence proceed by
LSN
an
deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for
thereby perhaps helping t o bring it about, in the sense
war,
against
evidence
s eems to support, ls that there is a non-negl i g ible probability of an
LSN war .
LSN
a nd
way
of
princ iple s
mapping
war into ar.gum~nts a gaJns t deter r ence of LSN war.
mi.gilt appropriately be called deont:ic
connecti ng
pr inciples .
moral
arg uments
Such principles
The
fl rst
of
the s e principles t a kes the foll owing preliminary form:
Cl.
should
If 1t is wro ng that X s ho uld occur, t hen not only
be
pr ob3ble
is
it
wrong
that
it
that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly
i ncrease t he pt' o ba bility that X occur .
Thus, f or
example ,
s i nc e
is
it
wrong
to
ki l l
a
large
noncomb atant
po~ulatf on in LSN wa r (by §4) it is al s o wr ong to put the populati on at ris k
and
wrong to increase t he chance tha t the hostage popul a tion is wiped out,
which
nuclea r de terre nce does .
botl1
of
For simil ar r eas ons a super s t te is not morally
entitled to im pose nucl ea r r i sks upon un invo l ved noncomb atants, esp ecial ly t
ho se
of third part y no nal i gned
most
Like
"' t tuations .
defeat by
example ,
0
t a te s .
sub s t an ti ve
Unless
mo ra l
count erexamp l es,
the
second
principl es oc c u r s.
probabi lity
that
par t
princ ipl e s
in
Cl
runs
into
dilemma.
and
of
a c c ord i ng l y,
Cl
e ncount e rs
to
require
complic ation.
For
apparen t trouble where clash of
Thu s it may be argued th a t it is permiss ible to increase the
oc curs
X
ord er
to
apartmen t bui l dings 3 4 •
nuclec1r
ethi s,
d l l emmas a r e duly all owed for, Cl appears li a ble to
t o avoid a greater evil.
pilot who increase s the pr obabilit y
c r ashes,
in
dct:crrcn ce ,
make
that
t he
Cons i der for example the
passeng er
plane
he
ic
flying
sure that the troubled aircraf t does not hit cit y
Suc h a defeatin g cond i tion do e s not apply in the case of
ihe r e
(though
the r e
explains ) wro ngness of a pr a ct ic e is not
ls
a
of fs e t
clash
or
of
principl e s, as §6
removed
by
its
role
in
avoiding greate r e vil.
I L can be a r gued that it is:
argumen t
from
t he
pr e vious
a r gumen t. de s erves lit t le
perhaps
f rom
more
such is pa rt of
succe s s
credence
t he
de terrence .
th a n
the
of
the
popular
However this inductiv e
racing
world
As Barnett argues,
driver's
argumen t,
'the
happy
acciden t
has surv iv ed the first thirty-f ive years of th e nuclear era is
unimp r e s si ve e v i d e nce that we can avoid nuclea r war
34.
point
a s imilar time base, that because he hasn't had a fa tal crash yet
(des pite some close calla ) , he won't,
th a t
of
the
in
the
coming
era,
This dilemma exampl e was s uppli ed by D.
Johnston .
There are more
dif f i c ul t putative coun t e rexampl es.
For example , in inciting people to
c ivil disobedi ence, the ri s k of stat e violence in r etaliat i on is increase d.
Thus, t o ta ke C,
Pigden's example , 1.n encourag ing disobed ience, Gandhi
i nc r ea s ed t he proba bility of wrongdo ing by the British Raj.
But surely
Ga ndhi, un l i ke th e Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi
d i d no t d irect ly incre a s e the probabi l i ty of viol ence .
But spelling out
what 'dir ec tly' means
in terms of short causal chains over which
r espo nsi bil i ty ca n be distribu ted - i s not only problem atic but leads on to
ot her connect ing princ i ples.
·2
(p. 100) .
lie offers fami.liar reasons suc h as the changing power
incrt.' ,ise
111
Russian
strengt h,
the
ri se
r e 1aU. ons,
th e
of other nu c lear powcr·s, etc .
(cf.
simllarly Cox ).
There ar e, a ccordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that
Dl.
De errencc will not continu e to work,
and. more lmportant for the present argumenl, that
D2 .
De t e rrence does increase the proba bi lity of LSN war.
The themes are of course i.nter related, and t he re as ons for t hem (which are again
persuasive bu t in: oncl usive) can be t a ken together :
some respects) weaker D2 ·- the probability facto r.
proliferati on,
the
emergence
bu t the focus is on the ( in
An initial
of lesser nuc lear powers.
reason
concerns
As a result there are
many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagrat.i on, and so enhanced prospect
Some nnnlyula co ns id e r that
lt. -i~i
us e of nuclear weapons by
confrontation
a
11
lesser
very Jf ke ly route to I.SN war l · th
stat e .
Moreover
scarcitJ
;::i nd
o f chea per suppli es, etc ,
weapo n
systems,
more
or
Lcrror
s ltua ttons,
deterrence
power
lnvolv e s 36 ,
being mainta.ined :
costs
Wi t h so many more
Arms races, and interwoven
balanc e
of
have an exc eed ingly bad 1,istorical track record.
lncr cas lng as tl1c race p roce eds .
of
resource
A second group of reasons concerns the
Ther e is substantial inductive evi dence that
pres en t
for
wi<iel y d lstributed, the probabili.ty of war
through accide nt o r e rr o r is inc reased.
powrr
opportunities
growing
nuclear arms race which deterr e nc e, as practised, is ti ed to.
wec1pons
.lnltlnl
to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political
Jnstnbillty , relat ing to thlrd world economic de cline,
and
the
of
lead
escalating
eventually
to
arms
war ,
races,
with
such
as
probabili.ty
Next, deterrence dep ends on a certai n
balance
if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen
during escalation, deterrence may well fail.
A related reason for
35.
that
deterrence
practice
increases
It can be the or etically a r gued t hat the fewer the nations
weap ons, t.he l ess the chance of nuclear. war: cf.
n 1clcar
p .. 2JO n.
36.
supposi ng
th e
armed with
Lackey, MM,
The standard ar gument for deterrence as significantly decreasing the
proboblli y of wa r, would be decidedly better if the arms race were
nbandoned, a nd weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for
dcle rrenc e.
Of c our se s uch a probability-well assumption is only one of
scvera l_ thi. ngs required if det erre nce i.s to be just:!.fled.
probabili ty of war conce rn s the continuin g shifts in
poli c y,
US
especiall y
th e
rcncwc<l quest for superio rity wh i ch is in creasing the inc en tiv e of both sides
to
rcsorL to nuclcJr war, the USSR t o avoid being
advantage
of
ov erwhelme d,
USA
the
to
take
superiori ty ac hi eved . 37 Rece nt dangerous shifts in US poli cy
the
tow;Jrds war fighting a r e .in part induce d by a much inc re ased accuracy of nuclear
missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrenc e (sinc e mi l itary tar-gets
con be selected for strike and ci ties to some extent r emoved as
hostages ),
thereby
war.
also
weakens
the
case
against
resort
to
nucle a r
detrrrenc c requires a certain (admitted l y r a ther minimal, ye t
of
mutual
understan ding,
leaders, and even some
nuclear.
sha r ed
principle s ,
cooperati on
supe r-states.
and
soundness
transmi ss i on
Finally,
impor tant)
level
judgement
among
of
of
and
informati on
between
It is not just that t he increasin g numbers of operator s
in n position to J.aunch nuclear weapons must remain of " sound mind" and not, for
instance,
follow
through on delusions of one sort or another.
deterrenc e depends upon judgeme nts
seriously
mistaken:
'each
is
regarding
the
other
It is al so tha t
side ,
which
slde ' s
threat
is to the other' (P L, p.313) .
we
think' • 38
But
about
what
the
o t her
considera ble , and perhaps catastrop hic , margin of
evidence,
that
on e
perceptio n of what is
possible
resul t
As
s ide
side
thinks
e rror.
Not
thinks ,
there
only
not
can be
is
a
there
sid e (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's)
rational,
as
regards
limited
nuclear
war,
of a first strike countered by massive retaliatio n;
must now be severe doubts
cffectlvc ly.
"conv inc ing "
There is a grain of truth in
the c1a"im that 'deterren ce is primarily about what t he other
what
be
a t the mercy of t he o the r's percept io n of wha t
strategy is "r.atio al", what kind of damage .is " un nccept able", how
one
may
as
to
whether
rationa l
principle s
are
with
the
but there
operating
to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous
37.
The point is discus sed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for
super iority is doct1me nted. The v.lci ssi tudes of US "d efenc e" policy - not
to say its shiftines s and occas ional incoheren ce (as in strategic forward
defence)
have confused many of lts supporter s even . Perhaps there is
some advantage in the ver y incomplet e and limited exposure of USSR war and
imperial policies :
we don't see, wit h alarm, their incohe renc e and
i.rrntiona llty .
J8.
Pym, quot,.• d .Ln Thompson , p .19. Yet a fundamen tal problem Russi a and the
West fac e, Lt is sometimes claimed, is not merely that they do not
understan d one another but that 'ther, is a lack of a wish to understan d'.
This casts into douht the psycholog ical basis of nuclear deterrenc e.
24
idea (alread y allu<led to , as he l d in hi.gh pl a ces of powe r in USA
and in UK) that
LSN war cnn be sur viv ed i n r ud ime ntary s hel ters , and also won.
The suppor ter of det er rence
connec ting
rrlnci ple s
ri val case.
such
J1as
not
onl y
to
defeat
a rgumen ts
Cl, but, more difficu lt, to fie ld a convin cing
as
For the onus of pr oof lies in showing that the costly
~:.:..!.~_rr.cncc Ls justifi ed_.
t hr o ugh
practic e
of
Bu t for from th e fair ly decisiv (~ case that i s requi r ed
( Lo contras t with t he argume nt through Cl),
only
a
feeble
case
through
the
questio na b le obv ers e of Cl,
Cl i.
If Xis wr ong then it is right to reduce the probab ility of X,
nppears open .
•
For it has to be shown that
deterre nce ( s ubstan tially) r e duc e s the proba bility of LSN war ,
and st ri ct lt (this indica tes part of the trouble with Clt) that
deterre nce does this bett e r (more morally ) than availab le options
.
o
The latter uniquen ess condit. ion ce rtainly fails, so it r,.,ill
be argu e d.
reasons already gi ven, does the probab ility claim.
up i-hc v ery
cond 1 t:1.ons
probab ility
of
suc h
for
a
an
LSN
war,
it
So ,
for
When nuclear deterr e nce set s
can
ha rdly
have
reduced
th e
war , e speci a lly over the situati on a mere 25 years ag o
when such an LS N wa r was not technic ally possib le.
More genera lly , i n showlng that nuclear deterre nc e ls justifi
e d, it i s
c..! l1 0l l f',h
refute the theme Lhat deterr e nce is wrong.
LO
out that deterre nce is permis sible, or alrigh t.
altcrn1 1LJvc
pe rmissi ble
courses
of
a c tion
condit:f . on ha s to be est a bli.shed ;
to be no t merely
alrigh t ,
bu t
;H:cc·p ' ah l<' cvidt!n tin l ato nd nrdA,
r ig ht.
But
I t is not enough to make
For t he re certain ly seem to
withou t
deterr ence , wh ic h appear more morally satisfa ctory.
uniciue ne s s
includi ng
fright
To surpass t hese option s, a
nuclea r deterre nc e has to be shown
es tablish ing
such
a
39.
LSN
war s ,
withou t
.(cf.
Jl
11
claim,
to
fear
or
is vf.nunl ly tmposa iblc. 39
OED)
40
•
For
most
people,
portray ing the horror of LSN wa rs would serve adequa tely enough
from
be
the costs or problem s of
Deterre nce cons ists in preven ting someth ing (often some wrong ) by
t hr ea t s
not
the
enormo us
expense ,
t rouble
vivid scenari os
to
deter
t hem
and wastage of
An analogo us point will ap pea r whe n i.t is asked whethe r deterre
nce is the
way o ut oft.he nuclear fix, the thin g to persist with in the circum
stances .
Given that there are appare ntly super ior, le ss dangero us procedu
res , the
an s wl!r hn-, to be, No.
- - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - -
p r epar i ng to e ngag e i n th em.
det t·r rl'ncc
And
deterren ce
i.n a ny cas e de pends upon) is of
by
such
means
ourse not immoral .
(whi ch
miJit4ry
(Sc.h e ll was not
immora l in publ ish ing hi s gra phic descri p tions of the nuclear destruc tion of New
Yo rk .)
But t hou gh de te rrence per se is permi ssible, nuclea~ deterren ce, that is
deterren ce by complete prepa ration for the object to be preven te d , is no t , where
this
o bj e ct,
a
LSN
war., itself is no t
permiss ible.
The argumen t for this is
thro ug h t he pr lnc J ple
C2 .
l f X is wrong then c omplete prepara tion for (carryin g out) Xis wrong.
Hence
since
p re para t i on,
LS N wars
nuc l ear
are
wrong
and
nuclear
deterren ce
deterren ce of LSN wars is wrong .
claimed th a t prepa ring for Xis just as bad as doing X:
wr ong a n d Z ( mue h) worse t1wn
i
Y•
wi11at
W.'.1 S
wrong.
complete
It is not however being
Y and
Z may
both
be
41
i s wrong i s b y no means un if orm l y ev1.1.
"
Tn 19115 Lhcre would ha ve been littl e doubt that
L SN wa r
implies
complete
prepara tion
for
Among the three types of crime s pecif led in Article 6 of the
Cha rt e r f or th e I nternati onal Military Tribuna ls
(which
tr ied
the
major
war
c r iminals a t Nurcm burg) we r e
Cr1- mes a ga ins t peace: namely planning , .:e_repar ation, initiati on or
waging o f a wa r of aggr e ssion, or a war in violatio n of internat iona l
tr eat:!.es , ag reements or a s surance s, or particip ation in a common plan
or cons pi ra c y for the accompl ishment of any of the followin g ( cited in
Ku pe r , p.2 1; ita lic s added).
But af t e r ma ny yea rs of nuclear deterren ce, the
become
J ncreasi ngly
liable
to
question .
wrongne ss
implied
in
C2
has
However the doubts mainly come from
40.
De t er r e nc e a lso commonly includes elements of mendaci ty,
deceptio n,
mi si nforma t ion, that is elements of what a re, for the roost part, morally
unde sirable traits.
Li l .
Nor a re
ordered
be cause
wrong,
equally
degr e es of wrongne ss required :
wrongs can simply be
as
reg a rds relative worsene ss. The point requires some
it has been quite erroneo usly assumed t hat if y and z
cat egorica lly or absolute ly , then they mus t be equally
evil. Thus, e.g. William s:
.
partiall y
labourin g
are both
wrong or
.
there is no moral differen ce between running a deterren t st r ategy
on the one hand, and intentio nally - indeed wantonly - start i ng a
nuclear war on the other; so that the first is as totally evil
a s the second.
This is because both are held to be absolute ly
forbidde n.
Not a t a ll. The argume n ts from "Y and Z are both absolute ly forbidde n" to
"S o Y i s a s totally evil as Z"
and
to "Therefo re Y and Z do not differ
mor all y " a r e both ent:i.rely without validity . Compare : 2 is a number, and
3 lg a numbe r;
s o 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ
numeri c , lly from 3!
26
a~sum ing t!w l comp l e t e prepara t.i o n i nc }udc i:; l ss t: lwn Lt nee ds to or do e s.
Complete prepa ration for something, s uch as
sever~]
other
fea tures.
LSN
war ,
already
writes
in
In particular, i t presup po ses the preparation is no t
ha1 (·-hea rt ed hnt is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply
pret e nce.
Obser e tha t mere pretence, or ot her more psychologic a l ploys, cannot substi tut e
for comp l ete prepa r a tion in nuclea r deterrence.
too
sophistica t ed
for
bluff
alone
to
Military
succeed:
t here
preparatJon for wa r accompanyin g the t h rea t s involved in
t he
ot her
hand ,
has
to
is
now
be serious
deterr ence .
But,
on
c omplet e prepara tion does not imply that what i s prepared for
wi l l be attempted other than condi tona lly:
imply attemp t ed X.
c omplete preparatio n for X does
not
It does however 1.nvolve a conditional undertaki ng to proc eed
with wha l is prcpa·ed
whell1er
intelligenc e
for
under
c ertain
conditio ns.
Comple te
preparation ,
for a we dding or murder or wha tevcr, wo uld be po int les s otherwise, so a
(proclaimed ) comm itment to proceed under given circumstanc es c an
be
taken
of
connecting
for
granted .
Principle C2
principles .
is
part
way
not
the
line
in
a
series
pr inciple of the same sort that is hig he r in the series is that
A
con necting X with a tt empted X:
perh,ps
down
if Xis wrong then attempted Xis wrong
as bad ) , whether X succeeds or not .
But the se ries ends ;
off well before th e l ower limits of i nte ns ionalit y, contrary to
the
(thoug h
it cuts
claims
of
various religious pos i tio ns.
For example, it does not foll ow that if Xis wrong
then
X
the
co n temp l ati on
con sidcra t Jon
of
of
is
wrong
carrying out Xis wrong.
or
that
non-action- oriented
The point ap plies equally to sexual
fant asie s, power fan tasies, and nuclear nightmares .
no Lhing
mere
In
particular,
there
is
wrong with contemplatin g nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are:
nuclear wars, even lf their horrors don't be ar thinki.ng on, a re not unthinkable ,
and in some senses are all too thinka ble.
Indeed one of the reas on s why the connecting principles appeal is that each
common ly
involves
lt connects with.
decidedl y increased pro ab ility of the wrongdoing or outcome
Accompanyin g the increased probability are
certain
r eprehensibl e atti tud e s tied t o the ac tion t he evil outcome involves;
nol
I ho:a·
of
mere
pas s ! vc
.o nt emµ l at f on
I,,
1
'.
Howev er
oll
the
sets
of
these are
connectl.ng
n
prL nc lple s
invoked
except Cl ho l d, where the y do, ~, a n when the proba bi lity of
wrongdo i ng ev e ntuating is not inc r eased.
c ho:;c n
One rea son for th1s is that the
means
o r epre hensible end s may be ineffica cious, for instance intendin g to do
s omeo ne harm using witchcr aft .
The inc r eased prohabi llty
of
an
evil
out come
o l.mply makcB things worse .
Nu clear deter r ence involves not only war pre parat ion, but
thi s
accompa nied
by
threats
and
a threaten ing posture .
pot e ntial e nemy, has to be sui tably frighten ed or moved,
announce ment
For some pa rty , th e
if
deterr e nce
s ucce ed :
the threat must be recognis ed as s uch and be cr edible .
n uc 1 L' i1 r
deterren ce yie l ds a further conne cting princip le:
CJ.
of
is
to
This aspect of
if Xis wrong the n serious threat ening of X und er gi ven conditio ns is also
wr o ng ;
or , in br ief, If Xis wrong then conditio nal thre a tening of Xis wro ng .
The r ema in i ng connecti ng conditio ns invoked all take this general form
CG .
If Xis wrong so is a cond itional
r eq uires
some
further
ex planati on.
the fo rm, ~ ( X if C), wl1ere
of' • 4 3
thre ate ning
~
Apar t
intensio n
to
A condit'o na l
do
intentio ns
e . g.
themselv es,
1
the
t ha t ) .
C
to
(or
in pr opos iti onal ra ther than event style:
the
most
cond i tion a l lnte1slo ns are conditio nal obligati ons where~ is the
oblj gati on
form
a
are
not
impossi ble
claim
in
whnt
or even remote or imp r obable:
(spe c ifica lly those involvin g
cornmitn e nt)
for
follows
certain
is
tha t
s ort s
there
of
discusse d
an
it is obligato ry
conditio ns
the conditi ons
typicall y conc e rn those specif ying a rtuclear st rike by a potentia l
fund ame ntal
cred1ble
functor:
To r emove complica tion it can b e ass umed hencefo rth that the
involv ed
whic h
intensio n is a judgemen t of
is some intensio nal functor,
f rom
X
enemy .
The
are intensio nal funct ors
threaten ing ,
intendin g ,
and
whic h CG holds , and that these versions suffice to demonst rate
the
immoral ity
42 .
There is plenty of scope for f ur ther
elabora tion
here.
Passiv e
s pectntor shJp of evil e vent s where one is in an appropr iate pos i tion to
make a differen ce i s quite another thing, from contemp lation of other
worlds where e vil oc curs .
43.
The condi tionnl i.nt nsion, ~ ( X if C), whic h is an intensio n , should not be
confused wit h the provisio nal form, 1f C then ~x. which is not . The
Ame rfcnns nre t hr eatening the Russians with retaliat ory action If tl1ey
strike :
Lt is not that: if the Russians strike the American s will threaten
them with reta l ia t ory action . Such confusi on has arisen because of the
problems of formalis ing conditio nal obligati on given usual defectiv e
theories of condi ti onality.
of
nuclear
deterren ce.
Natural ly
again
there
are
many
28
no11-;-1ction ·-oriented functors for whi ch ve r s ions
c.ont. :•mplat J.on,
t'1l nld.ng,
dreaming, etc.
of
e.g .
fail,
those
of
The.r e is also a n interesting group of
more borderline functors, those of hoping ( for) ,
expecting,
awaiting
and
the
like, for which CG is only dub:i.ously correct:.
Connecting pri nciple C3 evolved from the simp ler pri~ciple, if X is
then
threatcn.ing
X 1s also wrong, or, as f ormulated by Ramsay:
is wrong to threaten .•• ' 44 The r e ason is that
to do
into
prac tic e
(e.g.
if
wrong
'What is wrong
putting
something
committ ing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into
tlin•at<'nl ne t o pu t that lnto practice , in pn rti c ul ar the declflred intent to
that
into
pract i ce.
beginning as fo] lows:
The
point
ca n
if worlds where
alternative ly
X
happens
be
are
put
argued semanti cal ly,
exclude d
then
so
are
adjacent wo rlds where Xis poised to happen.
The comp li cat lon of the simple form is required for two reasons.
nuclear
war
obta i n.
However t he required c onditional form can be derived
form,
is
through
only c onditionall y threatened , i.e .
the
f ollowing
wh ic h is pe rf ectly general , X if
argument:-
c.
should certain cond itions
particular,
(of
§§3-4)
LSN
oppo si. tion has struck, or not , and so wrong when it
wrong,
44.
so
a lso
is
simple
if it weren't it wouldn't
(The converse route fails
arg uments
the
Observe, furthermore that if something Xis
have b en wrong in the first place.
ear lier
from
su bstitute for X in the simple form,
wrong, it is a l so wrong under restrictive co nditions;
by
Firstly ,
threatening X if C,
war
has.
of
course.)
In
is wrong whether the
Hence,
where
X
is
More generally, to e sta blish CG it is
Ramsay's formula tion of simplified CJ is considered in Wal zer, p.272.
It
i s this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian
who is a nuclear hawk , int o the awkward position he ends in, whi c h as
Walzer explains , really leaves no room to move.
For in virtue of
slmp li.f led CJ H must he allowed that the threatened wars are permissible
to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to
be effective as a deterrent, Lhe exchange permitted must both threaten and
also,
i.n view of CJ,
not threaten nonmi.lit ary targets, collateral
oon-cornbata nt populations . It appears that Ramsay's position, if worked
out, wou1d be inconsi.sten t.
S!mpllf1cd pri nclple CJ 1.£ nlso invok<'d by the US Catholic Bishops:
se
PL, p.316.
They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared
"i.ntent to use nuclenr we apons, which they pronounce morally wrong.
Ho wever s implifi ed CJ is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to
nssess Lhe moral stntus of u threat by way of expected utility. This is
open to Rll the objec tions to expected utility as a test of morality
mentione d below.
29
enough to e sta blish the s i mpl e r
If Xis wron g s o i s a n int e nsion t o do X.
CG'.
The s e cond com plic ation in C3, modifying the threat to
ca us es
more
t roubl e .
a
serious
threat,
Some modi f ica tion a ppears required, because it is often
contend e d tha t empt y t hrea t s or bluff a r e wa rranted on occasion even whe r e
is
t l1r e o.tene d
what
l
.
i s wrong , to prevent t,1c
occ urrence o f som et h.1 ng worse .11 s A"n d 1.n
f ac t one wny o f tr ying to vi ndica te de te rrence , a s morally permissible , has been
by pre se nti ng de t er rence as lnvo lv ing thr eats which do not involve any i nt en tion
at all to pr oceed t o action on
plaus ible
Lhrc a t s .
removes
i t
the
support
bas i s
for
of
threats.
s i mpl i f ied CJ.
Insofar
A seri ous th r eat th e n, in the slJ ghtly t echnic a l.
sense
co nditi on s,
is
con s i de r a
accide nt .
intended,
For the challenge
grossly
immo r al
unconvincing,
case
wh e r e
conduct
under
certain
not
and calls for moral double-think.
ci rcum st ances
th e
result
from
improbable
To bring this
an
intricat e
Eithe r the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by
Doomsday Mac h in e c ircui try, etc.) or w1th further choice, or - somehow Eit her
not .
is
in ef fect tha t it is perfectly morally permissible to issue serious
thr ea t s to under t a ke
out
is
Principle CJ is not
ope n to the same c ha l lenges as sJmplified a nd unqualified CJ.
says
this
Hence the shift to serious
one tha t i s no t a pre t ence, empty or a blu ff , but credible.
which
as
it
is
way the out c ome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously , in
the s e c ond cas e be cause the intermedia te reconsideration makes it plain that the
thr eat
nor
ought not to have been issued at a ll, be ing justifiable on neither mo r al
more
.. pra ctic al "
rep r es e n t atives
grounds.
Further more,
while
states
thei r
and
ma y accept moral double at t itudes, such as morally assenting to
immor a l threa t s, les s corrupt agents cannot:
it
moral
principled agents they ar e or take
natu r es ,
to
t he
kinds
of
th emse l ves to be ( a s Benn exp lains).
i nsignif i c ant
mora lly
would
run
For su c h agents , who may
counter
to
comprise
their
a
not
proportion _ of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such
a s CJ are no t in doubt.
The a r gum e nt agai nst nu c le a r deterr e nce using C3 is as follows:- Either th e
--- ---- ---- - - -- - - For a di sc us s ion of threats whe r e the threatener has no intention of
ca r r ying ou t t he threat, or inc e ntive to do so, see Schelling, p.JSff . The
quest ion of t he mo r ality of th e s e threa ts, where the item threatened is
i.m,-,, or a l , ca n be left ope n.
30
t.hrcnt involved
then
is
it
Ln deterren ce is ser .!. 1);..i1.. or l t is m 1 t,
inadequ ate. s o deterren ce is no
Lhen by CJ deterren ce
depcn<l
is
wrong .
The
maintain ed.
sub-argu ment
on se ri ous threats is a practica l one:
Lf
it
s
no t
seri ous
Bu t if i t j s ser io us
that
nu c l ea r
dete r re nce
name l y , that if the t h rea t s were
not serio us , but merely gave the lmpressi o n that they would be fo l lowed thro
ugh ,
then
the
op posit ion
would flnd out, in one way or a nother.
could not be entlorseJ i.n an open or democra tic polit i ca l
wi LhouL
A policy of bluff
system ,
f or
examp l e,
coining some discussi on, and so giving the game away to the oppos iti o n .
Even i n close d non-demo cratic systems
maintain ing
such
a
po licy
weapons , espec ially
informa lion
would
clown
during
l i kel y
times
escape
the
of
there
would
be
ma jor
di f fic u l t ies
i.n
chains of c ommand i nv olved wit h nuc l ear
change
through
in
gov e rn ing
el i t es ,
a nd
the
op pos itio n i ntellige nce.
But then ,
since t he bluff could be called, deterren ce wou ld no t ha ve su c ceede d .
Ther e a re
as
we l l ot her argumen t s t hat the thr ats invo l ved mu st he s e r io u s.
On e is t hat
nucl e ar d terrcnce already faces a cred i bility probl em , namely tha t do ubts
a bo ut
the
r ationa lity
of
carry i ng out t he big nuclea r t hre a t weak e n th e c r e di bil ity
essentia l. to its effec t iven ess .
To be effec tive then i t mu s t
be
s e r i ous
( c f.
Benn).
Meeting obj ec tions t o pri ncip l e C3 leads on t o two fur t he r ve r sions of
one
centred on intent io n , one on commitm ent.
CG,
Princ ip l e CJ is int1ma t e ly linke d
with , and it some times co nside r ed bu t a variant upon , t he pr i ncipl e
C4 .
If Xis wrong then t o conditio nally intend to do X [kn owing it is wrong ] is
n!so wr0ng.
The' prJrcJpl cs arc intimate ly a ssoci at ed because a th ea t is, ac c ordi ng t o
die tionarie s,
etc . ' .
of
'a
d claratio r
of
intent
to 1nfU.c t puni shment, l oss , injury,
It i s their intercon nect i o n which lies a t the bo t t om of
deter rence,
which
in tend ing to go to war .
princip l e ,
th a t
turn
0 11
C4
is
s ome
pa r a doxes
the prob l em of c red ibly t hrea tening war wi thout
Princ i ple
C4
is
j us t i f i e d
th rough
th e
s i mplified
inte ndi ng to do wrong j_s wr ong, a nd s o al s o i s i nte ndl ng to do
wrong unl es s favoura b le circums tanc es f o r one' s
p inc.iple
some
an
ex tr emel y
position
prevail.
Si mplif i ed
wi del y assumed mora l thesis, 46 perhap s for the
excellen t reason that it holds a nalytica lly.
Its ela bo ra t io n C4 can be us e d
to
Jl
agains t nuclear deterre nce , ea follows :
argue
siQ ~a pfoce eding to LSN war when
the Qnemy duly misbeha ve s is wrong (by §§J-4) , by C4. intendi ng
to go to LSN wa r
when
the enemy duly misbeh aves is also wrong .
Nuclea r deterre nce involve s such
an intenti on, all the availab le evidenc e shows.
He nc e
nuclear
deter rence
is
wrong.
But like virtua lly every
utilita rian
princip les
utiJita rian grounds .
deontic
t hems e lv es ,
princip le ,
princ i ples
For it is not difficu lt to
except
thos e
flowing
from
CJ and C4 c a n be challe ng ed on
outline
str a tegic
situati ons
wher e mnxlrnum ex pected utility result s from a poli cy of nuclear
det e rr ence.
But
on il s own this conces sion casts but little doub t upon
C4.
For
it
likewis e
fs
not
princip les
C3
difficu lt t o ou tli ne situati ons where the hanging oE
innoce nt people , or other injusti ces , are sa nctio ne d or enjoine d
by
maximum
expe cted
a nd
utility .
pu rsuit
Those who appeal to utilita rian assump tions try t o
avoid suc h more obvious di fficult ies with .elianc e upon utilita rianism
,
scrappi ng
the
sp ots
not
by
doctrin e, bu t by hedging app licatio ns of their princip les around
with quall ficatio ns , whic h, they hope , will
trou bl e
of
wit h
utilit a riani sm.
enable
So
.i. t
them
to
evade
the
worst
is with Kavka, whose work ni ce l y
illustr ates that whatev er (little ) deterre nce has in its
mo r al
f avour
depend s
upon uti.lita rian ass umption s .
Kavka 'bcgin[ s ] by no t ing that any reas ona ble system of
fwbst,r ntial
1itil.ita ri a n
e l ements '
(PD,
p.287).
consequ e n tia l
elemen ts
systems
incl ud e
must
infiltr ate,
an
with
the
' ass umption
if
Eve n
observ atio n were correc t - it is nox, dep e nding f or one
e thic s
thing
this
upon
must
hav e
astonis hing
confla ting
utilita rian - it would not follow that reasona bl e
particu lar
that
assump tion
produce s
normat ive assump tio n involv e d is that t he
a ct
Kavka
thereup on
t ries
the paradox es of · deterre nce'.
wi t h
maximum
expecte d
to
The
utility
'( the most useful ac t) should be performe d whe never a very great
deal of utility
- -
46.
·•---- ---- -
Ka vka , who labels simpli fie d C4 the Wr ongf ul Inte ntions Princip
le (PD ,
p.289 ), attri butes th e princip le to Abela rd, Aquina s, Butler,
Bentham ,
Kan t, Sldgwi. ck, Kenny and Narveso n. Ka vka also gi ves reasons as
to why the
pr i nciple ap pe ars 's o obviou sly tr ue'. Kenny and others apply C4
to argue,
like the US Cathol ic Bishop s , that ' nuclea r deterre nce is immora
l' (cf .
Kavb p.29 1 ).
It is the clas h of C4 with certain utJ li tarian princip les
(espec iall y the
maximi sation pr inc iple of p. 28 7) that directl y genera tes Kavka
's f irst
paradox of dete rrenc e and l ies behind his other "parado xes'' : see
PD.
.
, •"
.
12
i.s
s t. a ke ' ( p .Z87).
:;t
obj ec tions
as
This as s um p t io n is ope n to es s e n tia lly the same ba t c h
ut il i taria nism
i self:
it is mainl y a mat t er o f i ncre a sing or
vary! ,1g the s t okes i nvol ved s uf ficient l y in a y co unte r examp l e .
usud l
stratc ~y
of
of
Kavka tries t he
weakening a nd fudging the nor mative a s s umption to a voi d the
~o r sl pro bl e ms of distri butive i n justice , and t he like , t hat max i mising
u t i lit y
can mora l ly e njo i u.
But the c ru cial defect in Ka vka ' s argume n t l ies
fo l Low
fr om
t he
normative
( p . 28 7) • 11 7
what
ov erridde n
by
C4
s u ppo sed
u t il i t a rian
to
a ssumptio ns '
Though Kavka tends t o a pply t he fudg ed normat iv e as sumption s in thi s
way, as If it domina ted C/4 ( see e s pe c ia lly p , 29 0), wh a t
and
is
assump t i on howeve r fudged, namely that ' t his mea ns
o t he r mo r al ass ump t io ns a r e
t h at .•.
in
produce ,
situa t i on s ,
are
whe n
moral
c ombi ned
dilemmas .
in
si tu a t i ons
These
are
not
s uc h
th e
f udg ed
as sump ti on
as
special
de t e rr e nt
c a ses
where
one
decnti c
pr inc ipl e , tl1a t yie l ded by ut i l i t a r ian i sm , ove rrid e s o t hers, but wher e t he r e ar e
c ompe ting, ev en c nt ra d ic tory de ont ic pr inc i p l e s , such a s tha t it
int e nd
right
to
to pro c eed to LS N war whe n t he e nemy mi sbe ha ves (on specious u til i tarian
gr ound s ) and. also wrong to i n te nd to do s o ( by C4) .
wr ong :
that judg ement is not ov e rr i den.
Nuc lear de t e rr e nce
is
also
t he
case
is
t hat
in
r emai ns
Nor do es it in any way foll ow that C4
i s in 1eed of qu a lifica ti on as a r es ult (Ka vka' s a ssump t ion,
what
is
th e~e
s pe cial
p.290) .
situations,
Howeve r ,
t her e
ar e
count e r vall i ng u t ili t arian cons i dera tions s ugge sti ng different imperatives .
For
.ln
t he s e
is
wrong .
s pe c i a l ci rcumst a nce s a greater uti l:lty can be realised by doing what
Howe ver
it
is
ha rdly
ne ws,
but
a
standing
objection,
that
ut ili t a ri a nism some time s en joins wl1at is wron g .
Spec ial
s pons on s hip
de t e rre nt
may
appea r
s itua t i.on a,
where
under
ntl lit a ri a n
t o get a foot i n t he moral door, ar e very speci a l.
char a c ter is ed by Ka vka , the y a r e s uch that t he
47 .
deterrence
de t e r r e nce
is
very
likely
As
to
Lacke y ' s utiljt a rian app ro ach r e s t s on o similar fallacy, that u ti litari a n
cons iderations predom~n a te wher e s t a k es are larg e enough: see hi s argument
f or the ;i pp ro nch in MM p. 192 .
Wha · hap p n s i s not that importa n t c ons quenc es ov e rrid e moral principles,
but tha t Applica t ion of one pr inc iple wit h important consequence s conflic t s
with t hat of ano t he r pr inci pl e wi t h less s i gni f i cant consequence s, and in
the we igh-·up of what t o do in t he pro blemat ic circumstanc es the principl e
with impor ta nt con s eq uence pr evai l s .
sucr<"£:d , and nothing else .i s likely
tp
lodc ed in a deep pr.obability-well.
This is ve ry far removed from the real world
su.:, ceed (see p . .2~16), i.e.
si.tuat.J.on whe re nuc lear deterrence appears to be increasing the
deterrence
probabiU.ty
is
of
LSN wRr, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at
least as J.ikely to succeed as deterrence .
that
<l1~ont <:
principles
sllbject
Even if it were
mistakenly
to real-life d .1 .lcmmas should be qualified to
avoid di.l mmas, there is little point in qualifying working
such
RS
supposed
de ontic
principles
C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situati ons.
Instead of pul ling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral inte nt:lons it
involves, it can be criticized more broadly throug h the commitments it
equi. r es,
by wa y of the following principle:
CS.
If Xis wrong then a conditional commltment to carry out Xis
The reason is that the commitment is a commitment
circumstances;
and
that
commitment
is
to
act
itself wrong .
lso wrong.
wrongly
in
cer-tain
Nuclear deterrence is
however a poli cy which commits states to war under certain conditions .
And
as
wi th
conditional
intention,
so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt
th a t
su perstates
and
controlling
commitmen t
and
their
intention
to
use
representatives
nuclear weapons.
did
not
occur)
is
enough
to
establish
the
relevant
The dangerous strategy of
launc h-on-warning (which could , for instanc e , result J n a
thut
have
response
to
attacks
the point, for which there is
otherwise quite s ufficient factual evidence.
Now the connecting principles
suffice
logically ,
but
are
nucl ar
deterrence,
for
weighty
principle
would
detachment
from
the
by complete preparat i on fo r and
Deterrence of this type is
wrong.
also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence
trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so
parad ox ical:
det e rrence.
ir self
By
case .
i nstance
conditi.onal comm.ltment to LSN war, is wrong.
This
sound
wh n all are liable to be disputed, several defensible
ones, ideally in concert, make for a
principles
one
applied:
it
ou t
the
connections
between
and
not
be
engaged
in
(unl ess
i ts
ha s
appeared
nuclear war and nuclear
Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that
should
chang ed, e.g .
left
bizarre
nuclear
war
direct ion can be drastically
at .least limited, per impossibile in the case of nucl ea r warfare,
to purely mi l i t ary targe ts).
Til e a rguments t hrou gh conn e cting pr i nc i. ple s, can be reinforced by different
sort s
of
ar gument s agai ns t the mo ral c orre c t ne s s of nuclear deterrenc e .
a n 1 a r g uments from lim i ted c~nv erge nc e of et h i cal t heori e s
I
There
wh i ch start from the
commonplace ob se r va ti o n that
~
All the ethi c al a t"gum ents in
favou r
of
nuclear
deterrence
are
broadl y
ut ilitar i an.
In f nct roost of the arguments i.n favour of de t e rrence, including many
t hat
inf iltra t ed
hav e
the
e thi.c a l
l i t erature ,
ar e
those
of
ge ner., l ly drawn f rom game t heory, and primar :tly intere sted in the
one
playe r,
t h r>
USA.
Utilitar ia nism ,
t hough
s till
looking
of
those
expedie ncy -·
advantage
of
basically
at
~dva n tages , i n t e r es t s and ( t ypi ca lly ind i vidual) utilities, has to take
a
partisan
pain of
posi t io n,
a nd
consider
[ or[eiti ng i ts claim t o mor a lity
sup po r t t d
by
o t he r
na tional i ties
othe rwi s e .
The
as
well,
commonplace
on
less
observation
is
the fa c t that such qual i fied moral support as deter rence obtains,
dflrive s from ut il i tarianism.
118
Th e re a r e two d ir e c tions on to a gene ra l cla1m ag a i.nst
de terrence,
either
by wa y of t h e pro- ut il itar i an theme
Uti l ita r ianism properly a pplied also comes out against deterrence
or, 1n o r e s t rongly, by way of the a nti- utilt t arion t heme ,
Utilita r la nism doe s not furnish satisfactory moral arg uments.
The n , by t h e ;rnti. -utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory
in
f av our
d ir ec tion:
48 .
of de terrence.
moral
arguments
Na turally, it would be easy to strengthen the second
a ft e r all it is widely
thought
that
u tilitarianism
is
a
false,
Thu s t he hed g ed utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and J oynt, and
a l s o within th e broadly utilitarian r ange , of Gautier . Showing that cogent
de f ence s of nuclear deterrence have to take a util i tarian r ou te would he a
much t oug her ent e rprise.
Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the
e n te r pr i se c ould be carried through, much would depend on what was
· cc oun t e d cogent. For ce rtainly biz ar re principles, e.g. obverses of the
conne ct ing pr incip l es, · can be i ntroduc ed, which afford deontological routes
t.o deterre nce .
An,l, rl e spi t r some back sliding by bi s hop s , all other ethical positions can
be m., d c to "' penk again s t deterrence and i. t s cont.l.nuntio n . • A deontological
~RRC ngnln At dctc rr c nc · , pr ima rily
he way
of
<lcontic
connecting
pr i ncip l e s, has been a rgued i n some detail.
In the light of these
prlnciplcs , Lt i s not difficul t to s e e how c a ses from other ethical
positi ons would go.
After a ll C4 ha s been defended from a wide range of
stanc es , e.g . contra c t ua l, natural law, utilitarian even.
seriousl y as tray, or even shabby ethic~ ] pg&ition.
pol it i ca l
s yst em
whic h
depends
in
some
uL l l lt:arJan a rgum e nts for its policieo.
It hardly does
measure
then
for
a
upon consensus , to rely on
Yet with nuclear de.terrenc e
just
thnt
appe;1rs to be happe ning, with readily ove rturned arguments at that.
For whether even utilitari.a nism supports deterrenc e depends ess entia lly on:
how
it
ls
applied;
with
which
maximisa tion recipes; along with what other
r estrictiv e assum pti ons (such as those of a deep probabili ty-well);
genc>rous
arc
utll i.ty·
assignmen ts
or
upon
With
different
(and · a rguably
superior)
va rying the guestimat ion methods, very differen t results
emerge, oppo sing deterrenc e and favouring unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt. 49
basic
reas on for this is straightfo rward (and like that ending §4).
LSN war has a n extremely large negative utility.
deterrenc e
out to
whi.c h increases th
other
recipes
of
feasible
a
how
for such things as preservat l on of national
sovereign ty , nationa l security, etc.
assumptio ns ,
and on
Any
policy
such
The
It is that
as
nuclear
probabili ty of this, or even risks it , must los e
alternati ves,
conseque ntialist
type
whatever
are
initially
applied
(e.g.
plausible
decision
Minimax, Dominance ,
Di.s as ter Avoidance , Expected Value) .
The anti-ut ilitarian theme can be def ended either by a full-scal e criticism
o[
ut j lltaria nlsm,
beginning for instance with its well-know n justifica tion of
l ocalised In justic e s , SO or else
11t i l i tarla ni sm
when
applied
One obvi.ous dcflc iency is this:
by
to
addressin g
s ome
of
the
inadequac ies
of
issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrenc e.
on standard util itarianism , what to do , whether
to proceed with deterrenc e, depends on the probabili ty of its success and on the
improbabi l ity of other options working.
deep,
uti ~itarlanis m
If the deterrenc e
probabili ty-well
is
morally requires deterrenc e, otherwise not. 51 But what is
morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are
pro babl e.
49.
Th e ins ab ility of utilitari anism is illustrate d by the
discussio n
inv olving KovkR, Lackey and Hardln, continued in Philosoph y and Public
Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilita r ianism, diametric ally
opposed conclusio ns are reached.
(Hardin 's approach tends however to
expedienc y reasoning of the strategic type.)
50.
Such wider critic isms of utilitaria nism, in all its forms, as an ethical
theory are too well-know n to repeat.
Some of the main defects are
considere d in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for
utilit arl.an ism'.
The point that util:Ltari anism gi ves no firm place to
stand comes from L, Mirlin.
36
wheLh<'r deterrence i..s moraJ.ly wrong or not, i. s
likPly
to
work
or not.
indepe nde nt
deterrence
are
decidedly
essentially
nowhere
i.s
Moral
princi p~s
not
are
through expected Vf.llues, whether utilities or o th e rwis e - though how
ba d :rnme outcome is ma y be .
depend
.Lt
If nuclear deterrence is wrong wher e it increases the
probablllty of war, the n ls it wrong, simpllclter .
det:crmlne<l
whcrhc r
of
upon
firm to stand.
Wor s e, si nce the expected utilities in the case
uncertain,
these
a nd
of
the results util i ta r ianism delivers
uncert ainty
measures>
util itari anism off ers
In con t rast wi t h the soli.d deo nti c ground of principle ,
utilitariani sm provide s only shifting s and.
The objections made apply esp eciall y aga ins t act uti l ita r ianism.
(orm
shows
at
special
int e rests,
such
as
conditions
security
(the
of
estimation rules are pulled in).
probability- well
state ,
have
hi gh
1s
deep ,
utilities,
nat io n- s tat e
and
spe cial
It does not yie ld a deterrence polici;
ind eed
hnrdly yields policies. tall (other than act utilitariani sm it s elf ).
11nd certain othe r diff i ulties may be avoided by considering instead a
o[
act
most that nuclear deter re nce is "wrong" a c c ordi ng to its l ig ht s
under very
il
The
acts. 52 But the method lacks sta bi lity;
These
seque nce
di f fe r en t prescription s will res ult
dependi11g upon how the sequence is se l ected, what is inc luded and what left
(as
also
associa ted p obabilit i es depend crit ically on the sequence selected).
No unequivocal rec ipe is delivered.
selected
out
to
To
see
this,
suppose
the
sequence
is
include worst cases , for instance cases where deterrence fails a nd
war breaks out.
In this event it can hardl y be argued that
deterrence
is
t he
pol lcy that maximizes u til it y ov er the sequence.
Along wit h the argument s, there are
dissatisfac tion with nuc lear deterrence.
other
concom.itant
conventiona l wa rs .
f or
Firstly, the peace it has provided
011l y nuclear pc~ce, or rather lack of nuclear war , as the re
smaller-s cale
reasons
is
no
deep
is
s hort age of
And the "peace " provided is a t best a tenuous
pe3ce, which Is not stable , ~ut liable to upset at
any
stage
by
a
r ange
of
51..
Though this is to oversimplif y, the po int s made ar e not affected by the
simplificat ion .
In any case the simpl ifi ed picture reflects well enoug h
the difference s between Kavka and Lacke y that matter in their debat e
(ref rred to in footnote 49 ).
52.
Whether thjs is rule util itarianism , or still act util i tariani sm
the sequence can be construed as one long ac t, may be left open.
becaus e
- - - -- - -- - - - - - ·
-
37
fn,t_0 rs, lncl 11d1ng er rot· , both human and
t ec lrn1 .:fl.1,
j)C:lc (_~ ,
p 0:i
It thofl not
offer
genu i ne
of the sort re riuir e d fo r a stabl e intec nat.lo
nal 1. 1. fe, but only o fragi l e
·e o f a sort" (PL , p.316 ).
Secon dly, there
enorm ous
is
cost,
mora l
-~!_p_po r_t_~.r~~ _: ___ cost of de.ter renc_ ':_, be cause expe
nditu re on it exclu des othe r urgen t
moral prio ritie s. The US Bisho ps put th is fami
liar poin t, in a surpr ising ly
Marx i st
way,
in
terms
of
destr uctiv e capac i ty and what
'the
ls
contr a dic tion
ne e ded
f or
betwe en
what
cons truct iv
the
is
spent
for
devel opme nt'
( PL,
p . 316) .
§6.
Prac tical , prude ntial and more mora l arg umen ts
from
natio nal
dange rs
nuclr•ar build -up of the supe rstat es , a nd the gene
sis of nucle ar dilem mas.
to
Whil e
there are argum ents to the immo ra lity of nucle
ar war prepa ra ti on, there are also
counr c ·-arg ument s,
that have prove d rema rkabl y persu asive (espe
ciall y to
Amer I c;wi, ), to the mora l
just:!.fiab ili ty
of
nucle ar
war
pr e para tion
in
the
_p_!.c s':~- circu mstan c es.
The unde rlyin g style of argum ent is simpl y an
elabo ratio n, or state -upl ift,
of Liw1- for the esca lnti on of weapo ns at the
local leve l, for acqu iring a gun or
f o r s to c king- tip the neig hbour hood armou ry - and
every bit
a r gu1r.e nt
from
local dang ers.
dom inati on ;
a nd
dubio us
fir st
of
all
seco nd of nucle ar destr uctio 11 .
atom ic
s urren der
and
so
avoid the destr uct io n' (Wal zer, p.273 ).
prepa ratio n is suppo sed to guard again st more
than these ;
third
eleme nt ,
name ly,
loss
of
basic
rig hts
there
with these .
black mail
of
forei gn
appea seme nt
In fact nucle ar
is
ways
a
cruc ial
of
life
This furth er set of elem ents is linke d to the
dange r of
forei gn domi natio n - which is reall y a separ at
e eleme nt from risk of
Thoug h
and
(free dom, equa lity, etc .) and
fund amen tal value s (upho lding of truth , human
dign ity, etc .) and
int eg rat ed
that
The two go toget her,
sinc e lf we dtcl not f ea r the black mail , we migh
t adop t a polic y
or
as
It is that nucle ar prepa ratJo n, 'so we have be
en
tol d , gua r ds again st the doub le dang er:
forei gn
as
black mail.
dom inntl on -need not imply the loss of most basic
value s it does
imply the loss of a t le a st of one , self- de te rmin
ation , freed om to choos e vario us
natio nal objec tives ; conv ersel y loss or erosi
on or infri ngeme n t of basic value s
can occur witho ut fo re ign demi. natio n, for insta
nce, as is comm onpla ce in the
"[ r
•e " world, by internal change of go,wnmtent or irnvij,fnroenta l approach, through
the iiicrc>nsed security and contro l a
nti clcnr
prepnratlon
incr easi ngly
nuclear
risks,
state
demands,
extensive
etc.
But
what
nuclear destruction, also
involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction
ti, _ material
of
53
of the cherJshed life-style.
So nuclear preparation is hardly n c l earcut
bnse
me ans of guaranteeJng basic values. 51•
fn other respe cts too t he argument from loss of
lncku
cogency
an d
rings
ho 1 low,
It
is
basic
values
and
ri ghts
hnrd to avoid th' f •cling r:hnt tl1c:
oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like
ci tati.o n
of
religious
values at politica l ceremonies;
clean cover for economic consideration of one sort
from
demand s
of
the
military-indus trial
of
private
wealth
and
vnl \les
appealed
to
category:
in
and
anot he r,
them
having
However
arising
to
do
with
th e
an argument isn't, or
associations.
And
the
rights
and
But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into
particular nationalistic ones do not.
And one of the main
a l leged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment
or
many
are, most:ly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental,
and worth much sacrifice .
this
of
power.
oughtn 't to be, defeated by lts unsavoury
that t he argument 1.s a
omplex , many concerned with foreign
domJnatiun of other lesser states, and many
conccut ·at:1.on
pious
of
"communism"
of "socialism ", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention
of cnpi talism.
communi.sm
has
What has
been
happened
here
confused
with
of
course
(the
t o tal i tarianism, which does remove certain more
freedoms
(of
opinion ,
association,
is
reality
basic
information,
that
( the
of)
state
values,
etc.,
ideal
socialist
namely
etc.),
of)
and
certain
so does
derivative~ threaten basic values.
One critical q uest i on, then, is whether extens ive nuclear
LSN
wa r,
and
indeed
for
rational way of preservtng
nuclear
those
holocaust,
fundamenmtal
preparation
for
is a good or effective or even
values,
which
we
have
left.
53.
The converse obviously does not hold.
Basic values and
cherished
life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation,
as when a more powerfuJ state imposes its values and way of life.
54 .
The argument from freedom , advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by
state representatives , is further conside red early in Appendix 1.
.... ,
'lQ
J,
Simi la r ci. ue s tions
dominntion
and
arJs e
as
regard s
blackmail.
argumeq;; H from
er, e
Justification
danger
which
is
itself
open
questioned (i n §8 ), both from the
to
ser i ous
point
foreign
of the methods of extensi ve nuclear
preparation depends essent i ally on an arrangement of hostil e
structure
of
of
question,
v iew
of
nation
and
basic
states,
a
i s subsequently
valu s,
such
as
freedom, and oth r wise.
But whether ul tima tely jusU(ied or
dangers
are
no t,
t hese
from
natlonal
those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear
prcpnration, and
jus tific, tlon.
have
They
been
have
par t of many people ' s
accepted
in
moral
by
policy
outlook.
particular , that ex tens i ve nucle ar
however ,
the
makers
as
affording
moral
fact be e n wide ly accepte d, and undoubt e dly form
Wi thi n
frnmework the moral justification holds good .
others,
ar gumen t s
arguments
not
a
c onv entio nal
Northern
It i s within such a fram ewo rk, in
preparatio n
do
such
engenders
establis h
a
moral
fix.
For
the morality of extensive
nuclear preparat ion, but only make a prudential case for such preparation.
people
not
also
face a nucl e ar dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it ls
specif ically moral one.
,1
impressed
by
And
for
ma ny
other s
again,
who
are
who
not
so
or as familiar wi th Soviet and American culture and ways of life,
and thci.r r espec tive r ights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma.
peop)c
Such
live
beyond
For such
the "beneficial" reach of t he supers t ates , prudenti al
counter-arguments from national dang ers carry little weight, and the moral
case
against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged .
Thls is the ge nesis of the argument fr om isolated
people
who
live
in
people.
Consi de r
some
a comparatively remote a rea, whose freedoms are not (yet)
under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by
nucl~ar
d ter r c nce
(a s under pr inciple Cl).
For such isolated people, who may
ha ve little interes t i n the preservation of nuc lear states , there is no
nucl ea r
diJ emma ,
and
nuclear
lo cations may have problems
problems
people.
as
deterrence
to
natio nal
is wro ng.
dangers,
genuine
People in less fo r tu na te
but
in
meeting
these
they are not entitled to impo se grave risks on the uninvolved isolated
In doing so
i mmorally;
and
f or
through
similar
nuclea r
reasons
deterrence , superstates
the
are
proceeding
conventi onal No rthern framework is
j_mpug rwd.
conclusion can be al ter n ' tlvely -c t>rl c hc<l
Tht'. same
argument::
put
a
reflective
i s olat e d pe rson, and check
S! 11 ci>
Amer ican
the
or-
resulting
by
a
substitution
Russi.an 1n the position of such an
asse ssment
of
nuclear
deterrence.
IL wor Jd be th e snm c as that of n reflecti ve isolated person, stripped o f
m1p, rs lntc bins, moral ly opposed to de terr ence and not rnot·all.y
transfixed,
t h <~
c onventional framework fails t o sati sfy requirement s of morality.
The outcome of the arguments fr om dang e rs is, the~ ver y different depending
whc her
on
the
arguments
are
appU.ed
as
rega rds a superstate or not.
The
superstate theme which emerges is, in brief,
SST.
Because o f multiple connected dang e rs from other states which have
nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states
- is obllged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons.
Henc e, by detachment, a super- nation-stat e, such as USA, ought to have something
Jn
orde r
t hP
meet
of
the nuclear armoury that it has.
Or, weakening the theme to
ol.Jjecli on s concerning excess, "overkU.l" capacity, it
retain
i1
t
l east
solid
a
ou~
core of the nu c 1ear devices it has.
(moretlly]
to
For su bs equent
argumc~nt it can be left open whether the oblig-'¾tion involved is a moral one, for
inst a nce
be cause
of
the
character
the
of
pro r·c·c tcd, or only (as nrg ued a bove) one of
g rou nds
to
those
di. sa rmame nL
supporting
ag ainst
a
the
dangerous
SS
reason 55•
prudent:ial
the me
nuclea r
Northern values supposedly being
On
similar
it can be argued that unilateral
opponent
would
be
prudentiall y
Jrralto nal.
It will be fr ely admitted that what is prudentiall y or morally requir ed is
a
s11 hopLimal
st rategy ,
li.ke the famili.a r strategies of the prisoners ' dilemma
si tu a tions and of certain related competitive games .
that
a
su peri or
would
be
cooperative
For
expen sive ,
re source s,
dr ai ning
of
such
t he details are wel l- enoug h kno~1.
55.
admitted
arrangement s.
Cooperation
and
be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a
ra nge of other r espects .
future
be
strategy for nuclear adversaries , if sufficient trust and the
lik . could be achif?Ved , would
agreeme nt
So it should
arrangement s
would
be
much
less
risky ,
destructive of the environment , a nd so on;
However for the present and the
foreseeable
the prospe cts of cooperation a ppear - so we are repeatedly told by state
It can stil l, a nd presumably does, amount to more than mere local
expedi e ncy, s ince the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue.
rcprcscnlat lve s , who are (not always ~ ltt t~gly ) helpin~
unfortunate ly
rather
remote:
only
the
ca make
their
polici es
sure insurance is ex t e nsiv e
nu c l ear preparntion and full preparednes s t o 3pply nuclear force.
At least this is so where one is a superstate :
proceed,
largely
unabated .
nuclear
preparation
Where one is not a superstate , but a lesser state
one must, the r e presentativ es continue, _t::_':l..l_ on a larger ally who has a
one's
a rsen a l,
umbrella.
nu c l ear
pre paration ,
th e lA ck of trust d l splaye d, ,md
for
huddl es
conf l.dencc
in
!ts
and
which
under
co ntrast s
ncouragcd elsewhe r e .
st·at (• , one whic h r.clics for i ts nuclear
grrH1nd
one
anoth e r's
But he r e a level of tr ust and coope ration is_ called for, by
dep0 nd ent states, which is far from foolproof,
with
nu clear
in s uranc e (which is pres umably not fre e ) is obtained indirectly
thr oug h some supcrstate 's
nuclear
COVt!r
super-· ally
Does a "d epe nd ent"
on a s 1pc r -a lly,
rather
tha n
strangely
have
that
exchange
on its territory?
mu ch
Jt s ally's opponen t ?
Confidence, for instanc e , that its ally will not r e nder i t a ta rget or
nuclear
must
stag e
a
Given the pr ocliv i ty of states , especia ll y
l arg0 states, to res ort to expediency, and give n the recen t histo ric al record of
superstates and t heir leaders , too much fait h would be mi spl ace d .
Thus, whatever th e l imited force of t he argume nt f or the superstat e
it
<loes
theme ,
not extend t o the analogous them e for a dependent state, which d if fers
f rom SST nnd end s as follows:
DST.
Because ... , a st a t e without adeq uate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged
to r e ly upo n a s u pe rstat e ally , and within that arrangement , to accommodate t he
facilities and nuclear in stallations of the protecting ally .
ln pa r t for reaso ns already given, principle DST is not very plausible (a nd
same
goes for mo re obvious variants upon it ).
Nor do the arguments of f ered for
SST t ranspose parti cularly well to direct arguments
striking l y
illu str ated
by
the
case
the
for
DST. 56
This
is
more
of more remot e nuclear dependent states.
Consider the a rgument from basic values, for instance , from the angle of nuclear
dependent Australia.
Basic values ln Australia are not threatened by, o r put in
j eopardy through, the ac io ns or plans
of
the
Sovi et
Union.
Nor
ar e
they
thr eatened by the other superstate, t he USA, the only country with ' the physical
56.
As ls widely known, inadmissi ble and usual l y much overrated considerat ions
o f expediency frequently enter into reaso ns why states allow foreign
nuc lea r facilit i e s upon th e ir territories , e. g.
eco nomic consideratio ns
such as trade or local revenue and short- term jobs.
ca1 1acity to launc h
mot j .ve Lo
<.111y
<l o
look convincing .
carries
full scale invasion of Aust r alia ', but
R
wc .i ght.
reasons
In
fact,
the
with
a rgumen t
from
of
For there
arg ument
t he
only
is
qucstLonable
non-n l lf~twd prnc.ticcs.
of
58
domina tion
In this way
too)
the
from dang er of nuclear destruction could be nullified .
such
supe r state
foreign
li t tl e care, the pr e s e nt level of
a
economic and political dom i nati on could be much reduc e d.
fore(•
lack(ing]
so , , so far . 5 7 CJ.ear ly the argumen t from basic values does nol
For similar
1 it t le
'clearly
danger
because
nuclear
of
umbrella,
superstate
dang er
facilities
and
th e
tha t would be removed wi th
With 1 ess remot e dependent Europc 1rn states these
sorts
a rguments from nationa l dangers are only marginally more convincing , and may
b e defeated along analogous lines .
The differe nces in the situations of st ate s, and
peoples,
break
theme
the
of
a
of
monolithic West.
differently
situated
This is a theme especially
favoured by US and the Wes t European rep resentati ves, who present the West,
its
freedom,
as t hr eatened by Soviet domin atio n.
und i.ffrrentiatcd unit.
dep1!nd0nL
i;tntes
with
But
this
l eadi ng
idea,
NATO
desig ne d
powers ,
and
In this the West is a single
in
and
part
to
align
lesser
to justify pu tting them at
nuclear rl sk is as muc h a my th as th e idea of the Golde n West.
The West is
not
so monolithic, it ls not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free , much of it
(i ncluding the Ant ipodes) is not thr eate ned by Soviet domination.
Principle DST - li kewise what it dep ends upon , SST - is
now
coming
unde r
attack by Eu ropean disarmament groups , who c hallenge the core assumptions of the.
und er lying retaliatory model that
0
Safety lies in weapons ,
More weapons i mply more. security59 ,
Cerlainly, for mo:ce :f.s ol ated states, such as New Zealand,
safety
from
nuclear.
a t ack l i es not in wea pons bu t in excluding nuclear facilities (including visit s
from nuclear submar ines ) .
Europe ans are ar guing in
present
of
syslem
is
more
a
similar
wa y,
that
the
a ris k, indeed l ia bility, than a protection (e.g.
57.
For t he quote d c laim, and some of th e
Au stralia ' s Se curi ty , p .94 .
58 .
The Jssuc is furt her pursued in Ap pendix 2.
59 .
Sec, for exam ple, t he las t article in Thom pson.
argument
for
it,
s ee
Threats
to
Thompson, p.251);
envi s -1ged
and thnt: w-ithou!:
Lhcut.r e
for
a
h\icJ. ,;,)ll''
instal1.st:!on1>i Europe cannot be
limited nucle r wnr , in the way .l
thf'
is now seen by US
( ut not Soviet) strategists.
Once the weapons assumptions
are
qu es tioned,
other
assumptions
of
the
retaliatory model a nd its variants come up for examination, namely
ci
Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular
o
Whe th er tle proper response is through nuclear armament,
as
opposed ,
say, to other military responses, such as convent.ional arms, or,
takin g off from the previ ous point,
~
Whcthrr military approaches and procedures (through
ar e
proper
methods,
armaments ,
etc.)
or should be such dominant methods, of conflict
resoLuti.on at the int er national level.
It ls plausibly arg ued, against military procedures, that at no
ordinary
level
do we sens5bly s et about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal
weapons and thr eatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and
r e ally
warranted,
frontier
ethics.
This leads into the issue of alternative
defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary 60
and
explana tion
it
deserves,
questioning of the framework
of
but
never
one
that
already
nation-states.
While
emphasis
anticipates subsequent
the
state
system
is
inrac · , force ls far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expe cted
and are l LkcJ y ine vitnhl c.
nation-state
system ':
For 'forc e has
[a]
permanent
plac,~
in
the
thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very
orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements.
§7.
Th
resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned st;:ites
Ass~mbli.ng
r eferred
th~
to
as
themes
the
so
far
nuclear
de v e lope d
fix:-
States
war-deterrence, because (as argued in §J-§5 )
to engage jn war.-·deterrence , at l east
60.
yields
the
both
and
their
supporters.
deontic dilemma. often
ought
not
to
engage
in
it is immoral, and also ought
for prudential reasons (as
Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in
Mohists.
For contemporary work on alter native systems , see
su rvey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature
and social defence arrangemen ts, and a growing literature on
i . e . convercd.on t o such arr angement s .
argu ed
using
China by the
especially the
on non-violent
transarmament,
·,,,,._
44
SST and DST).
tl w
Th i s dilemma i.s no idle construction
of
virtues
parac.onsisteot
logic),
but
( c onc octed
61
prod uced
by
war itself 62 , or
at
war
and
its
version
of
the
deon tic
least war which spr.·eads beyond purely
mjlitary la r gc ts, as larger wars in evi tably
e . g.
nuclear
, a, wel l as bei ng virtu a lly ublqultous i.n nuclear war discu ssions.
ThP nuclear fi.x 1s in part simply a mor e intense
di 1 emma
demonstrate
a serious real-life dilemma, t he
ouLJ.i n s of which are r e peatedly encountered i .n text s on
asper.ts
to
do
(since
ra il t ra nsport , typically rely on ci.vilian ones) .
military
arrangeme nt s,
The ma in dil emma arises
from a combination of t he retaliat ory model with t he feat ures of
war.
War
is
requlr 0cl for defence of th e state and valu es it upholds (or pretend s to uphold);
but war also invo lves imm oral ac ts and cv.tl co nseque nc es .
war
can
undPr
also
ce rtain
justified.
be
se e n
as a t temp ting a rec onciliation by tryi ng t o show that
ctrcumstanees
Thus
' some
these
reall y
ju tifications
0
evi l
consequences
Regis
of
war '
(Walls ,
p.260).
accept ab l e than falla c ious ,symptotic
are
morally
of war aim to show that a ctio ns deemed
normally forbi dd en by moral ma nd ates are now pe rmissible
the
The doctrine of " ju st
But
this
argume nts
when
perfo rmed
under
is no better or mor e morally
for
uti l itorianism
as
bein g
corre c L \~hen the s takes are larg e .
W;n· and preparedness for
61 .
wa r
als o
gene rate
s ubsidiary
di.lemmas
f or
Thus Green, along with many others, ' find[s ] nucle a r deterrence
the
best of pra c tical policies available to us now •.. give n the realities of
world politics ' bu t ' s till demur[ s ) because of mo ral qualms' (p . xii).
Green
also r e presents both Morgent hau a nd Halle as having 'rather
agonisingly presented a • • . case for a deterrenc e strategy, even whil e
asserting that the stra.tegy is morally indefensible according to the
traditional et hical codes' (p.2 52 ). Walze r ends in a similar dil emma (he
is committed to a str onge r a nd less qualif i ed form of it tha n he set s
down):
though it [deterrence ] is a bad way, there may well be no
othe r tha t is practi cal in a world of sove reign and suspicious state s'
(p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pur sue.
Similar ly th e US Catho lic Bishops
d :llemma;
they s peak of ' th e
dilemma of how to prev ent the use
Fa s kius nn<l Dockrill and i n Benn
terms of moral dilemmas.
present the situation i n terms of a mora l
political paradox of de terrence •.. the
of nuclear weapons • .. ' (PL, p.3 13).
In
too the nuclear situation is pre s ent ed in
Th e nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who
think they have seen the clear admis sib i lity of deterrence, or differently
for those who have seen through the argumen ts fr om nati onal dang e rs.
But
it i.s a dilemma for th ose locked into the conventional f r amework.
62.
Situatior.s in war are als o a major so urce of moral dilemmas:
see Routley
and Plumwo od where several exampl es are gi ven. A general logic a l account
of and theo r y of moral di.lemmas is elaborated therein.
. ...
inst;ince, a sevc t·e tensio n be tween freedom and
difficult
prohlcms
au t ho f· t c y:
'one
of
th e
~0s t
o[ war involv es defending a free society witho u t destroying
the values that g ive it meaning and vali dity' (PL,
p.324).
The
problems
are
greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arra ng emen ts.
The nuclear fix not onl y i nt ensifies a nd complicates other d-Lle rnm:-is induc ed
by
t he
co ntemporary s ov ere i gn s t at~ 63 , in particula r the dee p tension c betwee n
national security and the ope r at ion o f libera l-democrati c arrangement s (sucl1 a .,
"
lnd.lvidual
li.herty , popular control of institution s, etc) .
othe>r more persona l subsidiary d i l emmas ,
( poll U ca l)
obl lgations
to
s for
example
(the
question
the
extent
of
one' s
a nuclea r stat e, and ro le-induced d Uemmas such as
one's conf licting obligatio ns as a docto r or a nuclear
res c•archer
It also accentuates
of
politic a l
obligation s
armame nt s
and
processor
or
eva sion
is
their
considered f urther in Appendix 2).
At the more personal level, tha t of individual and group ac tion, the re
several
ques Ions
to
'Wh, t. should my sta t e
be disen tangled - questions di ffere nt from the key issu e
be
doing
and
influence, d epending on who one is.
I do?
1
one
Jives,
-
do?',
on
whi c h
one
may
exert
influences, i.e.
in
what
l it tle
There is not only the question 'What shou ld
a question whi c h will have a quite different force de pending
a nd
ar e
on
whe re
sort of stat e, where one wo rks, what one contr ols or
on who on e ls and one ' s role s - but also the
questions
' What
sort of person do I wan t to be ?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'. 64
Answe rs to thes e latter char a cter questions will feed back to influence those t o
act ion-or ien t ed
questions .
Each
of thos e questions c an , in gi ven situations,
induce subsidiary dilemmas .
The essential fea t ure of a deontic dil emma is that both A and the
of
A
are
wrong
(or
di ffe rently,
pursu ing a nuclear def ence policy.
obliga tory),
negation
for some suitable A, such as
The place and essential role of deontic
and
63.
The nuclear dilemma is not alo ne re sponsibl e fo r these other dilemmas.
T.arg -sca l e nuclear power generation, a nd other types of warfare and
security ar rangements, also contribute. But a conflict of freedom and
autho rity is already an outcome of the la rge central state.
64.
For gro up formula t i on of t he que stio ns rep l ace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The
l mpo rtnn ce of distilling ouL th e se qu•s t ions, and the moral und es ir a bility
of r!Pt0rrr,n~0 fn terms of whnt: Lt docs to p oplc morally, are brought out
Ln Benn , where however the issues a r e made t o l ook somewhat more separate
than they are .
moral d il emmas ure not
l i t.t>r;,Lure
f, !.,
•
widely
or
well
und er stood,
p...." t'ticular]y
__
e 1-1
~ 1i
in
ca .1
Thi s l s par t ly be c a us e c urre ntly domin a nt e thic a l positlons lik e
utilitarlnnism "annot at al l e asil y accommod a t e moral dilemmas or the data which
giv•s
to
rise
them
but
the n such positions do not r eally offer reporti ve
acco11nU; of wr on~ an d obli ga_~_:!:_on anyw.-1 y.
d i lemma doe
Cont r ary t o utilitarian per ce pt:Lons
a
not neces s arily have any mo ral s olution , though there may be better
a nd worse ways
By
01t .
wh c h
assessments,
contr a st
f orm
the
with
basis
s uc h
e thical
theories ,
preanalytical
oE se n s itive theories, do recognise mor a l
dil~mmaa and reflect t he i r f e a tur e s.
Reactions an
f rom
the
res ponse s t hat a re c ha r ac t e ristic of deonti.c dilemmas
fix.
nuclear
The r e 1<• an un s t end iness, an uncertainty a s to whnt to
<lo , whJ.ch wny tu pr.occed , whl c h pr ind pl •n i n wa ter e d- down for m to
temporary
Thus ,
crutch .
for
as
world' GG , that
b st"
j
ethical
RU;l1 ,)ps wt-o
way
a
of
neve r
exerci s ing
"mora lly
ou r
s J. n a morally-str a pped wor ld .
fu nctor
s peak
moral
A similar
th e
'strictly
mor;il
Dete r r ence ha s a strlc tly temporary role
but
de t e er e nc: e
th e
c i rc um s t a nce s.
de ter r .nc e,
is
be
in a fallen
to
" second
a
acceptability '
object
mus t
cert ainly
one
str ictly
and
wrong,
is
of
from th e
conditional
be to move beyond det er r ence, 'towards a
optlon
as
to
of
what
the
to
nucl ear
do
in
Thus Wal z er, for example, s t r ugg les t o the conclusion
though
a
"morally
try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e.
world free o f the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out
And
can
shift
'moral
c ond i tional '
while
a ccepta bi U.ty ,
good",
responsibility
d~t c rrcnce
fix.
·s
(as from good to a c ceptable) is made by the US Catholic
of
we
gra s p
examp l e , th e Bishop of London contends t hat the
possession of nuclear wea pons 'whil e
acceptable''
emerge
neverthel e ss
the
policy
to
fix.
awkward
that
war
in
the
pursu e
circumstances ( p .274) . 6 7 Howe ver as more than a n immediate stepping stone
to
a
65.
There are exce pt i ons of course, e .g . i n the Catholic educated such as
Sar t re;
a nd Na ge l's f i nal example i s very instructive. For a fuller
t h e or y of mo r a l dil emma s s ee howe ve r Routl e y and Plumwood.
66.
Repo r ted in The Ec onoml s t; re pr i nted i n
1983, We ekend Magazin e p.2.
6 7.
As a response to a moral dil e mma , Walz er ' s approach is perfectly in order
logtcal ly. Tho se who, l i k e Be n n , ' f lnd i t ne ither coherent nor cceptable'
hnvl! no t gras ped t he logic of mo r al di l emma s .
The
Australian,
February
12-13
!i
'.rnp erior
pol Ley ~
nsscrabled
(in
sufficien tly
it
is
§5-§6),
a
dt! cidetlly
reasons
of
·1
}-toor
the
opti_ n,
sort
reasons
i'o r
that
are
decisive
already
for those,
outside the conventio nal Northern f r amework, who find
no
genuine
of
nuc le ar
nuclear dilemma.
To make matters worse the nuclear fix ls, furthermo re,
stal1.:s'
own mald.n&_.
fix
a
It is not somethi ng they blundered into, by accident.
initial nuclear jnvolveme nt was deli berat e l y c hosen, primarily by the
Lhc
escaJAtio n
of
In these respects the
situation
is
like
peop.1 e who deliberat ely let themselve s be invo lved in two incompati ble
relations hips , and build up
though
and
U.:, A,
has by and large also be en deliberat ely chos e n, again mainly by
the USA and the USSR in in teractio n.
th:1 t
The
one
there by.
It
is
build-up.
The fact i
programme is t o be in addition to existing
( which
are
to
Sovi et
that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has
frequentl y l ed escalatio n, and apparentl y still does.
esources
myth,
a
some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, an d nuclear
in North Amerlca occurred on a defensive basj_s in response
bui ld·-up,
nucl~a ·
with
onflJctin g obligatio ns
generally
agr eed
The recent (1980)
United
to
States'
strategic
be already in excess of
Russia ' s , and which always have been so ) (Thompson , p.21) .
The present dilemma , that many people fe e l acute ly,
state
policy,
allies, and
Naturally
not
the
USSR policies.
indicates
especiall y
that
merely
route
by
a
taken
advanced
response
to
capita list
t he
nations,
Soviets
(or
of
USA and its NATO
state
socialism ).
would not have been feasible without compleme nting
And independe nt evidence,
t l1 ere
is then a direct outcome
suc h
as
Soviet-Si no
confronta tion,
is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist
n.:.iti.ons .
There is a t wo-way co nn ecti on between world political arrangeme nts
nation-st.' .ltes
and
the
nuclear
f ix .
arrangeme nts are an evident source of the
nuclear
situation
is
increa singly
present wo rld polJU.cal structure .
is
widely
promulgat ed
.'.lrrangcm ents :
it .is'
seen
On
the
dil emma
as
one
hand,
with
t he
these
result
through
political
that
the
i nd icat ing the inadequac y of the
Indeed it is no longer a radical
theme
but
that: the source of the nucl ear problem comes from state
n world of sovereign states . • .
which
brought
the
wo.ld
to
the prese n t dangerous situation' ( PL, p,JlJ).
nucJ.e11r fix tends to lo':.~ political arrangements into
On th e other hand, th e
the
statist
form,
into
arrangemen ts of an increas ing ly authoritarian and centralist cast.
stutlst
espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to kee p the
and
security,
to
defend
national
inter est s ,
reasons such as perpetuating the system
advantageous
of
confrontation,
st ate
to
(!),
provid e
but underneath there ore other
sovereign
st a tes
and
frame work
the
rlnd
peace
The
military-indus t rial in ter ests, dependent state explo itation, and
polit i cally
favoured
of
inequa l ity
it
supports .
The ~merg ing t heme is t he n that the ve ry nuc l ea r s i tuatio n arising from th e
statist
arrangements
a nd
interr e lations
( conomic
ideologies , etc.) tends to , and is used to, lock
a rr nngcme nl.s
of
s overeign
where
the
pa ttern
world
states And zones of inter e st .
t heme is a pi ecemea l pr a cti cal one .
side
the
rivalries,
into
conflict i ng
the
present
The argument to th1. s
Consider first, the matter from the
Soviet
of nati ona l control and progressive military-economic
reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer .
The threat from the West, whether it exi.sts or not (and in Soviet
perception it certainly does) , has become a necessary legitimatio n for
the power of the ruling elites , an excuse for their many ec onomic a nd
social fa i lures , and an argument to isolate and silence critics within
their own bo rders. In the West we have ••. care fully con trolled
and se l ec tive release of 'offi c ial information ' (Thompson, p.20 ) .
"We" in the West, e specially the Americans, also
integrated
with
state
appara tus,
have,
in
forms
increasingly
the military-industrial complex, which is a
major. benefi c iary a nd promoter of the nu c l eR r. arms race . 68
Secondly, there i s evidence of entrenchmen t of the arrangements,
by
th ing s
S llCh
as
the
SALT negotiation s ;
shown
there are f i xed s uperpower s an d a
(growing) nucle ar club of nations all governed by a
rule , partly held in place by deterrence .
as
flimsy
negotiated
set
Connected with this , there are cases
rev ea ling the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example.
Soviet
US i s
68 .
of
The
invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so th e
not
over.duly
worried
about
Afghanistan
and
its
people.
What
was
The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is
sketched i.n Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism , would
assign even more weight to this point.
As some of them would free ly
concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation.
diff~rent, what it was worried a bout a nd made ~uc]d a r threat~
adj~c ~nt
~estcrn
oil
supp li es :
concerning,
were
these lay within the US zone of interest (cf .
th e d Lscuss ion in Sche ll, p.212).
§8 .
Ways out of nuclear dilemmas:
results.
in itia l political fall-out from the ethical
Virtual ly all the ways are wa ys of limitat:i.on , and they all invol ve in
one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and
limJt~tions
on
the
thu s inevitable.
and
more
or
power s of states.
Limitations on national sovere~.EX _~re
The limitations may be reache d by agreement
and
negotiation ,
less voluntarily agre ed to 69 , or they may be imposed, or possibly
worst of all, they may eme rg e from an ini.t i. al war.
As with other fixes produced by
there
are
suggested
ways
the
structural
ar rangements
of
states,
ou t which do not interfere with these ac-rangemen ts,
inter.stR-te approache s, and there a r.e ways which do seriously alter the struct ure
nnd
power
·elations
extrastate approaches .
of
state s
(and,
in the limit, remove t hem altogether) ,
All the familiar , allegedly "practical" and "realistic" ,
attempt~ to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms
limitations , etc . , are interstate ;
sovereign
state .
The
s ame
goes
(graduated) unilate ral disarmament .
about the nation- state;
they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the
for
les s
"realistic"
But in fact there is
proposals,
nothing
or
empi rical
fact ,
is it part icula r ly a stable one.
nor,
and
its
replacement by alternat.ive arrangement s.
as
a
We are certainly
free - Jn more libera l states, it should be eve rywhere - to theorise a s
demise
sacred
it is not a particularl y well justified political form;
it js 1ot even a very long-standin g form of political arrangement ;
matter
very
such as
to
its
And nuclear dilemmas
s houl d have e nc ouraged such reflection.
69.
In principle it would be relatively easy for sta tes to agree to settlement
of their disputes by less damaging a nd expensive contests than military
ones, e.g. by contests of selected rep re sentatives, and not just through
fiB l1Llng ln some form, but by contests of footballers , singers, da ncers,
lawyers , or etc . In prac ti c e, however, such more civilized alternative s
are never much consldered in thes e days of superstates . Animals, by
conLrast, are smart enough to settle dis pute s by means much more like
these .
Even the a nci en t Greeks - though they had a clear appreciatio n of
limits, which has been lost by post-Enligh tenment leaders
regarded the
institution of war as fi nal ( al l egedly inevitable ) means of arbitration
between city-st a t es , not seeing
its
social,
structurally -emergent,
characte r.
50
approaches take one of
Extrnstr1te
ittlernat ional
of slate s.
r.ol
two
rou tes,
way
~Ile
to
l~,
ge nuine
power, or the way down, throt1gh fractio nation or deunionisat lon 7 0
The ways up and down are by no means one and the same;
,10ccss;1rily incompatibl e .
but they are
Some of the impo rt ant machinery, for a way up to
world governmen t, is alre ady there in the
international
law-courts.
Wer e
the
courts ns signed suf fi cien t authorit y and po we r, the remedy , namely through legal
acl ion, that· medie val
principle
theo ri. t s
saw
to
all
disputes,
could
in
be rxtended to in t ers ta te disput es , and th e just war between states S
and T supersed ed by the just ~ase of S versLs T.
given
intrastate
s n fflcienl
least jilitial]y)
But if
the
law
courts
were
power then their a uthority and efficacy would likely rely (a t
upon
war deterrence ,
though
not by military means.
perhaps
Law courts, as usually conceived, are not
effective without police and jails or
their
and
equiva l ent
supcr-statist
back-up
eq uivalent
for
of
economic
other
penalties;
and
the
either wi l l involve the capacity to inflict quite
substi'.tntial amounts of damage on "delinquents" -· which, bec ause delinquents will
typicnlJy
be
organisations,
will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps
dissent 'ng , participants in those organisations, as well as to other
In
pa rt i es.
repC'ilt
uninvolved
short t such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to
rt .
Tl1 • Way Up is one more stnt i s t, legali stic , authoritarian way of trying
ec:t
t. n
gri.ps
with
the
nuclear
though mostly 1n passing to be
to
problem, and accordi ngly is often men tioned,
dismi ss ed 71 ,
in
orthodox
strategic
texts
on
-·--------- - - - -- -70.
Am e ricans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the US SR) is
a union, of fairly recen t orig in, and that a differ e ntly-oriented State of
the Union message could well consi der dissolution of the
uni on.
Regional
movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular s upport at present. By
contras t, the re are signif i cant se para ti on movemen ts , some deserving aid
and e ncouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR ,
UK and France . The USSR already has tr oub le in holding its (supposedly
voluntarily integrated) satellite em pire together;
and the one recent
attempted add ition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant.
Nor s ho uld powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be
f no t c rcd c l ocwhc r e .
The some appli es to state empire expansion, ns
.illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Mos t important, the reunification
of
Germany
should be resi sted;
instead a more rational regional
deuni fication than the p resent East-·West division of post-war Germany
sho uld be oought , al ong wlth removal of nuclear weapons from the border
regio n, and so on.
71 .
Thus for example, Ka hn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as,
impractical , etc.
Hardly ne ces sary to s a y the Way Up has won most favour
wllh the 1 ga l f r a ternity , and from more Authoritaria n organi s ations.
5l
thermonuclear war .
By contrast, the Way Down, thoug h like
the
new, is sca rcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions;
means
an appcara nc Q (a comeback) in some more radi ca l discussions,
combined
with the Way Up (in "world ord e r" mode.ls:
unl i ke t he Way Down, i.s
considered
however
beginning
to
be
cf.
Way
and
is
more
sometimes
The Way Up,
sympatheti cally
by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint.
a r e newed emphasis on world order, in rea c hing
inte rna tiona l
system';
and
'the
'towards
a
no
but lt is making
Galtung).
much
by
Up
mora lly
There is
integrated
missing element of world order today is the
absence of a properly constitu ted political authority' (PL, p . 320).
A main argume nt for the Way Up is
just
a
repetition
of
that
which
is
commonly supposed to underpin sta.tist arrangements in the first place, namely an
argument fr om ( gene rous) variations upon the Prisoners'
Tragedy
of t he Commons.
traditionally,
ecological order.
not
herdsmen
as
best
solutions
regards
to
problems
as
the
of
organisation,
public order and, more rec ently, as to
So with the "tragedy of nation-states") where the players are
but
nation·-states ,
and one of the prospects is destruction of a
r,ood parl of th e commons by rwclear wa r, the solution is now
sort
such
It is that authorlty and coerc ion - in the form of the
state - a r e r equired to ensure
espe cially,
Dilemma,
of superstnt e.
said
to
be
some
Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application
of the "traged y" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some
of
thcjr
be
order-imposing
corr espo, dingly weakened.
ar gum ent s
are
role,
and
But all
political
this
is
obligation
to
There a re, then, many problems
through
these
A
further
theoretical
with
h:1.tch
the
is
Way
that
Up,
a
both
"tragedy"
theoretical
and
the Way Up merely repeats
arrangements.
It
is
contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations
nearby, that the probl ems of interstate relations are not repeated
72 .
will
72.
stalist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate
only
that
states
good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are
only sound under quite restrictive assumptions.
prac t ical.
assume
to
See further loutley and Routley
especially Griffin.
and
material
referred
to
a
level
therein,
up
and
The rea reas ons for th e state are of course very different from the
thf!oretic::il c:ov er such argume nts af ord. Among other things, the state
enables and guarant ees the accumulntlon of power, privilege and capital.
again .
The maj or pra ctical hi tch is that there h
no prospect at all of getting
su ·ha "solution " t o work in tim e t o Aerve 5.ts intended purpose.
Tn rc:,1.li l y , we ar e no ne arer a world gove rnment than we were a century
ago ,
In fact, it is even arguable t hat since World War II we
have moved furthe r a way from a world government than we were before
Wo rld
War
TI.
The disint e gration of empires has mul tiplied
soverei g ntles . I t ia true that we hav e s omething called t he United
Nations, but eve n the United Nations has decline d in power as it has
grown in memb e rship. By the beg i nni ng of the 1970' s the United
Nations ha d bec ome, in some ways, a l e ss powerful and e ven less
influen tial organisati o n than it wa s a t the end of the 1950's (Hazrui,
pp.2-3 ).
The reaso n s for thj s Mazr ui goes on to o u t line .
future
For
t he
foreseeable
nuclea r
ideologica l d i ff e r e n ces be t we e n s tates , including especia l ly differenc e s
as to how politica l arr angeme nts shoul d be e ff e cted, exclude any prospect of
opcrnt l vc
world governmen t or a worl d legal s ystem capable of resolving nuclear
hostlllt i es .
extre~ely
I n some ways, this is just as well.
monol ithic,
woul d
World
gov ernme n t
would
cer t ainly ,
whatever
it s
( g ray?)
politic al
colour,
{~xplo l tatJ v e eco nomic sys tem whi ch would do i mmens e
impose
damage
on
to
It
undesira b le
l eve l
Ideological,
r equ1 site
the world an
many
remaining
of
inde e d
u nity
political
and
parad 'gmatic ,
cannot
be
and,
e c o nomi c
sepa r atio n
expect e d
in
some
crucial
respects,
unity.
of
Moreover ,
give n
Northern
main
within nuclea r dea dlines.
swee ping
more
sovereig nty , c o ul d
blockages
and
agr ~ements,
be
negotiated?
dea dl ocks
i1
the
involving
genuine
There
an
way
is
When not even
endless
of
of
that
state
series
of s uch state reconciliation.
a pp lies to int e rst a te arrang eme nts, whi .h ma y make limited us e
the
of
The s ame
Way
Up
nego tia tions or other conc i liation pr ocedu r es within a fram ewo rk arranged
•
-
through the Unit ed Nations);
73.
it
limitations
almost
the
cultures,
nuc l ear weapon s li mitations can be worked out, how much less l ikely is
(e .g .
would
systems. 7 3
The Way Up thu s presupposes an unlike ly
much
be
f ost e r e conomism, would ent r ench bureaucracy with
all l t s damaging f ea tur e s, a nd could e asil y tend to totalitarianism.
·1
n .:ltur.:iL
an
7 11
Fo r a mor e de tailed (bu t decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a
world
gov e rnment,
see Galtung.
Naturall y the objections to world
gov •rnmcnt , 11nd dlffl c ult lca in the woy of oht in i ng 1t, do not extend to
mo r e f l ex ible world arrangements, such a world federation ofcultu res (cf .
Ma zrui ).
Such a plura l lstic ana rchlstic Way Up can
be
genuinely
s yn thesized with the Way Down.
jJ
There is
arrnrgemant s
regrettably
and
als o
conventions
much
are
e~ tdert ce
frequ ently
concerning war and human rights 75), a nd are
scntJments
signed
does
slide
smoothly
that
not
not
1nce rnational
observed (especially those
worth
into despicable dee d s .
bode
well
ever be rcc1chcd.
ln
<'nnv,•11t f< n
any
great
deal:
openly
violated.
I ndeed there:.> already appears to he at least one
fon·C!,
of
lofty
It
for nuclear arms limitations , s hould suffl c i en t ag reemen t
wl 1I C'h
tn
nl1
the
following
intEirna t i ona l
i1P mtljor 11u clc•nr sL 1t:es ore slgnnt:o r l.en,
w!1fc:h w11uld rule ·11t LSN war and nuclc11r cl ic• rcnc
includes
a
Even agreements states have
are oft e n enough disre ga rd ed, sklrted ar ound, or
not
tr ea tie s ,
1
,
t h ton genocide.
Genoc i de
ac.ts commit ted, in time of peace or war, with
inl ~nt to destroy in whole or part a natural, e thical, racinl or rel igio us group
as such:
ki.11:lng members of the group, causi.ng serious bodily or me ntal harm to
the members of the group , d e llbcrately inflicting condittons of life
to
bring about physical
destruction
i.n who l e or i n pa rt.
f ollowing associated a ct s are also punishabl e :
dJrcct
and
public
shall
Beside genoc ide th e
c onspira cy to
commit
be
Persons committing genocide o r any of
punl.shed ,
whether
they
are
the
othe r
act s
responsible rul er s, priva te
individuals or public officials. 76 It is not diffi cult to argue
nucl~ar
genocide,
inc itement to commit ge no ci de , attempts to comm.it ge nocid e ,
complf.ci.ty i.n genoci de.
mentioned
ca lculat ed
that
a
larg er
st rike (such as det e r rence policy requires as a ba ck-up respon se ) would
almost cer t ainl y consti tute an act of genocide, through what
minority
groups.
conspir acy
repr:esentati .v
'S
does
to
some
But then, by virtue of connecting principles like CS, nuclear
deterrence stands indicted
pa r ticular
it
of the
and
as
involving
i.ncitement .
nuclea r
s t a tes
acts
ass oci a ted
with
genocide,
in
Some wel.i - known political and military
would
thus
ap pear
to
be
li.able
to
indictment . and punishment und er internation al law .
7L1.
Even Dahl itz, who gi.ves a detailed and s ympathetic accoun t of nuclear arms
control at t empts and lost opportuniti es, is by no means confident th a t
suitable arrangement s onn now be achieved (se e pp.
210- 13).
Reasons
include technologic al advance s now taki.ng place, and the renewed America n
drlvc f or strategic super ior ity .
75.
See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty Int e rnat ional reports.
in t his paragraph were sugg est ed by c. Pigden.
76.
The accow1t of genocide given is taken directly f rom the
Genocide Convention, whic h is reproduced i n Kuper, p . 210ff .
Most of the points
text
of
the
The nuclear fi.x cmergi.ng fr om nat.io ,,-stnte arran!_1, 111 ~nz:s - c ombin ed wi th the
appare11t
I mpot ence
interstate relations to alleviate the situati on , indeed
of
with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation
ne:.rer
to
nuclear
the
" brink"
is
now
taken
to
ind ica te
contemporary angle) the inad equacy of natio n-state po litica l
tias
gi v en
new
impetus
sovereignty
the best-seller
and
to co nsiderat ion of other extrastate r es olut ions .
The
According
to
can
reorganise
the
radical
namely
n iclear
in
Sc.hell ' s
1
unsatis factoriness
situat .l on
The
should
the foundations of politic c l thought'
pollllcal
t.iicy opvrate •. ,
the
indicates
inst itutions
Fate
lead
political
of
to
req u i red
a
t he
Earth .
' ful l-sca le
to
make
't he
co n sonant with t he g lobal reality in which
and in ' work [ lng] out the practicnl s teps by which mankind ...
its
political
li fe' (p.219).
However Schell himself tri e s to
avoid the se ' awesome urgen t tasks, which , imposed on us by
the
of
the present system of nati on stat e s has even reach ed
stands,
Schell
reexaminatio n o f
world ' c
and
book
a new
a rrangements,
thesis that the nuc l ear problem
national
( f r om
and
work of our age'
else overimpressed
by
political t he oris ts.
the
7
Z
history,
c onstitute
So, no t feeling th e pressures of history or
real ities
of
(unstable)
nation-states ,
do
most
But there i s no good r eason to av oid the task of politic al
rea ssessmen t, made so much more urgent by the nuclea r situation.
There i.s li.tt l e doub t bu t t ha t we live ( too
11nthinklngly)
with
an
an tiquated
s ystem
many
present
state
arrangements,
representative
century
communications
•ery
different
condition;
in
a
77.
when
and
the mai n outlines of the mod ern totalitari a n state
and its mauifold defic i en cies recogni sed, even ea rl ier.
of
( a llegedly
17th
we re
willing ly ,
The feat ures
go vernme nt: , were largel y fashi oned in t he
especially ,
us
even
of poli t ical a rrangements which t he
nuclear impasse , among others, calls in to q 1est ion .
best
of
even
dem ocratic)
techno log y,
more
were
t he
and
primit i v e
d iscerned,
In the br iefs prese nt ed
A similar theme , similarly qu estioning 'such sacred tradi tions as a bs olut e
national so ve reignty', was p r essed by Bradley, a significant US g enera l
( sec Co x , p. 225).
Sch 11. (like Bradley) does not mak e it entirely clear whether he is
thi nking of the Way Up or t h e Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the
Way Up. So does the mai n t hrus t of what he says, e.g. ' Thus the pe ril of
extinction is the price that the world pays not f or "safet y" or "survival "
bu t for ito [sic !] insistence on co ntinui ng to divide itse l f up into
sovereign nations'
(p.210), as if the natural or original st ate were an
undivided one ? On Schell's position , see further Append ix 1.
for political a r rangements such as repr~nontat ive government, the excessive siz
an,! compl ex ity of modern states was not envisaged .
But such systems con tinue to
opcrn Lc , i ns ufflciently questloned, though tl1el r justificato ry bas es
und c r mi ne<l.
prese nt
Nuclear
problems
rep r esentative
have
political
emphasized
have
been
several other defici encies in
arrangement s.
In
particular,
they
have
rcv cn l ed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident
will of t he people on an issue , for instance in installing US missiles
Euro pe a n
countri es.
cen tury
ca s e for r e pr e sentative proced ires is dissolved.
issues,
~
i s sues.
The
least, be reduced.
reduced
excessive
power
back
at
dev e lopme nts ,
pro cedures,
But the route down through
issue-regul ated
large
i mposes
and
complex
other
modern
requirement s.
states
What
lnl t .t1-1.l
s maller
a s iL ls
to
inf or med
citizens
gro uping
than
approx i mate
of
a
g lant
satisfa ctory
good will.
As
the re .1 r c se riou s dcfic encies .f.n
the
l.nf ormation
by
are
stn tes,
government
recent
tec hnologic al
called for a re smaller
Firstly,
in
present
information
and
democratic
progressive
procedure,
of
control,
nation-stat es,
channels, and so f o r.th.
ncc e ptable
the
from
These
upon
nuclear problems have again made patent,
even
·release
the
and
distributio n
distortion
r estrictive
of
most liberal of them (and
Aga in, especi a lly with new and less
systems , there is little excuse for thls.
information ,
upward
depends
But there ar e
e vi dently vest ed i.nterests whi c h stand to benefit from the limited
pub} l t:1 y
and
Secondly , democracy, insofar
political
rela t ed clcfi c i ncies as regards educati.on).
flow
major
li ke many other social arrangement s, appear to function better with
lnt egraLJon of groups by principles of federation.
a nd
on
of governments would, to that ex tent at
grou p.i.ng s , information flo w, communicati on and education.
cx pe n,, ive
lea st
governmenta l power to more participato ry democratic forms, a rout e mad e
poss ibl e ev en in
mu ch
elected
wny that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues ) are not given an almost
f r ee hand on eve ry issue, but are required to answer
polic:y
th e
It is past time
for mor e is sue-control led d mocratic procedures , where governments once
(i n
some
Now that modern communicati ons a nd info r mati on-processin g
make i t fe a si bl e to dete rmine the mi.x of public positions on major
19tl1
in
of
data
featu res
in
have
a vailab ility
major communicati on
helped
in
making
present delib e rat e ly fostered pattern of nation-stat e
56
co11frontatl on, and in establishin g the prisoner's
nuclear
superstates
are
often
seen
to
be
gJlemma
type
situation
th e
locked into (on which see, e.g.,
llardin1.
A central a rgument, arising from the nuclear fix, for
political
questi oning
current
arrangement s and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at
le~sl), takes the following shape:•
Political arrangement s shoul d answer ba c k to certain
j,rnt iff.-.d
111
te1·ms
of
dolng
ut
.eas t
where
and
are
so. 78 The s<.i r e quir ements lnclude ,mch things ns
en;,blJ ng good and meaningful and moral l lve s for those
arrangement s,
requirement s
(as
certainly
in
who
operate
under
the
muc h of the West) the basic
mat e rial condit i ons for such lives are met .
•
l\ccaus c of the nuclear [ix, nation-stat ~ arrangement s have
these
requirement s.
For
guarnntce the prospect of
arrangement s.
nation-stat es,
good
meaningful
lives
those
to
under
their
yet ther e ls a non-negligi ble probability that
person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged
a
meet
at least in the North, can no longer
such 1.lv •s may terminate, leas tl11rn fulfilled, 1.n this way.
support
to
A life's meaningfuln ess ls certainly diminished if it ends before
its 1,rimc inn nuclear d i~aster ;
m.-iny
and
ceased
s tate
to
Furthermore a
acquiesc e
in
or
engaged in nucl ear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf.
Benn) .
Th_erefore, nation-stat e arrangement s have
should
be
amended .
have
their
justificatio n,
and
Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though
not all) natlon-stat es:
natio n- s t ate
f orfeited
it ls not only because of the
forfeited
their
mandate.
nuclear
Political
fix
that
some
obligations to such
states a r e corr espo ndingly dissolv ed .
There is enough evidence that power- brokers who control
stght
of,
or
worse
have
lost
don't care about, t11e point of political arrangement s, of
wha t justifies or is supposed to justify their sta tes.
78.
states
This
applies
both
to
How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the
irn lerlyi.ng politica l
theory.
Rawls, for example, puts it in familiar
contract ual form: that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for
mutual adva ntage' (p.4). Mao puts i.t in a standard democratic way: 'since
Lhe purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people
and the i r interests, it is the people who should control in a meaningful
way, the gove rnment' (see Soo, p. 68).
r;7
rnnre powerful s tates nnd to lesser states, both
c lai m
popular
Ln
and
mandate
ag;iinsL the wllL of the pcopl(! ,
power~.
put
a
value
hi3 lier
where,
nlrea y
illustrated
milita ry situa ti ons:
viol.1ted
the
'IH' t:.1k er s
on
some
have
more often , they act without it or
as
The sit1.1at-ton has been reached
sove reignty
nation al
survival. ' (Scliel1's conclu sion, p . 210;
is
-✓ hl.'lfe
where
than
'nuc l ear:
they do on human
for copio us evidence see
Kupe r).
Thi s
by I srael, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear
the
principles
of
just
warfare
repeated ly, as hav e ma ny other pr i nciples.
much of whn t c l .:i im they lv1d to externa l
have
been
blatantJ.y
Such states have forfeited
respect or internal political obedienc e;
so, on other grounds, have many other state s .
It could just be, of course, as is oft en
a lt er nat ives,
that have
been
re s arc hlng
glimpsed,
though
of world go vernment).
dismissed,
for
s tirc withou
very
no possibly better alterna tives .
but
little
As
to
whether
all
has
such
are
no
been
expended
on
opportunity
do
to
work,
a nd
not
Appea r
to
give
we
alternative s
w~y
Down.
There
working tow ar d s the wea kening
es pec .i.ally
can
be
the
may
and
ha ve
been
given
know very little a bou t how humans
suff icicnt
org anisi ng and trying out alternative
accessi ble
alter natives
instance as lacking feasibil ty , it is diff i cult to be enti r ely
operate under su bstantially different arrangement s.
But,
t ime
arrangemen t s,
to
even
once
again,
proc eed
thos e
nuclear
very far on
of
the
mor e
be time to pr oceed a l i ttle way ho wever , in
breakdown
of
t he
large r
s uperunion s , which are the immedia te problem.
ln valid to simp ly conclud e that alternative poli t ica l a nd
while
t here
But alternat i ves the r e are,
effor t
toking the risk of being dogmati c;
little
d e ad ii ne[,
tha t
t1e r a nge of alte r na t ives or their features (except pe r haps for th e
0
op Li. on
or
insinuated ,
nuclear
st a tes,
Thus i t woul d be
s oc i a l
arrangemen t s,
theoretic a lly feasible and certainly a l onge r- te rm goa l , do not present ly
off er a part of t he practical response to the nuclear fi x.
But there is no need to insist upon a s1 nglc-trac~ Way Out of
dll emrna
to
th t:
exclusion of all olh .rs:
quite the contra r y .
t he
nuclear
We can no t only
afford to be fa:!.rly catholic about " second best " ap proache s and embra ce wha teve r
seems to be working or looks like helpinJi • wUhin re c ogn i sed e thi c al ( and o t her )
con st rain ts ;
Indeed, given the urge ncy,
the
direness
of
t he
si tuat i on ,
we
58
:,hou1d
~s
be
fairly catholic and not lnflexibly co~mitt ed to narrow methods, such
boRged
rlown
( a nd
v ery
on
a rms
limitations
ner,ot inti o n s
m"thod::i
should
si~nifica nt
be
undemocratic
perservered
concessions
unrepr•sentativ e)
between main nuclear states.
wi.th,
from
cert ai nly
tJ nd
and
the
attemp t s
superstates,
made
to
e.g .
No-first···use declarat.lon, a ban on weapons in space, etc.
But even s uch
a
wring
further
jointly
signed
The direction of most
hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially
new .
The politica l means of the Way Out are what they have
la rg e r
eve r y
liberal
or
huma nitarian
been
on
issue that has matte r ed:
from ou tside
state governmental apparatus by organised pressure fr om within or
nnd
it '
by
furnishing
self ·- organising
characte r is tically Bottom-Up
famiL l ar
cons i de rations
are
methods
an
alternatives
practically
wi t hout
which
never
virtually
upon
bypass
it ,
Top-Down.
Such
but part of the more general , and very effective,
case agai nst relia nce upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to
supply,
but
whic h
effectively and [or
can
almost
t hat
invariably
mnttcr
le ss
be
obta i ned, where required, more
e x pensive ly
without
them
(and
their
monopo1 i.es) •
In the case of security it i s states , with very few exceptions,
impo sed ,
or
acqulc s ced
and nuclear weapons .
frequently
from
time
being ,
movement
have
in, milit a ry solutions involving nuclear installations
The opposition to th e
local
a nd
neighbourhood
esca lating
grou ps,
nuclear
fix
has
come
some of them now feder a ted
:1cr,;11s nntions ( " o the dir c cLion :!.a not rcnlly interstate).
!we n rrnc:ccr-rn fu1
that
These
groups
have
in blo cki ng some nuclear ln s tal lat.tons and establishing, for the
some
a ga inst
nuclear-free
nu c le a r
neighbourhoods .
equipment
The
patchwo r k
grass-roo ts
is strongest in Europe, which is - as the
mov emen t realised , and what gave it impetus - a leading thea tr e, on US strategic
thinking,
for
a
limited
nuclear
war
not
touching
ext r eme ly doubtful th a t i~1crea i ng NATO and American
Europe
will
E11 ropc wil l
these
mnke
it
a
saf er
place :
American shores.
nuclear
r emoved
installations
in
on the contrary it seems probable that
bec nme much eafcr lf t he anti-nuclear movements
installations
It is
succeed
a nd Europe r e ndered nuclear-free.
g ro ss ly lmmoral condu c t will ther e by also be conside1.·ably reduced.
Ln
having
The chances of
mrnt of the spectre of Soviet dc)tnl.11t\don, mil..ib:Jt:t, ideological and
Exc:c•p l
in
the
case
of
Eu ope,
where th e inexcusable suppression of Eastern
Eu ru pe a ll too ev iden tly persis ts, this is a n obvious fabrication .
8Cr i ou s ly
And even ir Western Europe the spec tre is
failing
partly
g iant
fashioned
military-in dustrial allianc e.
inc r easJ. ngly
dominated
and
largely
domi na t ed
financially
ideo l ogically.
much
propped
exaggerat ed.
no t
nnd
c1d c quatcJJ
and
ec onomically
some
of
and,
in
some mea sure,
Indeed much of the "free"
world
countered
as
mil.itary
by
The
means .
i .,"
in
basic
any
mode of
mUitary .
But
mil itary, and associated poli tl c al, domtnatlon of We ste rn Europe by
the Sovi e ts is a
problem,
t here
are
several
ways
other
predomi na ntly American nuclear weapons to mi tigate it.
on] y local def e nc e arrangement s - whethe r top·-down
alternative
is
it domina ted economicall y , by the US A.
doml na ti on to whic h nuclea r weapons are con s ide r e d relevant
in sofa r
a
up by the NATO powers '
i s not ge ncraJ. ly considered so much of a problem (as it ts 79 ), and
ls
anyon'
Since the l ast World War, Western Europ e ha s be e n
polHlcally and ideologica lly , by the USA ,
c a1;e
Does
expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canad a
or Brasil say?
Th Rt
other?
social
methods
but
also
some
and
much
r eliance
on
These should include not
state-suppl ied
social
decentralis ation , regionalisa tion and devolution of
orga nlsat{ons,
than
me thods,
or
r estructurin g, such as
power
to
dispersed
local
mo r e cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and
East e rn Europe.
Part of the point of
whether
external
or
r es tructuring
internal,
so
is
especiall y
situa tions, is to
st a t e-contrived
79.
break
make
any
military
takeover,
much more difficult and pointless, and the
rest o r ation of loca l control easier . 80 Part of
int e rch1nge,
to
the
point
of
cooperation
and
at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary
down
conditions
of
hostility
and
distrust
and
to
s abotage
the
West-East confrontati ons, and thereby to remove
For many pe opl es of the world , and in it s impact on the natural world,
advanced corporate capitalism is an oppress ive and damaging doctrine. But,
in contrast wit h a ustere Marxism-·Len i.nism whic h would i mprove the lot of
some of Lhe oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural
world, corpora t e capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many
mo r e individual ri gh t s and libertie s. Ce rtainly Marxism-Len inism which
appears to degene rat e in practice to an authoritari an and totalitarian
position is a less welcome alternative . It is fortunate, then. that we need
be saddled wi t h neither: there are s u per ior options.
60
ot.hC'r
motl ves
fo r,
and
Western
popul ar
suppor t
Eu r ope ,
for
f or,
long
j.
much
Uitary
too
adventures
partial
to
and
military
advt'nturcs, sho uld now be hel ping i t se lf rath e r: than relying on a leaky Amer.lean
nucl e ar
umbrella
for its defe nce .
Moreover it ough t to be, at the ve ry least,
1ncomfortable about the risls of c a tastrophi ca lly damaging
t he
world
in
the
i nterests
of
its own security .
extensive
parts
of
Nor should other "nuclear
depende nt" states be prepared to ac qui esce in this not uncharacteristic European
impositlon.
There
wo rl<l, wha t
LS N war
is
no
risks,
enormous
for
virtue
Western
in sacrificing othe r parts of t he
Europe,
rn i. li t r1ry-base d dom ina tio n to other parts of the worl d.
which
has
long
exporte d
There ar e better. options
than clublou s and ris ky nuclea r shields for Europe.
-·-·- -----
--·- . ·--
80.
Thus , for exampl e, t o the exte nt that lo cal defence groups a re integrated
under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle th at
s urre nder of the central directing sect i on absolved the federated groups
fr om following suit or following further dir ec tions. That is, through
devolution of power, surrender becomes structurally impossible (though
individuals or baste groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section
wnuld ho ld only limited informa t ion about the federated
uni ts
it
in tegra t e d.
The locally organised groups themselves, which would mer ge
wilh local po pulati ons, would be train e d in tact ics of passiv e resist ance,
sabotage, (nonviolent) guerilla warfare, et c.
The net effect (as c.
Pigden, who made most of these points , argues) would be to make the cost of
militar y conq uest, occupations and exploit a tion prohibitively high.
One reason why t he Japanese Army High Conunand decided aga inst invasion of
Au s LraHa i n March 1942 was th e cha r acte r of Australi.ans and the fact th a t
th ey 'wo uld resist to the end' ( Threa t s to Australia's Secu rity, p . 62).
Ycl
th
1 9 112 (wa r
r edu ced ) Aust ralian populatton was substantI.nlly
untrained a nd unorganised for loc ally-based defenc e . With such a defence
r estruc t uring, Aus tralia wou· d not only much reduce its vulnerab ility to
military adventures, but remove standard reaso ns for succumbing to threat s
of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like.
81 .
In par ti cular , with sufficient cooperation
and
trust,
competitive
prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept
separa te, are removed. So too a main mode l
supporting deterrenc e policy
would be undercut.
And the arguments from national dangers would b e
further co rroded.
In the same direc t io n, i t is import a nt to extend cooperation between USA
and USSR down below t he l e vel of state trade deals, e.g. in grai n and gas,
to communicati on and coope r ation between people. For such commercial deal s
there is suff ici e n t tr us t, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why
should it not be so also a t more significa nt people-to-people levels? Many
f ur ther Ror ts of lnt c r rclo tionshfp ore fe slble, nnd jnexpenaive by
m:llltary st a ndards, e . g . sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges,
gi.( t
pro Jee ts .
If, for ins tnnce , 100 1 000 o r mo r e ord lnnry Americans wer e
l i ving, working or holiday i ng in USSR ( and vice versa), Americans would
feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclea r missiles into Russ ia (or vic e
versa ) . Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual
respect and trust; or the con tr ary , a l ot of resources have been expended
to enco urage pr ecisely th e opposite a tt itudes, e.g.
as part of the
strnteg y of the "cold war".
~
6J
What th e anti-nucle a r movement s must press
b,oa rl out1 i.nc;
fof
::tccordingly
i.ic>
perceptive
t r ansarmamen t,
to
i.e.
conversion
outer
edges
of
graduat e d
the
movements,
alternative social defence arrangements).
Bu t t h e ar gume n t a lso makes it clearer how f a r this should go,
t hrough
in
i n pa rt it i s what they hav e_ been pushing for, nuclear reduction
an d rlisarmamen t ( a nd, on the more
wa y
clear
namely
all
the
disarmament 82 to total nuclear disarmament,
unilateral
c e rt a inl y to lo cal disarmame nt across progr e ssively larger parts of the planet's
s ur t~cc ,
inc luding
especially
Europe.
For
once
the
state is demoted , its
i mpo r t ance a nd t he necessity of its maintena nce properly downgraded and reliance
on
dec i s i on- making
its
diminished
de ci s ion-making - once all that is
happe n ) ,
one
in
duly
favour
of
allowed
more localised cont r ol and
for
(it
does
not
need
to
major component in the nucle a r fix is removed, namely the problem
o f red 11ction or even loss of state sove reignty .
Ma'ntenance of that sovereign ty
has been ass i gned a mistake n importance, which in turn acco un ts for the mistaken
we ig ht ass i gned to the arguments from national dangers.
What is
important
and
wo rt h pres e r vi ng is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the
stn r- c .
The na ti o n- state and dangers to it, and accompanying
features
s uch
as
mis p.l aced natl.onal J.sm, are the weakest links i.n the nuclear fix situation .
On ce th e demise of the soverei.gn nation-state is allowed f or, the arguments
fr om
nat iona l
conce rni ng
part i cul a r.
dangers
.lndividual
also
and
grou p
rights
and
In
their
freedoms,
by
t he
that
nation- s tate .
matter
The
are
to
arguments
liberties
in
for
t hem,
as
sma ller
or
exclusivel y
nation-state is neith r sufficient for
are
disappearing,
nor
community arrangements can ensure them.
But
a r guments f r om lnd i vidual and group dangers remain , do they not?
ri sks
are
civil
necessarily
th em , since i n inc r eas ingly many states the s e liberties
nec e ss ary
pl ace
None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life.
None o f ti e rights and freedoms
g ua r a n te ed
disintegrate.
in div id11a ls 11nd groups r e maln:
To
be
sure,
th a t has always been so, 83 and ls not
---~------ ----82.
The In i ti a l but impor ta nt st e ps are at zero cost as regards deterrence.
Wer e det e r re nce re a lJ.y the pol icy there would be little case for more than
a f r a c t io n of pr ese11t nuclear arsennJ.s.
The ste ps to disarmament ;ire
well-known , e.g.
the scrapping of obs olete weapons, and an end t o
modernisati on, the removal of nuclea . weapons in crucial theatres such as
Euro pe, et c .
62
hci n1~ clwnged but only woH,f!ncd in thi. s age of
moslly
to
wont
be
sure
t hat
nucle
or
arc
othe r
outsiders.
People
t hclr li v es will contlnue to run their course,
i.denlly i n a flourishing fash ion , a nd wi ll not be
Russ nns
natlon- states.
t
controlle d
by
Amiirican s
or
Nucl e ar arrangeme nts which threaten t he ir lives
not a rational rout e to these ends .
In t he weigh-u p t hat should occur in char t.tri g a way
dilemmas
the
as
nuclear
out
of
such
deo ntic
fix and its subsid i ary dilemmas, there ar e then much
more i mport a n t elements than featut·es of the nat :ion-st:ate, namely E~-~ of
things
those
the st at e is s uppos ed to safeguard, such as individual and local we lfare
and a ut onomy;
wc,1pons.
but those th i ngs are bett e r ensured by
The
main reasons are fam il iar :
threaten Lhe lo ss of basic values,
such
the
removal
nuclear
of
in particular, nuclear circumstanc es
as
welfare
and
autonomy,
for
many
cr•ntures and reg ions, and the potential los s is in general much great er than in
a nuclear-frcP si tuation ( even should another
with
nuclear
weapons ).
ideological
party
the
o pportunity
armed
There are also well -kn own supplementa ry reasons;
example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local
of
remain
welfare
for
(because
costs of wea pons manu fa cture) and autonomy (bec ause of th e
accompanyin g sec urity measures).
Thus
the
appropriate ly
de vi ces
and
nuclea r
fix
limiting
weapo ns
is
resolv ed ,
theoretical ly
it
can
deploy,
and
how ),
and
rate,
by
by
allowing
for
the
But, although that is a reasonable
Way Out , at little c ost in the circums tances , it will be
s ince
any
sovereignty of the st ate (especially as to what nuclear
con sidera bl e reduc tion of st a t e sovereignty .
pra ctice ,
at
strongly
resisted
in
those who hold power hold it , in one way or another, unde r th e
au s pices of the state.
This is a main reason why people must organise
and
act
aga i nsl the state .
Again the resolution also lo ok s practicnl enough, since
sovereignt y
reduction
in
ne ed apply es s e nt ially only to the the production and deployment of
nuclear weapons .
83.
the
Ind eed
it
could
in
principle
be
obtained
by
negotiated
It will rema in so und er any satisfactor y political arrangement s.
Until
human s ocial arrangement s change substantial ly , there is no substitute for
on-golng vigi lance to ensure or maintain political liberty.
agreement ( at the top l e ve l s of s tat e) .
to
far
with
the
superstates , the li mitations of s tate- powe r will likely ha ve to proceed further:
for nuclear weapo nr y doc s no t stand in sp l endid isolation.
i.nto
both
milita ry
s yst ems - and
( c ivil)
Rather
it
is
industrial production of the states
So, uns u r pr i s ingly, practica l- look ing resolu t ions are being
concerned.
ti ed
solidly
resisted by super states.
Accordingly more popul a r (bottom up) act ion aga ins t nuclear-involved state s
and
espec i ally
against
the supe rstate s , af t e r all the stat e s causing the mo s t
serious dilemmas, wil l have to be t aken much furth e r.
variety
of
organ is ed
forms.
These in clud e a refusal to contribute to nuclear
war preparatio n , e ithe r d i rectly or
wld •l y,
from
such
s t e ps
ns
Once again it will take a
The
indir ect l y.
the
forms
of
action
range
block adin g o f shipme nts of ur a nium, and the
rc f1 1!:lal of suppJ 1, Qa a nd se rv i c es to sa i1or n o n nuc le ar ships and subma r i ne s,
t he
to
withho lding or r ed i rect i on of t axes des t i ned for nuclear security purposes.
They inc l ud e as we ll the whole
r a ng e
nuclea r
facilities
i nstal l a tions
and
of
nonviolent
(methods
protest
which
method s
against
do
exclude
not
i ncapaci t a t i on a nd decommissioning of equipment l and which do include new
model
.
8'~
resistance and de f e nce organisations).
It is important to realise that petitioning of
powe r
state
representat i ves
and
ho l d e rs, f or instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct
ap pea l, t s far f rom a complete strategy , a nd may be ine ffecti ve or ignored,
th e r esul t s disco u r aging.
and
This is one reason why popular action should be based
on a mor e com prehensive politi c al
strategy,
which
also
involves
withdrawing
s up po rt f r om prevailing state arrangements, and working out and partic ipati ng in
alter nati v e a r r a ng emen ts, especially
alternative
defence
forms.
85
Sufficient
d etn' l s as t o what to do ar e already known, enough to make an immediate start.
84.
For some imp r e ssion of the rang e of me thods, see aga i n Sharp.
85.
For muc h mor e on all these points, s e e e .g.
fu rt her Appe ndix 2.
Martin .
As to what to do, see
64
APPENDI X l. ON THE FATE
or
MANKIND AND THE EARTH,
according to Sch e ll, and to Anders.
A
ncrtes
of
nucl cn r
prophet s
lw a
pr odu c ed
a
EJ e r:les
of
ph ilosophj cal ly-·o riented works on nucl e ar war and the all e ged impl i.c c tions of
l1 uman ex t inct io n . 1 The series is important for its dee pe r penetration into the
nuclear d ilemma , down to metaphysical leve ls; i n this the series contrasts ith
the transie nt s u pe rficialities of much o f the political commentary.
The most
wi de l y c i rc ul ated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the
s l ightest of t he ''prophets", Schell' s The Fate of the Ear th.
This skillful
piec e o f medi a -philo so phy uncannily redeploys some of the appar e ntly deep
phenomcno]ogi cal themes of Anders . So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell
and And ers ca n often be considered together. To critic i se their a ssumptions is
not of co u r s e t o belittle their wo rk. In pa rticular , Schell's little book, for
a ll i.ts politic al shortcomings, is having a significant a nd much needed ef f ect
j n sh i ft i.ng att: lt udes towards nuclear arrangements.
It is especially valuable
f or
i ts vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack.
Unfor t 1111,i t ely it: a lso exhibits, both phi losopld.cally and fac tually, sever e
defects .
Somr of it 1s simp ly ga rbage:
to selec t one example ,
consider
the
claim
that
' witho u t . . . a world-wide program of action for preserving th e
[ human] spec i.es
nothing else t hat we undertake together can make
any pr a c t tea l or. moral sense
(p.1 73, rearranged ).
Th is s1ou l d cer t a inly be rejected phi losophica lly ; for ther e is no separate
moral issue of s uch overwhelming importance that a ll other lssues become mor ally
ne 11 t r al. Mo r a l issue s remain moral issues: they don 't cease to be so when
compar ed wi t h more important moral issues ( as Schell effective ly acknowledge s
el s ewhe r e, p . 130 ) . And the claim should a l so be junked on more f actual grounds.
Humans fo rm a highl y resilient sped.es, like r abbit s i n Australia a survivor
spec i es, unl i kely t o be exterminated unde r
presently
a rrang ed
nuclear
ho l oca usts .
l.
The di.st i ng ui shing term i s from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, wher e many of th e
l eadi ng prophets are assessed. One well-known pro ph et not so consider e d
there i s Jas pers , presumably because hJs ma in work (which might equally
we ll ha ve been translated as The Fa te of Mankind) comes out in entirely th e
wrong direction.
For it gives heavy philosophi c al attire
to
the
be tt e r -d e ad -than-red abomination,
A ma ln argument agai nst Jaspers so presented i s simple. Howeve r bad being
r d mig h t be come ( at present it is debatably worse than living under some
of Lh e tot a l i tarian regimes th e free We st props u p), it still gives human s
a fu rth e r chance for good lives , since r e gimes fall or can be topp led: bu t
t o t al a nnihil a tion removes that all-important oppor t unity .
But J as pe r s does not pr e sent his po s ition so simply . Rather his con t e nti on
i s t hat there a re circum st a nc e s whe re a nd princ ip les for which a person or
group of per sons ought .to s acri f ic e even their lives . Freedom is such:
a
l i f e worth living i s a fr e e life. But the latter pint can be granted
w!. 1:liout conceding tha t s a c rlf1cc is a possible means to it ,
While the
sai:rifice of one or a f e w l i ve s may be a possible ( if dub i ously effec tiv e)
w~y t o fr • . l ivc D for oth e r s , c er t a inl y the sacrifi c e of all l ives is not a
poss i ble rout e to fr e e llve s for a l l, s ince no human l i.ves r ·emain. To thi s
rx Le nt Sche ll l s ri g h t (on p . 131) i n a ccusing Jasper s of an ea ch to all
f al l Rcy.
J aspe r 1 s i dea that "the f r ee life that they try to save by all
po s s ibl e mea ns is mor e th a n me r e lif e or lives'' breaks down when applied to
al l participating pe ople. None c a n ga in free live s by extinction of all:
t hat is not a possibl e route to l ife e ve1.
was selected howev e .· b1?ca,.1se it 1eads i0to, lndeed presupposes,
two of the major defec tive assumptiono in the work ot Mchell and And ers:
Sl.
Nuclear w,n· will ellroinate life, humnn li.fe r1t least, on
arth (the
2x~_~nc:Uon assumption); and
S2.
111 the absence of humans, very many notions, not only
those of morality
a nd value, but t hose of time and space for example, make no sense ; or, to put
it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their
s nse on a n act ua l human context ( the ext ravagant a nthropocentric assumptlon).
It is appli cations of S2 which giv Anders' and Schell 's work 2 some of its
apparent phllosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement
through the paradoxica l propositions generated. B11t the frequ ent applications
of S2 depend esse ntially on Sl. For without total extinction there will he
humans abo ut, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense!
Th ·-- exDmp l e
Granled the factual assumpti on Sl is by no means ruled out as a real
po ssibilit y; granted the technological means are now available to make it true,
to render Homo sapiens extinct; 3 granted the prospect of nuclear war does
t hreaten leacfing centres of Western c .i vilizat ion witb obliteration. Even so Sl
appea r s unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information.
Even in Ca nada, which lies on the pol ar route of Soviet missiles, human li fe
should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian
medi cal studies) . Sche l l's argument to Sl is extremely flimsy. It depends, for
example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern
Hem i s ph ere , but for the most part it does that very North American thing , of
con tracting the world to North Arner.lea .
(All that matters, all worthwhile
civili zati on, i.s in USA, or at least, to be more char.itable, in North Ameri cA
and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be
eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon , for
example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significant l y
out of <late. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less
we ll f rom Nortl1 to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than
Schel l's,
by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern
Hemisp here , New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa a nd Latin America could
escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. 4
Roth Anders a nd Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" th e
mean s of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they
both foresee as at least a live possibilit y, would furnish a good medium for
unl e 3rning nuclear technolog y (something very like this emerges from van
Daniken's theor y of an earlier "high" technology). In v i rtue of S2, they would
however 0xc lud e such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly
2.
For a deta iled comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions
o( S2 , se Foley JS.
3.
Thus the Las t Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer
merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new
ur gt'ncy. It is this sort of argumen t: that connects environmental et hic s
and nucl ear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulld oz er
are out of the s ame technological Pandora's box .
Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only
Pando ra's box.
Biological and chemical mea ns are perhaps even more
effective, and ce rtain l y can be more selective in what gets extinguished.
4.
Howev er, new modellifig~ and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep
appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario,
generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange, th e
immuni.ty of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern
LSN war has been questioned . In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching
the evidence , has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous
diff e rences in temperature between south and north, shifting normal wind
pa tt e rns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7
1983, p .56). Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a
vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust
for life on earth, much as many stotesmen have an interest in minimizing
t'r""l .
66
th n t lhc notion no long er rnnde sense.
But what tlh•y s(H'm t.o want to s uggest
wi. Lh th e impo ssi bility-of-unle a rning mes sage is th "' inevitability of the
de velopment and event ual use of the technology - as if having learnt th e means
ull else was dete rmi ned , and manufac tur e and use ceased to be a matter of
c hoi ce. Certainly such vie ws have been flo ated 5• But: they are no t t e na bl e .
Ther e are man y examples of
technological advances that have not been t ak en
adva nt r1gc of, and there are even cases of tec hnological developme nts that have
be en mRnufact u rcd but not marke ted or used. The re is not something ve ry special
a bo ut n11 c l ear appa ratus that puts it beyond the scope of such· generalis;<1 tio ns .
Both Schell a nd Anders do claim tha t the re are very special things about
nu clear wea pon s , in particular that they do not allow "expe riments ". Even if
thi s were tru e - i. t is certainly not of smal ler weapons
i t would not tell
aga .inr,t the pr e v.lous argument: against the ine vitability of nuclear weapons. And
in fac t Anders and (e ven) Schell hedge thejr claims a bout testing , and
the
limits to nuclear sc..ient if i c work ,
to large-scale weapons and independent
experiments which do not interfere w.ith tl1 e observers and those outside the
" J.abnrn t.ories".
Again they have latched ont o major po i nts: in parti c ular, we
hnv e at present no way of testing the c umul a tive effe cts of large nuclea r
weapons in concer t, e . g .
for more holistic effe cts such as fireballs or
firestorms , e le ct romagnet ic puls e or ozone destruct ion. Sho r t of an LSN war,
and l ike ly eno ugh with it, these crucial effects must rema in largely untested
and lypothelical in chara ct er.
The penetrat.ion of human chauvini sm , a s in S2 , is not something peculiar to
Sch e ll, but is a product of Western ph ilosop hy, European philoso phy especially.
This cl,auvinism is unfortuna tely alive and sti ll well, Anders' ve rsi on of S2
being ju s t on e striking illustration ( c:f . AA p . 252ff . ) . It ha s a lso deeply
penetra ted Anglo- Amer i can phi.losophy, and has recently been extended
by
Wittgenslein ' s wo rk , where even the necessary t ruths of mathematics are taken to
be a pro duct of I um:rn co nv enti ons , and would va nish w.lth bumnnsl
Such ar e
all eged imp lications of ex tinction ;
but the fact is that the truths of
arithm PLlc a r e in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humano ids or of
gods or g iraffes .
In Sche ll, human c hauvinis m is dished up in a particularly
powerfu l and obnoxious Kant ian form.
Th oug ht s and proposit ion s, time and
tens e s, history and memories , values and morality, al l depend on the life- giving
pres e nce nf human being s - past or fu ture or me rely potential humans are not
e nough , persons t hat are not humans are cer t ai nly not enough. Thus, a ccording
to Sc hell (p.1 40 , e .g. ), ' ... t he thought "Humanity is now extinct" i s an
impo ssi ble one for a rati onal person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In
imagining a ny ot her event , we l ook ahead to a moment that is still within the
strea m of huma n t.ime,
The thought is howeve r perfectly possible for
huma ns; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later
ratl onal creature may well be able to hav e it tr uly. Schell erroneously denies
that: t here is no "later" ' . . . outside th e human tens es of past, pres en t, and
futur e
(p . 14 0) 6 •
Human ext inc t ion eliminates ' the creature that divide s
time into past, presen t and f uture ' : so anni h ilati on canno t 'come t o pass'
(p. lli3) .
But it: is simply false that the tenses are human;
the tens e s depend
on a local time ordering (per ce ptible to many creature s ot her than humans, but
no t depending at all on that perceptibilit y f or its via bil ity) relating other
time s to the present , to now (a l so a huma n-independent location, evident t o
other cr eatures, an d borne witness to by suc h sequences as the passing seasons).
And nnn ih llntion may als o too easily come to pa ss , for ma ny humans in the Nort h
at l e ast, as it came to pa ss in recent ge ologic al times that human s began to
exist upon earth. Bef ore t hat ther e was a time befor
there were any human
beings.
- •••-- - - H•--- -
--- - - - - -
S.
Not merely by technologica l determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth,
a form e r US general , a r gues by straight induction, that if the US mili ta ry
ha s a wea pon it will u se it.
6.
Th e ap palling theme that humans c reat e past, present and future
repeated e l s ewhere , e . g . p .1 73.
(etc.)
is
Anders ' arg um ent for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no .Longer
even what has been', is also explicitl y and narrowly verificat ioni.st: 'for
wrwl wo u ld t he d iffer e nce be betwe en what. ha s only been and what has never been,
if the r e J s no one t o r emember the things that have been' (AA p.245). Ther e
would st l ll remai n ma ny sorts of differenc e; for one, the history record ed i n
mm1y
other org anisms would be differe n t.
Temporal themes do not la c k
' legl lma y be ca use not regist e red [or
verified]
by
anyone';
truth,
signl Eica nc e , sti l l less meaning, are not matters of human verificat ion.
be
Here , a s e ls e where, the human cha uv i nism is mixed with other distortin g
metapl1ysi ca l assumptio ns of our Western he ritage , in particula r, verificati onism
and on t ol og ical assumptio ns (to the effect that there are severe difficult ies in
talki ng ab out what does not exist).
Thus, for example, Schell takes over
dub I.o ns metaphys ic s from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossibl e to
i magi ne our own death; and whenever we a ttempt to do so, we can perceive that
we are i n f a ct s till present as spectator s" (p.138). The second clause goes a
good dJ e l a ncc t owards refutjng the first. In fact there is no g r eet dlfficult y
in descri bing coun terfactua l s ituations which undermJne both Freud's claims.
The same go e s for Schell ' s extension s of human chauvinism into one of i t s main
tr a<l 1 ti o nal str ong holds, value theory:
the simple and basic fact [si c!]
th at befor e t here can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoici.ng
there must be li f e' , human life ( p. 171) .
These are no facts, but deeply
entrenche d
philo sophical
dogmas whi c h have been exposed and criticise d
elsewhere 7.
Natura l ly s ome t hi ng s will disappear with the extinctio n of humans:
trivial l y t here wi l l be no mor e humans (unless humans re-evolve or are
rec eated ) , and t hus no mor e human ins ti tutions, human activitie s, huma n
emo ti on s , and so forth. But it is a lready going too far to suggest, as Anders
does, that t he r e will a c cord i ngly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain,
no hope , no comf ort, no sa crifice, no imag e, no song ... '. For there are, and
may eontlnue to exist, othe r creatures th a n humans with emotion, struggles ,
songs ,
Nor will the endJng of all such human Vf?ntures, if it comes to
p3ss, show that nl l past huma n ve ntu res have be en 'all in vain', meaningle ss ,
and already so Lo say dead. The decay of t he s olar system, or the heat-deat h of
the uni.ve r s,~ cv~n, wi l l no t s how t hat worthwhil e human activitie s were not
worthwhi. le. 8
Sev er.a l of tbe other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive
from t he i r shared assumptio ns Sl and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical
no t io n (in Re vela tions ) of a Second Death , redeploye d by both.
'The death of
mankind ', und e r Sl, is reckon d a ' second death', because by S2 end Sl remaining
lJ fe i.s r e nder ed mean.lngle ss and already ' seems to be dead' (AA p .244, S p.166)
a nd Ls already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially , a
per son f a ··es ' a s econd death ', not merely one's own but in addition that greater
de ath of the spe c ies and all future generatio ns (S p.166, p . 115). However even
if nu c l e ar ext inction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicate d,
becau s e it de pe nds on the fallaciou s inference to the meaningle ssness of
prec edi ng lif e and on the
very
questiona ble
represent ation
of
this
mea ni ng l ess nes s as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die
just once , pe rh a ps all at about the same ti me . The idea of a Second Death lacks
even a s o li d met aphys i cal bas e .
From Sl , t og ether with the minor pr inciple that extinctio n being an
absolu t e does n ' t d i ff er in deg ree, come s the universa lity of peril them e that
' we are al l exposed to pe r il in t he same degree', which is according ly
'd isguised' a nd 'diff ic ul t to rec ogni s e', be cause there is no contrast (AE p.61+;
S p.15 0 ) . Thi s th eme fall s with Sl. In a ny event, not all peoples are equally
i mperilled by t he nuclea r situation , th e Indians of southern Patagonia being
7.
See , e .g ., ' ll uma n chauvi ni s m a nd env .l r onmental ethics', in Environm ental
Ph i l oso n~
(ed i ted D.
Mann.ison and other s )) Research School of Social
Sciences , Aue trallnn Na tio na l Univ er0 l t y 1 1980.
8.
Anders is here ( AA pp .244-5) r e l yi ng upon a ve rs i on of
the
argument
from
68
rnLher betlcr pJac d than the Germans of northern gu , e .
1 011
Nor are all pe opl e
C<JuaJJy locked
in to the situation or inca pacitated by it; as exp l.aine d,
th e
po s ition is different in different countries a nd placeR.
Nor,
---
1
i ke wise , are all people equally res ponsible, an obnoxious theme,
(in co ntrast to Anders) r-c pc a tedly infiltrates . This is the Po go
theme, ,iccord ing to which
-S3.- · Responsibi lit y for t he pre sent nuclear si.tuation (fiasco, really)
distributes onto e verybody, it be longs to very human in the world . 9
B11t there is 3lso , mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the
stronger one , namely that we have some responsi bil i ty (the Nazi situation is
compared). An es peci ally blatant example of the Pogo theme 10 runs as follows:
'
t he world's political leaders ... though they now menace the earth with
nucl cnr wcapo nG, do so only with our permis si on, and even at our bidding.
At
least, this is true for democracies ' (pp .229- 30) . The theme is elaborated
e l sewhere :
we are the authors of that extinc tion. (For the populati ons
of the super powe rs this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction
and support the governments that pose th e t hrea t of it, while for the peoples of
t he non-nuc lear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail
to try to do anythi ng about the danger)' (p . 152) .
But this is more of an
argt1ment indicting r epresentati ve government, by revealing its insensitiv ity and
unr es pon s iveness to many of the populace they alleged ly govern, not to mention
those affec t ed by its activJties who are not represented at all (namely
ioreigne t-s ). But Schell convenient ly neglects all such points:
we are
pote n tial mass ki llers. The moral cost of nuclear a r maments is that it makes of
all of us underwri. ters of t he slaughter of hundreds of m.lllions ' ( p .152).
And
again '[ as] perpe trators
we co nvey t he steady message
that life not
only is not sacred but is worthless; that
it had bee n judg ed acceptable
fo r ever yone to be killed' (p.153) . Little of this is true . Those who campaign
against nucl ear a rrangements , vote against nu c lear- committed parties so far as
is possible , a nd the like, are certainly not the authors of potential
des t r uction, and responsibi lity .for the nuclear situation does not simply
dist r ibute onto them. Nor does responsibil ity - or the unlikely opinions as to
worth Schell tl l eg itima ely attributes to everyone - fall on those who have don e
less .
Responslbil ity for de cisi ons taken in "liberal democracies " even by
representat i ves (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything
as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented , since among
wi ll c :1
Schell
--- ·------·---- - - -
9.
An inter•stJng converse of thls t heme is sometimes advanced , that no one is
responsi bl e , the whole thing is out of control. The technologit al vers i on
of this no-responsi bi l ity the me is dis cus sed s hort ly. More satisfactory is
the theme that nuclear arrangement s are ou t of political cont ro l , but fo r
re aso ns, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclea r things goi ng,
whic h enable respons ibility to be distributed . The vested interests , wh i ch
bear considerabl e responsibil ity, include the mi li tary weapons i ndustry,
a nd r e sea r ch and a cademic commurd.t.ies , Under pressure s for re-election
especiall y, politicians give in to these powerf ul groups, so losing contro l
o f pol itic a l. processes. The argument fai l s at it s final stag e. For many
politicians either belong to or represent vested interests . Thus polit ic al
processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run ou t of
political control .
10.
Another example of spreading the responsibil ity runs as follows:
'The
self-extinc tion of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sa ne
or sens ible; neverthel ess, it is an ac t that, without qu ite admitting it
to ourselves, we pla.n in certain circumstanc e s to commit' (p . 186). Ev en
for most of the plnnners, ex tinction is presumably not part of "the plan",
but an 1ninte nd ed consequenc ; and most of us have little or no role in
the pl a nning, enough of us even campaig n agai nst the planning .
Fur ther
't he world
chose the course of attemp ting to refashion the system of
sovereignty to acconm1oda te nuclear weapons ' ( p . 194):
the world'?
This
connec ts
of
course with the ideological argument from defence of
fuodamental s, e .g.
for libe rty, for the (USA ) nation, and against
soc inli.sm.
In the'
.nurse of
th:fA
argument yet Rn o thm: fallR 1011s
assumption is rolled out: ' The means to the end are not limited , for the
end itself ~ets the limits in each case' (p,189 ) .
mnny otller th1.ngs, a representative .LH only
represf.ltiJ:ai:ive of a p· rty which
offers a complex and often ill-characteris ed package of policies, and a voter
may vote for ze ro or more policies of this package.
Only in the (uncommon)
event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can respo n s i bility,
st .Ill of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to
e ve ry one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important refated
th eme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nucl ear situation
generates responsibilitie s for every social ly involved person (thi s theme is
discussed in Appendix 2).
When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying theme s,
part of what r es ults is decidedly along the right lines; namely
S4.
The controllers (not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us]
have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out
f step with the nuclear age , the one-earth system, etc.
(the whole ea r th
theme ). Thoug h Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the
state and the frequently immoral purpo es for which the state is us ed,
unfortunat el y he often loses sight of this i mportant theme (indicated pp.187-8).
Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large,
scatter ed and fragmentary.
As observed (in §8) , Schell arrives at the
conclusion t hat the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new
pol iLlcal institutions more 'consonant with t he global reality' are required as
a matter of urgency.
But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out
viable alternative s.
At mos t he makes some passing gestures, some pointing
towards the Wa y Up.
So l utions to the nuclear dilemma come, if not easily, in a similar
simpllstlc way, from the Top Down; tho se who can must appeal to the Top (cf.
p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and pmitat io ns
( such as SALT) and in worl d government ( as with the United Nations) . 1 Given the
r ec ord of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations a nd regulators, it
is by now a pathetic fai th. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of
the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to
explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to
military-indus trial organisation and ways of life .
But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation a nd ,
more generally, of t he roots of war can be found elsewhere. 12 The roots of the
nuclear fix are not confi ned to the ideologically-a ligned arrangements of
nation-slates , but penetrate also into key components of those states, their
mjlit.ary, their controlli.ng classes, and their supporting bureaucracies .
And
both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for th e
a rrangements, and in key components of the states , a con spicuous and crucial
feature
Ls
the drive for power and domination . 13 Thus the push for [nuclear]
supe r iority by the super-states, to be achie ved through military-orient ed
science and technology, which involves a nd enables domination, in seve r al
inter.related forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough
surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from
nature) to proceed wlth military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found t he
h.lgh-te)~nology research and devel opment means to ever more expendable power and
energy.
In changin g t he structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of
nucl e ar war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mai n power·-base,
the natlon-stat0.; it ls also Important to alter key component s of the state,
and, mor e swe epingly, to ·remove trouble-maki.ng patterns embedded in all these
social and political arrangements , namely pat tern s of domina tion, patterns
anife sted not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured
relations,
ma le- female
re l ations,
human-animal
relations,
human-nature
relations; to remove, in short , chauvinistic relations . However not everything
11.
Sec p.225ff.
12.
In Anders and el-borated in Foley, and more straightforward ly, in Martin.
The inco1iplete list of items given ab ove, to be investigated in a deep er
analysis of the ruclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p,164.
and especially p.227, bottom paragraph .
j
nee ds to be accompl ished at once;
and
the clus~~ - of damaging power and
do1nlnaL l on relatlons tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the
probl e ms can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key
components of sta tes.
[n ~1at analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats
th<• familiar false contrast of state cxpedie.ncy with morality, as a c ontra st
between "raison d'etat" and the Socratic-Ch ristian ethics.
The teaching that
'tl1e end justifies the means j_s the basi s on which governments , in all times,
ha ve li. ccnsed themselves to commit cr::imes of every sort' (p.134).
So 'stat es
may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival ' . Schel l
then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justificatio n by
destroying e very end; but again the argument is far from sound, a nd depends on
human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions .
Even if
all humans were extinguishe d (as under Sl) ends could remain, for instance for
nonhumans such as animal s and extraterres trials , actual or not. The e nds-mea ns
argument can however be repaired to remove such objections : instead i t is
13.
These motivating drives form pa rt of a larger int egrated
packag e,
compris ing maximisatio n drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth,
('TI C" rgy, sp ecr,
sat:f.sfnctto n, . • . • for the
newer
Enlightenme nt (but
Faustian ) vlr tues.
Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for
excessiv e neatness nod implic1ty manifested ) to reduce th package to one
main component, prefer e nce-satisfa c tion for 1nstance, or ut .i lity. And the
type of drive ls justified (especially for those who have it, but worry
abo11t i t) not 01ly as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational,
which agai.n it is not. Rationality , the deeply entrenched myth has it,
consists in maximisatio n, of the virtues .
Maxjmisatio n of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation
theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisatio n of power, as with the
Christian-I slamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence , the parallel
maximls ation
of knowledge
paradoxes of omniscience .
There are no
consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient.
The drive for
ma x i mum consistency , often taken to be the epit ome of rationality , also
l e nd s to inconsisten cy in the case of more important theor i es, s uch as
arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative
t heo rems).
IL, .
R & D, though directed by military requirement s and the arms race, also
drives the a rms race. Its role .is partly disguJsed by the myth of neu tral
science.
There have been a tt empts, not only by those committed to technologic al
dcterminlsm , to involve technology more dee ply as the main, or single,
source of t he nucle a r fix . It is technology, th e mega- machine, running out
of control , that has brought us to this pred cament, the nuclear abyss.
Sometimes t his serves to exonerate states and thei.r key components and
those
who
control
them, for they are simply caught up by this
out-of-cont rol machine; but sometimes the s tate itself is se en as a
machine also running out of control. But technologic al determinism , like
other varieties of stronger (nonana lytic) determinism , is false .
Nuclear
technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known po l itical
dispu te involv:i.ng distingu1.sh ed scientists ; it was deliberated , fund ed and
promoted , while other alternative s were not.
Damag ing technologie s of th e nuclear age were not inevitable,
but
dellbcra el y chosen by certain components of the large nation-sta tes. And
murh as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted
with.
The fashionable inevitability /determi.nis m themes admit not only of
refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often
recalcitran t
technologie s.
They also admit of being made t o look
r idic ulous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolut ion, then if
it fu nctions (as it p ·obably will , a matter also determined ), it will serve
as a human population control device, a matter also determined.
That is,
the Bomb has its fixed evolutionar y place in human population regulation.
7l
claimed tha t ext inction null i fies ends-me ans justlft&A~ion by frustrating the
r a J iqntion of ev ery re levant end - me a ning by ' r e levant', in this context,
t hose end,, the rea li sa tion of which th e stat e appeals t o in justification of its
n uc l ear pol i cies . 15
An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe
c no1 1gh 1 sses , would undoubt e dly frustrat e the realisation of relevant state
ends.
So eve n f rom an ex pediency perspective, superstate policies are open to
severe c r i t icism , for exampl e a s motivationa lly irrational.
As to th~~ pa r. t of the st a te and (state) sovereignty tn war,
Schell leave s
us i n no do ub t . A s ov e r e ign state is virtually defin ed as one that enjoys the
right and powe r to go to wa r ln defenc e or pursuit of its intet"ests (p,187).
Wa r ari s es fro m how thi ngs are; from the a rrangement of politic a l affairs via
jealous na t i o n stat es (p.188). Ind e ed th e r e is a two-way linkage betwe e n having
s~:".'_E:_r~}:_f;;22.._~ a n d _ca pad 1:.7 t o wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell
c o11Lends , nec e ss a r y f o r people to org a ni se fo r war. On the other side, withou t
war it is impossibl e t o preserve s overeignty. Neither of these c ontentions i s
t r Rnsparen t l y c lea r a s the y stand. The f l rst is damaged by civil war and the
like, t h e s eco nd by t he per sistence of sma ll nonmilitary states. Now that the
mac r o-state s ystem is e ntrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in
pci r ticu l ar ) t o a rgue from t he "'real:1.ti e s"' of international life, which include
sel f··i n terest , agg r ,~ss i on, f em.· , ha tred.
It is on this basis th a t peace
ar r angeme nts are r e adi ly d ismissed as un rea listic, utopian, even (amu s ingly) as
•xtrcmlsl (c f . p . 185).
Schell's f ur ther th eme that nuclear "wa r"' is not war threatens, however, to
undermine hi s ca s e a ga inst the s overeign state; for example, his ends-means
arg11m nt and t he a rgument based on its nucl e ar war-maki ng capacity. Fortunately
th e nol-wa r t heme needs much qualifi c ation, and starts out from an erroneous
c ha rac t e r i s ati on of wa r as 'a violent mea ns employed by a nation to achieve an
end'
( p .189 ):
but--this is neither ne c e s s a ry nor sufficient for war. What is
ri ght ( s o it i s a rgued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different. from
ea r lie r c onvent i onal wars.
Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end
whic h nuc l ear "' va r" does not have. But nuc l ear attacks can certainly have ends
( ev en if LSN war s cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games
a r e wo n).
It is a lso cla imed that war depends on weakness; on one side being
defeated on a de cision by arms. But in nuclear "war" thi.s doesn't happen, ' no
o ne's st r e ng t h fa ils until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what
t hese sorts o f considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear
wa r s a r e not wa r s, but that they are not wars of certain s o rts, e.g., not just
wa r s (be cause they fall on such criteria a s reasonable prospect of successand
improveme n t ), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conve n tional
war s have pe rs isted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that
nu r:10,1r we a po ns h av also ru i ned " c onventio nal"' wars, and his connected theme
t hat t he demise of war has left no me a ns to finally settle di.sputes between
na t lo ns, f or th e final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192- 193 ) . The theme
d epend s on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war
a nd t he mi s t ak e n proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of
a ppea l'' betwe e n nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests
tha t coul d s e rv e , and
there is also th e possibility of more cooperative
behaviour, e . g. joint refer e nda) . The theme also imports the social-Darwinia n
assum ption of Clausewicz (the "logic of wa r" theme criticised in §2) that war
has to pr oc eed to the t e c hnological li mit
as if war and violence were
thoroughly nat 1 r a l actlvitLes independ e nt of recognised social settings (for
winni ng, su r rende r, etc.) a nd rul e -less activities. On the contrary, wars are
pa r asitic on s oc i a l organisations such as sta t es and are governed by a range of
understandl ngs , conventions and rules .
The y are a social phenomenon, with a
rule structure, if no t a logic .
Huch ca pital has bee n ma de not me rely from "the logic of war" but from what
i s now cal l ed "'the logic of deterrenc e " a nd the "'logic of nuclear [strategic]
plann lng'". The me ssage that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive
n uc l cnr 11rr.1 ngemc nt a t he wo d<l l s now en ll ng 1. ed in a rc perfectly loglcnl, sotmd,
15.
Thi s re for mu lation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main
qual ificat ion can be inferred from Sche ll's context.
- j
72
rcnGonab.le, rational.
However thJs represents li l i:. le more than a cheap
semn nti.cal trJ.ck .
Logic in no way justifies the present arrangement s, or
nnythiu g 1·ke them , or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of deci.sion
(as presented , e .g., in Jeffrey) which ca n be appUed in strat eg ic. planning;
but it does not yield s pecific results without desirabilit y measures being
assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in,
extraloglca lly.
There are various ways these va lue assignments may
be
determined, to meet moral requirement s or not;
but in nuclear s tr ~tegic
planning they have invariably been set tled on the bas iG of expediency. l& In
fact,
'logic of' tends to be used very gener ously, as a word of general
commendatio n, to cover something like 'rational consideratio ns ente r ing into t he
policy or strategy of '. In these terms, S hell, who like o thers enjoys pl.e ying
with the term 'logic of', should write o f ' the il logi c of deterrence' , f or he
emµlic1size~~ (p.21.J) tlP disparity bct:wc11n the supposed rati.onali ty o f t:hret1t~nl.ng
11se of nuclear weapons and the irrational i ty ( even from a national i n te r e s i
viewpoint) of act ually using th m should the threat fail: 17 ~ the success of
deterrence doctrine depends on the c redibili ty of the threat
of
thi s
unjustifiab le and irrati onal use. I nd eed Schell wants to go sti l l further a nd
locate a contradict ion in deterrence (e. g . pp.201-2): but the argume nt depends
on an interesting conf uaion of cont:radictl on with cancell at ion , 18 along with the
Rss •mption that deterrence invo lves cancellatio n . Nucl ear deterrence ma y wel l
be irrational, i.t is immoral, but it is not inconsisten t .
16.
Selecting the 11sual came theory scttlng sees to th is almost automaticnl ly;
for it is then assumed that each player plays to ma ximiz e his or her own
ndvantagc. Thus too th e presumption Jn Walze r, p .277, that 'the logi c of
deterrence' is based on eye-for-eye and toot h- for-tooth as sumptions .
17.
Even the irrationali ty of the use hac been contested, e . g .
it
wishful]y
thought that America will rise l ike a phoe nix
radioactiv ~ ashes .
has be en
f rom th e
The r e is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of th e mis sing
mo..!_ivc for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a r etributiv e
one, but a n ideological one:
eliminate t he prospe ct of the f uture
dominance of the riva i deo l ogy .
18.
An anal ogous confusion of negation with cancel lation or obliteratio n
appears in recent US " st a r war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to
"'negate" incoming USSR missiles .
Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a diffe re nt dire ction;
although
involving negation t hey dep end upon perhaps questionabl e i nterconnexi ons of
intensional func t ors. One type of paradox (consider ed in §5) derives from
a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to
proc eed to LSN war, though credible th reats ( ap pear to) imply an intention
to proceed.
Another s tyle derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the
number of nuclear missiles when t he persis tent pract ice, which impl ies an
intention, is to increase th e number. This paradox is technically r emov ed
how satisfactor ily in another matter
by a dis ti nction between
longer- term ai.ms and :1.mmediate practic e , a time-ho noured method of removing
.PPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collt>,.•Uyr,, and Indiyi,hli1 1 Responsi bility
and on Regional ~~rategie ~
What one do e s depend s , naturally , on where one lives and what mea ns one
hns , AS we ll as on wha t one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be .
So too what s tr a t egy a stat e should adopt depends on where it is located and
what sort of power it is , on national as we ll as on moral co nsi de r ations . In
presen t circumsta nces states have an evident responsib il tty to work ouc th~lt•
pol te l. cs .
The r e nre however some pcrs uua iv • argum ents that this is where uLl
r espo ns i bi l i ty ends : t he se major re sponsibi lities accrue entirely to states,
a nd ther e is no individua l, or (smal le r scale) c oll ec tive, responsib ilit y to
work out a pol i cy or stance on such matters as nuclear ar rangement s and still
l ess to ac t, perh a ps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such
a no-respon sibi l ity or ~-out posit ion no doubt suits many people
many for
th emsel ve s, s ome (especial ly mor e a u thoritari an power-hol ders) on behalf of
othe s - it do e s involve i nadmissib ly opting out of moral responsib il itie s,
r e spon si bil it i e s ac quired by vir t ue of being a person wHhin the fr amework of
ce r tain soci al a r r angements .
Now the r e is no doubt that individua ls a nd groups can do t his, c an opt ou t.
They ca n neglect t he:tr moral re sponsibi liti e s; b ut they are not ju stified tn
doing so. Against th i s clai.m, whi ch is bas ed ultimatel y upo n each person's
being set i n a we b of respons i bj_lity-- induci.ng social r elat ions, whether they
like it or no t so long a s they choose to liv e with others, there are some neat
arguments which a ppear to pe r mi t , or even wa rrant, opting out. One influenti a l
argument take s t he following lin es:
1.
The (o r dina ry) ind i vidual, or group, ha s no poss ibil ity of making a
d i fference t o wha t happens. Theref ore
2.
Such ind ivid ua ls, or grou ps, have no obligatio n to try to make a
differenc e . Hence
3.
Suc h i ndivid uals, or groups, are not mor a lly responsib le , f or instance when
thint s go wr ong.
There are two mai n a ssumption s in this a rgument , both of which should be
resiste d: fir stly, in gett i ng from l to 2, a varia n t of the "ought implies can "
t heme 1 , and se condly, the ass1mptio n tha t individua ls can't make a differenc e .
While it is true tha t individua ls cannot accomplis h much on their own, together
th ey can. Wha t a n individua l can achieve depe nd s on what suff ic ien tly many
other i. nd lvidua ls do.
In highly competiti ve communi ties, full of hopeful
f r ee- riders, a pe rson may encounter a familiar impasse: that he or she acts in
ma nner
M (e.g.
morally, against nuclear arrangeme nt s , r a tio nally), at
con si de r a ble pe r s onal cost , with no gua ra ntee that othe rs wil l also ac t M-ly.
Suc h nn impasse no long e r faces so many in the West, at least as regards initi al
s t eps agai nst nuclear a rrangemen ts. The individua l can cooperate with others in
ways t hat do make a differenc e.
An i ndividual is not exonerate d from
r e s ponslb1.l ity by the argument .
While ind iv iduals can re s pond by joining organisat ions whose activitie s are
di rected a t mak i ng some differenc e , many individua ls a l so have the option of
more indi vldu All st i c action in such forms as boycotts , go slows, po l itical
di s obedi enc e.
An important form of individua l resistanc e, a lready adopted in
Canada and nor t h··we stern USA, is refusa l to pay income taxes directed towards
defenc e
or v·r ious pa r t s thereof ( e.g.
nuc lear weapons productio n and
de plo yment ), or a l ternat ively redirec t ion of such taxes , for instance to peace
fun ds,
Evi de n tl y, however) all these more indivi dualistic forms of political
act ivi ty wo r k mo re ef fe ct iv~ly if individua ls integrate their activitie s, since
th e i mpac t s aggregate ( a nd appear aft e r a certain stage to exponenti ate). As
we l l co l lective action he lps in distribut ing the impact of retributio n or
puni ti ve ac t io n by st a te aut horities.
1.
Any sat i s f a c t ory d _ontic th e ory which t akes mora l dilemmas with du e
se r io usn e ss is bound to r eject th i s theme. There are als o independe nt
g rounds for j e ttisoning this Kantian theme : see Routley a nd Plurowood.
- II
.,I<,'
Th 0 re are, furthermo re, arguments of some weight that individua ls are under
Ro1ne
sort of moral obligati on to t a ke political ac t ion to disaffili ate
tlwm,, l' lves f rom wlrnt contribut es to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of
ac t ion Lhjs is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance,
whether i l is a nuclea r power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilitie s,
etc., and o
such complicat ing issues as what kind of preventiv e action the
state iN l ikely to take in return. (Any state seriously practis ing deterrenc e
Js bound to take some action against effective protest, or ri sk losing
cred ibi l ity ; but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one
individua l need bear.)
One a rgumen t - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear
wea pon s to, fo
example, providing fac ili ties for them - proceeds from th e
wron g ness of nu c lear war to the pos'ition that it is not right to be making the
we~pons for such war.
The argument here appli.es connectin g principle s (like
those of §5), while appealing to such backgroun d informati on as that the
manuf act ure and de ployment of such weapons j_ncreases the risk of s uch war. But
j f it is not morally righ t to be making s uch weapons t hen those who live in a
state that is doing so ought to d isaffilia te themselve s from such defence
productio n, an1 disaffili ation includes not paying for such prodtictio n through
d e fence taxes .
The argument is not without substanti ve as sumption, but the
a s sumptions appear morally reasonabl e and defensi ble.
Another
effective
argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be :
Does one want to le, or effective ly to be seen as, the kind of person who goes
along with the nuclear destructi on of human populatio ns?
Or with making
c red i bl e a threat to do so, or th e like?
What follows applies primarily to
people wh o do not want to be, or be seen as, such people .
Arguments like hese not only put opt-outer s and do-nothin gers on the spot
insofar as they contribut e to national objective s; they also raise questions ,
perhaps eve n dil emmas, as to pol:L ti cal obligatio n fo r those who would take
act ion, ev en limited action such as redirectio n of taxes 3. For are there not
political obligatio ns to the state, such as paying due taxes and supportin g the
national defenc e effort?
It i.s usually assumed that there are. However, no
dile mma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligatio ns to be
re gulated in some fashion by moral obligatio ns ;
for in this case moral
obli ga t i ons ov_rride political obligatio ns. In fact political obligatio ns are
alread y significa ntly limited by moral constrain ts. The nuclear situation does
not so muc h bring out new limits on political obligatio n, as em phasize the
respects in which those obligatio ns are already limited, and introduce further
moral considera tions against sponsorsh ip of national defence arrangeme nts.
\n obligatio n to try 4 to dissociat e oneself from preparati on for nuclear
war or from nuclear-d eterrence , for instance by not spending part of one' s
working life contribut ing indirectl y to it, does not commit one to more t ha n
this:
to an obligatio n, for example, to work for an alternativ e nat ional
defenc e policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this wou ld be a good
thing to try to contribut e towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on
wher e one lives, the level of one ' s commitme nts, e.g . to nonviolen ce, and so
forth. For not only are different types of policy reorienta tion appropria te for
different nations and regions, but there are more superfici al and deeper
rcori ntations that can be worked out and promoted, e . g. schemes that leave
2.
An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthauss en of
s upport of his refusal to pay defense taxes.
3.
This dilemma and op ti on is now removed in practice for most wage earners by
Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes ap parently introduce d to give
t he state interest on gross earnings, bu t obviously very effective in
remov .i ng taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferr ing
ower from ind ividuals to the state.
4.
Given the power of institutio ns and the state one may be able to do little
more than .!:El_, without giving up one's work and thereby one's abili.ty to
contribut e to other deserving causes. For example, it may be v ir tua lly
mpossiblc for one to avoid contribut ing to a superannu ation fund which is
Seattle
in
"co nven ti on,'.11" warf a re a pparatus more
that ch:ing,.. tha t .
H
T
~~ s
intact,
and
deeper
(ecological )
sch emes
Th<:! US Bisho p , f or examplet pr esent R rather shallow set of goals for a
su pe rp owe r s uc h as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the
d e velo pmP n t a nd deployment of destabilizin g nuclear weapons systems and 1o1orking
for better co nt r 1 of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear
s i t ua t i on a ffords an import ant opportunity to press however for a much deeper
se t of cha nge s in the superstates .
For those whose very limited political
i nfluence is exe rted in cons i derably less powerful states, even the shallow
goa ]
ma y look quite different: there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps
t ho se of a nother power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to bett er
c ontr ol .
The vi ew from the very minor powers in the Antipodes i s furthermor e
diffe r e nt from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect ln
much of the Antipodes of avoid.i.ng the more immediate effects of an LSN war,
whi le t her e is Little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and o thers).
There
i s ac cordingly some obligation - an obligation little considered and not grasped
by the powe r holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve
th e r e in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilizatio n. Local
a nd re g ional self-intere st would also suggest substantial steps
towards
s e l f-p r e s e r va tion that (foolishly) have not been initiated.
Wha t i s broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once
th e gonls are gli.mpsed. Steps include wlthdrawal from the American alliance,
wh jch i s in an y case of questionabl e merit since its main advantages lie with
the US a nd J.t affords no guarantee of local defence; 5 c losur e of American bases
and wi t hd r awa l of Ame r ican a cess ri.ghts for. nuclear-car ryi ng equipment to
por ts , a ir bas e s and other facilities, espe cially so as to remove local nuclear
ta rget s; pursu i t of a mor e evenhanded policy of nonalignmen t (something quite
s mal l powe rs elsewher e have managed to achieve ).
That much is easy, in
pri nci pl e ; and justified. It is justified because local commitment to th e
Am e r ica n mi lit a ry operations in the r egion lacks a solid f oundation; it is
preml s s ed prim a rily on t e acceptance of deterrence, which, so it has been
a r r, ue <l ( in §5ff.), lacks justificatj_ · n. That Australian commitment to joint
Aus t r al ian-US f acilities and to US military operations in the region is
e x pl i citly bas e d on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent
s t a t eme nt s of gov e rnm e nt policy. The jolnt fAcilities are 'part of a system of
d e t erre nc e ' • 6
More dif f icult to e nsure, at least without much preparation , is that
economi c and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North.
Se condly, then, the building of increased socio-ec onomic independenc e in th e
Antipod e s is r e quired. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear- free zone
not wo rth targeting militarily: the regio n must also have a sustainabl e life of
1.ts own. For a small region, thcit lo oks a very costly exercise unless combined
with other desirable objectives; for example, in Preddey and others it is
estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build
up New Zealand' s economic independenc e. 7 For a larger region whi ch included
Aus t ra l ia, the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many
Northe rn military budgets, and l1ave the advantage that much of the expenditure
is genuinely productive. If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structu r al
readjustmen t were combined with t he .independen tly desirable aims of moving th e
5.
Se e the dJ s cussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.14O-1.
How slight
t he commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been
e mpha si ze d again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the
USA .
Of cour s e, the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparative ly minor
one , of he many mi.litary treaties that should be terminated:
from a
Eu rop ean nnd world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
ar r a ngeme n t s , and the r moval of American and Russian forces from Europe
( a nd el s ewhere ), are very much more important.
A ful l e r d i scussion of Austr.alia's defence phil osophy
will appe nr in a subsequent publication in this series .
and
alternative s,
76
whole reg i on towa rd s a multi- c u ltural conserver societ y and perha ps even
dh,r ,, r t i ng
"d e fence " spend i ng to conne cted self-managem ent and soci al dt'!f ence
gon l s, the costs would be very considerabl y lessened . They only appear so g r eat
in th e s e tting of a consumer-s atellite soci ety. In any case, wher e lif e and
c ul tu r e themselv e s are conce rned , the cos t s do not appear excessive.
I n sum, Southern countries s ho uld be s e vering their milita ry linkages with
Northern
nuclear
powers 8 ,
a nd
s hould be preparing now, socia lly and
e conom i cally, for the time af t er the LSN war, the g reat No rth ern war.
Howev er
ther e are serious blockages in the way of such th ngs in the Ant ipodes) and
inde e d impeding an y substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war.
Some
of the blockages derive agai n from the f act that present nuc l ear arrangement s
favour man y of the power holders and s u it strong cor porate interests which wield
poli t i c al powe r .
But the main blockages to mo r e popular action a r e sl og a nis ed
r.n the false dlchotomy: "either it won't hnppc.n or we ' re all dead a n}•wayj
so
why bot he r".
One reason for blocka ge is then the extinction assumption ( S l of
Appendi x 1), the unwarr · nted a doption of which is excessively nihil is tic .
A
mor e i mportan t reaso n is that most people, and most of the ir political
re pres entatives, do not bel ieve that majo r repercussio ns of LSN war are going t o
bcf;1l l
th e m.
These are e vents which , .l i. ke starvntion and tortur e , happen to
o th ~r ( r mot) pe o ple , not them.
It is no t tha t LSN war i s unthinkabl e :
rather i t is that i t seems
unb,~llev a hl e t ha t it should make any d ifference . Most people in t he Antipodes
~eal l y do not believe that thei r lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear.
war.
Wa king up and mo bi lis ing t hese peo ple is a major part of the problem in
6.
Se e th e letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Min1.ster , replying to a symposium on
conseque nces of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, l.9 83. The
point is also made by the Fore ig n Minister in his Evat t Memor ial Lecture ,
as
Hawke~ notes.
The point is softe ne d by r e pr ese nting the fac i li ties as
also having a role i n verificatio n, as well a s dete rr ence, 'that mak es arms
c o nt rol and reduction feasi ble': the known role of the facilities in war
fighting i s not alluded t o , and nor i s t he fact that any verificatio n role
can be alte rnat iv ely a ccomplished us i ng satellites. However the matter is
not in any do u bt:
'successive Australian governments . • . have taken the
vi e w that our primary conce rn should be to suppo rt the effectivene ss of th e
Uni ted States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for De fe nc e;
quoted in Threats to Aust ralia ' s Sc ur.lty, p.17).
Government representat ives (e. g . Hawke ) conc ed e that the joint facilities
put Austr a lia at nucl ea r risk.
' Howev e r it is t he judgement of t hi s
Government that the benef.its to Australia in terms of its immediate
int e rest and globa l st r a tegic consideratio n outweigh potential risks'. A
prope r de cision-t heoretic analysis would not sup port Hawke's claim:
since
Australia is known to be a nuclenr t arget because of American bas es (c f .
Ball, pp.130-8 ), the pot e n t ial risks given that an LSN war has
a
non-ne gligible probability far outweigh a ny i mme diate benefit s . Since
Australia has only a r egiona°i strategic role, the global st r ategic
consideratio ns are , as could be othe rwi s e i nferred, primarily those of the
ma in user of t he facilities , the USA. The Governme nt is prepare d to put
Australia , its peoples and e cosystems , a t what is decide dly serious risk
.for i.mmediate and Ame r ica n i.nt ere st s .
A
worthwhile
re presenta tive
government docs not hold its people s hostage for such re asons . Not only i s
tha t short-sighte d expediency decision maki ng: it seems virtually cer tain
t ha t the <letai l s of the decision mak ing, were they ever. revealed, would not
justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, bu t
wou l d turn on s uch things as present trade advanta ges and short-term
co mme r c ial considerati ons.
7.
As to the e c onomic and so cial problems Aus tralia would face in t he event of
a n LSN wa r, see Coombs fo r a preliminary as s es sment.
8.
Id e ally the removal of s igni f icant nuclear targets should t a ke pl c e nc ro as
the whole Sou thern Hemisphere , because this is the zone that is r e latively
insulated, a t mosph e rically, from the Northern Hemisphe r e.
77
achie ving requ isi te social and politi e Rl ~djustmen t.
-yen those who believe
tha t LSN war ls no t improbabl e (but may well not be totally destructi v e of life)
do little to reo r ganise their lives in a way that would reflect their
assessmen t: . 9
Richard Routle y*
9.
Aga in , for some of what to do, for some ways to reorg a nise, see e.g.
Mart in .
There is als o much in teJ.J.ec tual work to be undert ake n, for
example , searching out details of alternati ve arrangeme nts, and al so
dJ.scredit ing establis hment experts, especiall y economist s and poli.tical
scienti s ts , who intellect ually underwrit e present nucl e ar arrangeme nts .
*
The tex t has bee n much improved as a result of detailed commen t s by C.
Pigden , R.
Good in, N.
Gri ff in t B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through
cor r espondenc e with G.
Fo ley.
J.
Norma n has helped in its final
organisat ion.
The initia l outlines of the pa pe r were worked out in
Victoria , Canada; and an early version was read a t Simon Fraser Universit y
in 1982 .
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Citation
Richard Sylvan, “Box 59, Item 1894: Draft of On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out,” Antipodean Antinuclearism, accessed May 20, 2024, https://nuclearharm.org/items/show/98.